DON'T "LEAN ON" ANYONE

-In the next few days Azerbaijan will be marking the 90 anniversary of the birth of former Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev. Experts particularly stress the important service he has done in forming the balanced foreign policy that is being pursued in the country today. What is the reason for the success of this policy, in comparison to our neighbours who have chosen either a pro-western or a pro-Russian stance? As the author of numerous monographs and books on Azerbaijan, including the book "The Caspian Gates of Asia", what do you think about this?

- From a geographical point of view Azerbaijan is not only situated at the cross-roads of the main trade and economic routes from Europe to Asia Minor, but also at the focal point of the conflicting interests of major world powers with their own geopolitical ambitions. Although, from all points of view, it is advantageous to be a kind of "bridge" between the West and the East, being in the "position of an intermediary requires exceptional restraint and diplomatic agility. So the only alternative Azerbaijan has is to manoeuvre its way in all different directions between "the strong and the influential". The foundations lay down by Heydar Aliyev from the moment of the country's independence ensured financial independence from both Russia and America. This is why Baku can please itself while not spoiling its relationship with any of the influential players in the region.

As far as Azerbaijan's northern neighbour, Russia, is concerned, relations with her appear to be taking shape fairly equably, but at the same time there is no sense of trust or any similarity of approach in resolving important regional problems. These relations are simply determined by the various national interests.

Azerbaijan also enjoys equable relations with Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. But, whereas Astana is one of Azerbaijan's most reliable partners in the economy and particularly in power engineering, Azerbaijan's ties with Ashkhabad do not always run smoothly. Healthy pragmatism is not lacking in them, so there is a reasonable chance that the two Caspian countries will find a common language when it comes to laying a gas pipeline on the Caspian seabed. They surely won't damage their own national interests by behaving like rivals.

It is hardly likely that the state of Azerbaijan's relations with its immediate geographical neighbours in Transcaucasia will change in the very near future, in spite of the different courses being pursued by

Azerbaijan in its foreign policy. Baku has very close, partnership-type ties with Georgia, which probably won't essentially change for the worse even if there is a change of political power in Tbilisi. Azerbaijan's relations with Armenia will most likely stay much the same. They will continue to be in a state of confrontation, and ultimately a military conflict between Baku and Yerevan to resolve it cannot be ruled out.

Finally there are the two most interesting neighbours which are extremely important to Azerbaijan. The various ties with them are subject to ups and downs. This is a cause of serious concern that these ties (with Iran) might even deteriorate substantially and that its closest neighbour (Turkey), might be drawn into its own conflicts with other neighbours.

- Russia is inviting other former Soviet countries to join in its project for regional integration - the Eurasian Customs Union. Some countries have already joined this association, others are still thinking about it, and yet others are reluctant to join. Azerbaijan is one of the countries that have chosen to stay independent. What do you think about its stance?

- I have already mentioned that Azerbaijan is self-sufficient and economically independent from any kind of post-Soviet associations. You have to get a precise understanding of what the purpose of these "unifying efforts" and who potentially stands to gain from them before you take a look at the advantages and disadvantages Azerbaijan would get from co-operating with post-Soviet organisations. What alternatives would Azerbaijan have in conducting its own foreign policy, if co-operating closely with Russia in the international arena were not always to its advantage?

As an economically and politically well organised state, it is quite obvious that Azerbaijan is interested in pursuing a maximally well-balanced and varied policy, which does not mean "leaning on" anyone particularly strongly for support.

This explains why Baku is continuing to be a member of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States], which doesn't incidentally oblige it to do anything seriously affecting its own national interests. Azerbaijan regularly attends the CIS summits, mostly to take the opportunity to maintain contacts with the leaders of the former Soviet countries.

Baku is fundamentally opposed to joining the Customs Union, and even more so the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, in which Russia is maintaining close, allied ties with Armenia, Azerbaijan's main military opponent in Transcaucasia. As far as the Customs Union is concerned, Azerbaijan does not discern in it any economic advantages for itself (Baku maintains completely normal bilateral relations) with members like Kazakhstan, Belarus and Russia) and is clearly concerned that Russia might try to exert purely political pressure on it, so that Azerbaijan might find itself dependent on Moscow's policies.

Unlike Armenia and Georgia, which do not have any serious industrial potential or any significant fuel deposits, Azerbaijan can allow itself to pursue a foreign policy which is almost completely independent from Moscow's, because it has considerable oil and gas reserves to "fall back on".

Today these reserves allow Azerbaijan not only to deal with many vital internal issues (in the social sector, construction of a road transport infrastructure among them) but also to pursue an active foreign policy which does not depend on anyone else.

