CONFRONTATION OR COOPERATION?

The recent foreign political steps taken by Russia in Ukraine will undoubtedly lead to a change in the geopolitical situation of all the post-Soviet space. How will Crimea's becoming part of Russia affect the region of the "Eastern partnership"?

What should we expect from Armenia's membership to the Customs Union?

What can be expected from the other players of the region - Iran and Turkey? Head of Research of the European Geopolitical Forum, Mr. George Niculescu, shared his views in an interview to R+. 

- Before Ukraine Russia has shown its intention to enhance its influence in the South Caucasus. What should we expect from Armenia's membership in the Custom Union?

- In strategic terms, this was a significant move. You know that there is a geopolitical and ideological competition between European and Eurasian integration going on in the Wider Black Sea (WBS) region, including the South Caucasus. We have seen what happened last November at the Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius with Ukraine. In September last year, we have also seen Armenia giving up their plans to sign an Association Agreement and a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) with the EU and deciding to join Russia's Eurasian Custom Union instead.  Armenians said this choice between Europe and Russia was imposed on them by Moscow.

This strategic competition raises a big question mark about the future stability of the South Caucasus. It is highly unlikely that Turkey will remain just an outside observer of this competition evolving on its doorsteps.

Turkey is obliged by its economic interests and circumstances to promote regional cooperation, because, on the one hand, it has a Customs Union with the EU, and, on the other hand, it is not involved, and might possibly not wish to become involved with the Eurasian Customs Union (ECU).

The membership of Armenia in the ECU has changed the regional game in the WBS, more specifically in the South Caucasus, in the sense that future Armenian involvement in regional cooperation initiatives generated by the EU and/or Turkey might be hampered by Armenia's obligations under the Eurasian Customs Union. This might exclude Armenia from a broader range of future regional cooperation initiatives and make it much less attractive for Western and Turkish investors, while deepening its economic isolation.

Let's have now a look at what is happening in Crimea, with Russian occupation of this internationally recognized region of Ukraine. This territorial move is unlikely to be welcomed in Ankara. Apparently, the regional landscape within the Black Sea is quickly shifting from a Russian-Turkish mutually agreed condominium, which was set up after the end of the Cold War, towards a possible confrontation between the two major regional powers in the Wider Black Sea region. I'm not saying that this would automatically mean that Russia and Turkey will enter into a direct conflict with each other, but that the current relationship between Russia and Turkey is very much under strain, and it's rather likely that those strains will be growing with the Russian strategic offensive in Ukraine, and further in the South Caucasus.

Therefore, it is high time for the West, Russia and Turkey to reconsider their strategies against the WBS region, including the South Caucasus, and work together towards increasing regional stability. Otherwise, the prospect of another strategic confrontation will likely shadow the regional landscape rather soon.  

- How could the Ukranian crisis reflect on the South Caucasus?

- As I said before, the Ukrainian crisis will have a negative impact on the South Caucasus. It may either freeze the current status quo, or it may push it into the swirl of instability around Ukraine. Two factors seem decisive for the future evolution of the South Caucasus: 1) Russian territorial advances in Ukraine if unmet with strong Western and Ukrainian opposition may rather tend to support the first option. Otherwise, Russia might see itself obliged by the logic of the conflict to expand it to the South Caucasus. 2) Turkish tacit acceptance of Russian incursions in Ukraine may also favor the status quo in the South Caucasus, while Ankara's entry into conflict, via NATO or directly, may dramatically raise the risk of instability in the South Caucasus.

- On the other hand, the US is going to engage Turkey more actively into NK [Nagornyy Karabakh; Azerbaijan's breakaway region] peace process, as the co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group, James Warlick's recent visit to Ankara has shown. The US officials rejected so far a direct link between the NK conflict and Turkish-Armenian rapprochement process. Does this visit mean that decision-makers in Washington change their mind?

- This might be a most welcomed change in US policy on Karabakh. I have always argued that Turkey should play a greater role in conflict management, not only in NK, but also in Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. So far, Turkey didn't get involved too much in South Caucasus conflict management for a number of reasons. The visit to Ankara of Mr. Warlick might signal Turkey's decision to get more involved in resolving the conflicts in the South Caucasus, and in particular the one in NK.

