DISPLEASED KINGDOMS

Of late relations among the countries of the Persian Gulf have become drastically more complicated. The Arab states are furiously demanding from one another that they do not support local extremists. In particular, the United Arab Emirates [UAE], Saudi Arabia and Bahrain have formed a united diplomatic front against Qatar; these states have recalled their ambassadors from [Qatar's capital] Doha "as part of their measures to protect their stability and security". Saudi Arabia has decided to go furthest of all. Riyadh has presented an ultimatum, stating that it is prepared to set up a complete land, air and sea blockade of Qatar.

Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain think that Doha is not "meeting its commitments regarding non-interference" in the internal affairs of its neighbours. The fact is that a man who was sentenced to seven years in prison in the UAE for his links with an unnamed Islamist group, was set free in Qatar. It is thus thought that Doha has violated the security treaty signed by the CCASG (Co-operation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf) countries in 2013. According to the treaty, its signatories are to refuse to support persons or organisations threatening the security and stability of its neighbours.

Qatar's neighbours, moreover, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, were extremely displeased by the pronouncements of the radical Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi (an Egyptian with Qatari citizenship), who scathingly criticised the policy of the UAE and Saudi Arabia, and also defended the "Muslim Brotherhood" movement and HAMAS. Besides, Riyadh does not like the activity of the "Al-Jazeera" television channel, which sympathises with the "Muslim Brotherhood" too much and from time to time allows itself to make  uncomplimentary statements about the [Saudi] monarchy. Incidentally, it is precisely on "Al-Jazeera that Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi makes his appearances". Is it worth mentioning that at this given moment seven members of staff from the Qatar TV channel "Al-Jazeera's" Cairo office are under investigation, accused of helping the "Muslim Brotherhood".

In the opinion of former Qatari ambassador to the UN and the USA, Nasser bin Hamad al Khalifa, which he expressed in an interview on that same "Al-Jazeera", the main reason for relations between Saudi Arabia and Qatar becoming more complicated is Egypt, and precisely the "Muslim Brotherhood" movement which Doha supports.

In February the Egyptian foreign ministry handed a noted to Qatar's charge d'affaires in Cairo, demanding that Qatar cease its interference in the internal affairs of Egypt. The "Muslim Brotherhood" was again  banned in the Arab Republic of Egypt after the president, Mohamed Morsi, a prot?g? of the movement, was removed from power.

Following Egypt's example, Saudi Arabia recognised the "Muslim Brotherhood" as a terrorist organisation at the beginning of March [2013]. Besides this, the Saudi authorities also "blacklisted" the Yemeni Shiite detachments, a number of groupings operating in Syria like Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, for example, which are also helping the rebels fighting against the Bashar al-Assad regime. Saudi Arabia has appealed to all its citizens involved in military actions abroad to return home with two weeks. All those who disobey are threatened with a 20-year prison sentence. Also, anyone supporting all the radicals financially or ideologically in the Kingdom will be prosecuted.

In Egypt itself, which after the overthrow of the Hosni Mubarak regime has been in a state of extremely severe political and economic crisis for three years now, the Palestinian movement HAMAS has now been outlawed; in its time the "Muslim Brotherhood" helped in setting it up, secretly sponsored by Doha. Although, as observers suppose, HAMAS is unlikely to represent a risk to and openly fight against the current Egyptian authorities, the risk of losing the Sinai peninsula is too great, so the Palestinians have been caught in the net, so to speak. For Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, who is most likely to be the next president of Egypt, the instructive show-down with HAMAS might be of definite advantage. For example, the failures in the economy and the poorly controlled public safety may be partially blamed on the movement. At the same time,  Egypt is boosting its ties with the UAE, which al-Sisi recently visited for secret joint military exercises. But the main thing is that Egypt now greatly depends on financial aid from the Gulf countries.

Against this backdrop, in an interview with the France 24 TV channel, Iraq's prime minister, Nuri al-Maliki, accused both Qatar and Saudi Arabia of actually declaring war on his country, since they are rendering political, financial and intelligence aid to the Iraqi extremists. Al-Maliki also added that Sunni Saudi Arabia and Qatar are helping the Syrian fighters who are destabilising the situation inside Iraq. "These two states above all others bear responsibility for the inter-religious, terrorist and  security crises in Iraq," the Iraqi prime minister stated. The head of the Iraqi Cabinet of Ministers stressed that Baghdad has no intention of becoming involved in a full-blown confrontation with Saudi Arabia and Qatar, but he warned that support for the gang formations will backfire against their sponsors.

