NUANCES OF THE AFGHAN CRISIS

The year of 2014 is going to be extremely important for the future of Afghanistan. Both political forces of the country and the interested foreign governments are bracing themselves for the withdrawal of multinational troops from Afghanistan. Hence, for the processes that may unfold in the region in a situation where the official Kabul will almost alone have to confront the radical movement of Taliban.

Islamist radicals, which include not only the Taliban but also such organizations as Hezb-e-Islami, Hizb ut-Tahrir and others, recently managed to expand their influence in various parts of Afghanistan. Taking advantage of the moment of transferring responsibility for security in Afghanistan from NATO forces to the national army and police, the Islamists are gaining ground, especially in the north, where the number of their fighters has reached 10,000 men. A civil war in Afghanistan is becoming increasingly fierce.

In such circumstances, the Alliance and the official Kabul have opened negotiations, which should result in the conclusion of the Convention on the Status of NATO forces in Afghanistan. Here we are talking about the mission of the Alliance in the country after the withdrawal of the international Coalition Forces - a mission which is expected to consist mainly in improving the skills of the Afghan armed forces. However, negotiations have thus far failed to bring about a concrete result: NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen has made it clear that no document will be signed between Kabul and the Alliance until the conclusion of a strategic security deal between Afghanistan and the United States.

Such a stance is understandable, given that it is the United States, as the NATO's leading force, should ensure the fulfillment of the Alliance's mission in Afghanistan after 2014. Therefore, Kabul and Washington have begun negotiations on the status of the US military in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of the main contingent of foreign combat forces. The United States insists on immediate signing of the security deal in order to ensure the continuity of counter-terrorism operations and the presence of a small U.S. military contingent in Afghanistan to train Afghan army units after 2014. The official Kabul is very interested in the signing of this document too, realizing its utter dependence on foreign military assistance, especially after the withdrawal of the main part of the multinational forces from the country.

However, even though preliminary arrangements on the continued presence of U.S. troops in Afghanistan had been reached, President Hamid Karzai refused to sign the deal at the end of 2013. While not rejecting in principle the prospect of signing a U.S.-Afghan deal, Karzai made a number of conditions, including termination of American military raids on civilian houses, reduction of air strikes, as well as Washington's assistance in the peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban. In defending his position, Hamid Karzai even ignored the opinion of the Afghan council of elders (Loya Jirga), which called on the President to sign a deal with the United States. Karzai reiterated that he would only sign it if the conditions, which he put forward, would be met before the presidential election in Afghanistan scheduled for 5 April 2014. "If this happens after the election, then the responsibility will be taken on by the next Afghan president. So there is no time frame, there is only limitation on actions," Karzai said.

Meanwhile, a number of Afghan politicians, which are opposition-minded towards Karzai, believe that he only pretends to be a "real nationalist," demonstrating that he is ostensibly not a puppet in the hands of foreign powers. In reality, the opposition circles argue, by refusing to sign the deal, Karzai intends to bargain certain privileges and security guarantees for himself and his associates. Such statements, of course, have their own logic. After all, the incumbent president is well aware that, after the completion of his term in office and the withdrawal of multinational military forces, it will be difficult to cope with the pressure not only from the Taliban which considers him a "traitor of the nation" but also from systemic opposition which accuses Karzai and his cronies of massive corruption. It may be that Karzai, despite his repeated promises to remain neutral in the presidential election, seeks to ensure Washington's support for a candidate preferred by Karzai himself.

However, all these subtleties of US-Afghan diplomacy do not give ground to doubt that the Bilateral Security Agreement will be signed after all. Strategically, it is not so important whether this happens before or after the presidential election in Afghanistan. No wonder that the United States does not show any concern about Karzai's stubbornness. As stated by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, if the deal is not signed by Karzai, then it will be signed by the next president of Afghanistan.

Meanwhile, the question of what expectations the United States has for Afghanistan, at least for the foreseeable future, is no less important. There are two views on the premise from which the U.S. administration proceeds in determining its future policy in Afghanistan. First, the United States would not mind to withdraw from the country completely, preferably leaving behind such a configuration of local authorities which would best suit its interests. Over a period of more than ten years of military presence in this remote Central Asian country, the United States has learned enough of the costly character of this activity. 

Moreover, it does not promise any clear geopolitical benefits, and first of all strengthening of the regional position of the United States. The latter is associated with the fact that, despite all attempts, Washington has been unable to establish itself in post-Soviet Central Asia. Kyrgyzstan's decision to suspend the operation of the U.S. military base on its territory is an illustrative example. Other countries in the region, notably Uzbekistan, have been convinced that the United States is not the best guarantor of the inviolability of the local ruling regimes and preservation of the secular state.

There is purely emotional aspect of the U.S. motivation too. It is appropriate to cite here an observation made by well-known columnist Kimberly Dvorak almost two years ago: "As Americans learned with prior counterinsurgencies in Vietnam and Iraq, the "hearts and minds" strategy is unwinnable when employed by a third party intervener (US and NATO). When the host populace distains its own government they turn their displeasure to the occupier and mar any chance at victory. Unfortunately for Americans, that is precisely what is unfolding in Afghanistan."

Another widespread view on U.S. policy in Afghanistan is that Americans do not really want to leave this country.

They continue their strategy of addressing the economic and geopolitical problems. In accordance with this strategy, they do not withdraw completely from countries exposed to American intervention. Thus, the "key points" of American influence will remain in Afghanistan in any case. To this end, the U.S. will continue to provide financial and organizational support to its proxies in Afghanistan, expanding its influence in post-Soviet Central Asia.

The last issue is bound to raise concern of Russia, which considers Central Asia as its traditional sphere of influence. At the same time, Russia's attitude to the Afghan crisis is ambivalent. While still opposing Washington's expansionist plans in Central Asia, Moscow is at the same time not interested in the complete withdrawal of U.S. troops from the region because the Taliban's activity in the Tajik direction will increase significantly in this case. Therefore, Russia is taking the initiative to establish close regional cooperation between NATO and the CSTO. "We are seriously concerned with the situation in Afghanistan. The flow of drugs is increasing... Without the build-up and consolidation of efforts, it will be impossible to solve another key security problem, i.e. terrorism which receives financial support from drug revenues," Russia's Permanent Representative to NATO Alexander Grushko said.

However, NATO is apparently not very eager to cooperate with the CSTO in Afghanistan. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov explained NATO's position by "exclusively ideological reasons" which prevent NATO "from cooperation with the CSTO on an equal footing."

Meanwhile, the activation of China is another factor that will have an increasingly greater impact on further development of the situation in Afghanistan. During his autumn tour of Central Asia, Chinese President Xi Jinping offered the region a Chinese model of the "Silk Road Economic Belt." Beijing is ready to allocate tens of billions of dollars for expanding the network of roads and railways in the region, and most importantly pipelines, which promises significant benefits to countries of Central Asia including Afghanistan. In return, the generous Chinese require only one thing - all new transport and energy routes should lead to the Celestial Kingdom.

Thus, the "adventure" of Afghanistan continues...