This evolution may help keeping the conflicting  parties at the negotiation table. That is not only because Turkey has a special relationship with Azerbaijan, but also because Armenia is very keen to cooperate economically and, more generally, to open its closed borders with Turkey. Therefore, Turkey has certain leverage on both main actors in this conflict which could enable Ankara to make a significant contribution to finding a peaceful resolution.

Regarding the second part of your question, in fact, the United States has never rejected a direct link between the NK conflict and Turkish-Armenian rapprochement. Remember, in 2009, one of the first initiatives of Mr. Obama related to NK and the South Caucasus was to intermediate a Turkish-Armenian rapprochement. True, that attempt was eventually blocked by the Turkish government upon Azerbaijani request. At that time, the US has recognized that there was a link between the two issues. However, this doesn't necessarily mean that the US shared the opinion of the Azerbaijani government that Turkish-Armenian rapprochement  should only take place after the NK conflict is solved.

On the contrary the American government might wish to promote a small steps approach to conflict resolution in NK. Small steps in Turkish-Armenian rapprochement might be matched with small steps taken by Armenia, first of all, to solving the NK conflict. This means that there is a connection between the two processes, but not that one should be absolutely conditional to the other.

- Azerbaijan has been trying to restore its territorial integrity by peaceful means, proposing to Armenia to gain from regional cooperation (including joint with Turkey energy and transport projects) after this country withdrew its troops from Azerbaijani territory. May we hope that one day this proposal will be accepted?

- This is an important question. My organization - The European Geopolitical Forum from Brussels - has been very much involved over the last two years in researching the ability of economic initiatives to support peace-building in NK.

In 2012, we published on the web-site of our organization (http://gpf-europe.com) a  study whose main conclusion was that while economic initiatives cannot on their own substitute the political settlement of the conflict, including its territorial dimensions, they could play a key role in confidence building between the conflicting parties.

In fact, one of the main conclusions of our research in 2012 was precisely that the stalemate of the current negotiation process on NK is very much related to the lack of confidence between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

A recent European Parliament resolution also suggested that "implementing confidence-building measures" to address inter alia "humanitarian and economic issues", and "developing regional cooperation" are the best ways forward for the European institutions to address the "frozen conflicts" in Eastern Partnership countries.

This is why economic initiatives, in the shape of infrastructure projects, in areas like transport and energy, or on the rehabilitation of NK and the seven occupied districts around it may provide a significant contribution to the peace process. This kind of balanced, constructive, and imaginative post-conflict scenario building exercise may shift both sides towards a more flexible approach to their security policies on the conflict in NK, hence it could make a difference in NK conflict resolution and peace building. However, this is not something which would happen overnight. This is a longer-term confidence building process which needs a gradual approach, and a lot of sensitivity to each conflicting party's red lines.

- May the Azerbaijan-Turkey-Georgia format become a serious rival for Armenia-Russia format in the region? And what about Iran, which also proposes to the NK conflict sides its mediation initiatives?

- Azerbaijan-Turkey-Georgia looks like a logical triangle for regional cooperation since the three countries share major energy security interests, while Iran has a hardly predictable position on regional cooperation schemes. On the one hand, Iran is an Islamic country and might seek to engage in regional cooperation with Turkey and Azerbaijan based on their common cultural identity. However, Iran is Shia Islam, while Turkey is Sunni Islam, and we have seen the two powers in opposite camps in the conflict in Syria. Consequently, I'm not sure that Iran would choose cooperation with Turkey over that with Russia, if it had to choose between the two.

Armenia, on the other side, has very good trading relations with Iran. Actually, Iran is one of the escape routes for Armenia from the trade embargo imposed by Turkey and Azerbaijan together. This might be another reason for Iran to choose cooperation with Russia and Armenia, rather than with Azerbaijan, Turkey and Georgia.

In conclusion, I would rather look at this regional cooperation schemes in the South Caucasus as an expression of shared interests, and I do believe that they should be as inclusive as possible rather than promote regional competition or conflict.