Saudi Arabia called al-Maliki's accusations "aggressive and irresponsible", adding that the Iraqi prime minister is thereby "trying to blame his own failings on others". Al Riyadh [newspaper] believes that al-Maliki's Shiite government is conducting a short-sighted policy that encroaches upon the rights of the Sunni minority.

At this moment, Iraq is a state with a shattered economy and huge security problems. The country is divided into religious and ethnic communities, which are loosely subordinated to the centre or not subordinated at all and are constantly subjected to terrorist attacks, the level of violence customarily registered. The main tension factor in the country is the enmity between the main Islamic communities of the Sunnis and the Shiites. The Sunnis, who occupied the main posts in the policy and economy in Saddam Hussein's time, were later pushed out by the Shiites, who traditionally enjoyed the support of the monarchs of the Persian Gulf.

Thus it is obvious that yet another decisive stage in clarifying relations is being observed among the Arab countries. It is noteworthy that the decision to pursue extreme diplomatic measures came about immediately after the tense talks held by the foreign ministers of the CCASG, whose members are Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and Oman, had ended in Riyadh.

The Co-operation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf [CCASG] came into being back in 1981 and was called upon to boost co-operation among the member-countries in the economy, culture, social problems and security. But for all that the union's main function remained a military one, in close collaboration with the USA. The setting up of joint security forces, the creation of a single currency called the khaleeji ("gulf") were even discussed by the union, so it was a kind of Arab-type European Union. But the internal contradictions constantly hindered these initiatives.

They could at least have got rid of the internal contradictions. For example, all the Arab monarchs were afraid of the growing influence of Saudi Arabia, which never disguised its claims to the leadership. Qatar, which was recently taken over by a young and ambitious emir increasingly desires to become more important and independent. Not everything is hunky-dory between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain; the latter is displeased by the arrival of Saudi servicemen on its territory. Now, obviously other sources of dispute are firstly Egypt (Saudi Arabia supports the Egyptian military, while Qatar supports the "Muslim Brotherhood") and Syria where yet again Qatar and Saudi Arabia are support different sides of the opposition confronting Bashar al-Assad's regime (Riyadh - the "Islamic Front", and Qatar - the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant" and Jabhat al-nusra). Besides this, not all the Arab monarchs have the same attitude towards Iraq and Iran. For example, the Qatari foreign minister visited Tehran quite recently. Doha thinks that the Islamic Republic of Iran needs to be encouraged to help in resolving the Syrian conflict, while Saudi Arabia is categorically opposed to that.

But nevertheless the Gulf countries have always united when they fear a common threat. During the CCASG's foundation, this was mainly the confrontation with the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. The Iran factor has remained unchanged, and in the place of Afghanistan as the main unifying force there is protection from radical groupings. You see, of late the terrorist groupings of various hues have been gaining in strength, both financially and ideologically, but the main thing is that they have convincingly proved their ability not just to collaborate, but even to merge completely with the internal opposition. And the monarchs cannot fail to be alarmed by this. 

So, a new law came into force in Saudi Arabia at the beginning of February, according to which the powers of the staff employed by the bodies of law and order and the security service have had their powers considerably extended in order to prevent terrorism: Internet monitoring, phone hacking and unsanctioned searches are permitted. Observers believe that now any actions in the country that can be construed as a violation of public order, can also come under the definition of terrorism, which naturally makes it possible to suppress any expressions of opposition to the policy of the authorities.

Naturally, on its own level Qatar also understands and shares the concerns of the Saudis; it has responded in an extremely restrained manner to the diplomatic manoeuvres, having stated its concern regarding the situation that has taken shape and having stressed its readiness to honour all the accords provided for within the framework of the CCASG.

It is however understandable that it is advantageous, on the one hand, to the external players in the region that the Gulf countries have a common enemy, but on the other hand that these countries can never come to an agreement with one another. This provides the opportunity for unlimited influence, which has been boosted by many-year-long whetted practice.