This explains the striving of the officials in Baku to take advantage of its status as an associate member of the UN Security Council to expand its relations with Turkey, boost Azerbaijan's role in the Middle East, which involves a wide variety of co-operation, military co-operation with Israel among other things.

It is also significant that Azerbaijan maintains equable and mutually beneficial ties with practically all the former Soviet countries (with the exception of Armenia) without close co-operation within the post-Soviet organisations and is intent on building up political contacts on a bilateral basis and defending its interests in the future as well.

In Baku they are undoubtedly well aware that the so called post-Soviet integration (in any form) has by no means been initiated by Kazakhstan, Belarus or anyone else on the territory of the former Soviet Union. This is a process has been kick-started exclusively by the present Russian leadership purely to suit its internal interests and by no means for foreign political reasons.

How can it be perceived - as a form of "bringing together the former Soviet territories afresh", of "restoration of the Union which has collapsed" or of creating "a future Eurasian community". It may sound fine, but not what it actually stands for. Azerbaijan will have to be very cautious and try not to rub the organisers of post-Soviet integration up the wrong way."

- I would like to know what you think about Azerbaijan's relations with its other neighbour, Iran. Relations between the two countries are not enjoying the best time in their history…

- In theory Azerbaijan's relations with Iran could be friendly and even fraternal, taking into account the fact that Northern Iran is inhabited by approximately 30m ethnic Azeris. Moreover, relations between Baku and Teheran have become extremely tense over the last few years and at the present stage they are no longer reminiscent of a mutually beneficial partnership and close co-operation between states.

First of all, it should be noted that both countries are pursuing totally different foreign policies at the present time and are advocating opposite courses in their future development. Whereas Azerbaijan is strengthening its ties with the USA, getting economic and military contacts going with Israel and making more active attempts to resolve the Nagornyy-Karabakh conflict, Iran's policies on these issues are exactly the opposite.

The officials in Teheran have long been at odds with the United States. They are striving to complete the final stage of their nuclear programme (which will further boost anti-Iranian sentiments in the US Administration) and are obviously provoking Israel with the possibility that they might get nuclear weapons. Iran's close economic co-operation with Yerevan is not helping the resolution of the Nagornyy-Karabakh problem.

Don't forget that owing to Iran's uncompromising stance, the waters of the Caspian Sea are divided up just as before. Iran is demanding that 20 per cent of the water surface and the mineral deposits under it are under Iran's jurisdiction.

This is why the talks on laying a gas pipeline on the Caspian seabed between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan have stalled; the officials in Teheran are categorically opposed to this project and are threatening to take appropriate measures if it is decided to construct a gas pipeline.

In the power engineering sector in general Iran is considerably interfering with Azerbaijan's attempts to develop normal co-operation with many other countries, since Iran has in fact been cut off for many years from European and what would be other important markets for it, owing to international sanctions. Owing to these sanctions, Azerbaijan is forced to consider transporting its hydrocarbons via the Black and Mediterranean Seas, because transit through Iran to Asia Minor, to the markets of India and Pakistan and also to the Persian Gulf states are close to it.

I don't think the forthcoming presidential elections in Iran will improve bilateral relations between Baku and Teheran in any way. This will depend more on relations between Iran and the USA and whether even the slightest positive progress is made. Then it cannot be ruled out that Iran will make certain changes to its policy regarding Azerbaijan.

- Recently, for the first time in the history of this independent republic, Azerbaijan's foreign minister [ Elmar Mammadyarev] visited Israel within the framework of a tour round the Middle East. The foreign minister did moreover announce Azerbaijan's intention to open an embassy in Israel. In what way is this visit significant, apart from the fact that most experts regard it as evidence of the sufficiently tense relations between Baku and Teheran?

- For Azerbaijan relations with Israel are a further continuation of Baku's overall many-sided policy, for co-operation between Jerusalem and Baku can surely bring considerable dividends. "Azerbaijan's diplomatic break-through" is much more important to Israel than forging ties with Israel is to Baku. The opening of an embassy is not the most important thing that can be "squeezed out of" bilateral relations. At any rate, for Baku it is not the Middle East and the countries of the Mediterranean that are the most important partners, but Turkey, the USA, Russia, Iran and the countries of the Caspian. But expanding its international ties, strengthening its position as an active player in the region, first and foremost in the power engineering sector, and in relation to Israel is at any rate a bigger "plus" than unnecessarily worrying about the hard-line anti-Israeli attitudes of the Moslem states. The main thing is that Baku should not make too much of a special effort with regard to Israel, because most of the Arab countries absolutely cannot stand Israel, and it is not in the least in Baku's interest to damage relations with them.