SPRING THAW

A significant event took place in the Turkish city of Diyarbakir with a predominantly Kurdish population on the day of the Novruz spring festival. A call for a truce from the leader of the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK), Abdullah Ocalan, was read out in front of a large enthusiastic crowd. Having served 14 years of his life sentence in a Turkish prison on the island of Imrali, Ocalan continues to be the leader of the separatists and remains highly influential among Kurdish militants. The essence of the call boils down to a radical change of the PKK's fighting methods to achieve their goals and a transition from active military operations to political struggle. Ocalan called on militants to leave Turkey and go to the north of Iraq.

This appeal is the result of recent talks between the Turkish government and the PKK. Following the talks a three-stage "road map" has been agreed. After the withdrawal of Kurdish rebels from the country negotiations will begin to end the fighting, lay down arms, eliminate the refugee camps in Iraq and ensure their return to Turkey. Kurdish rebels are giving up previous claims of state independence in exchange for a consideration of possible formulas of broad Kurdish minority rights, including autonomous administration.

Due to the willingness of both sides to make compromise for the first time in 30 years since the start of hostilities, the hope has emerged that it is possible to find a solution to the conflict which has claimed the lives of more than 40,000 people. So what are the chances that it will be possible to avoid further confrontation and put the stand-off on political rails?

It should be noted that Abdullah Ocalan began to formulate the idea of a "road map" back in 2009. But the Turkish government did not accept the initiative at the time. Only by the end of 2012 did Turkey consider it possible to enter into direct negotiations with a view to giving an impetus to resolving the long-standing conflict. This is explained by the fact that the government's initiative, described as a democratic process and initiated a few years ago to change the situation in the region, did not produce the expected result. On the contrary, it led to a further escalation of the confrontation.

The change in the PKK approach to its objectives is due mainly to the fact that its prolonged terrorist activity has not produced any effect. Its leader is serving a life sentence, while the selected method of struggle of terror is perceived very sharply and negatively in the international arena. The PKK is recognized as a terrorist organization in the USA and the EU, therefore the illegal fight can not bring a desired outcome.

The Turkish government, for its part, having begun a democratic process to resolve the Kurdish issue a few years ago, was ready to provide more rights to Kurds. The policy was based on the fact that as political, social and economic rights of Kurdish citizens expanded, they will show loyalty to the state and thus the PKK will lose support. In practice, everything was not as expected, the reforms did not produce results and the fighting intensified further. As a result, in order to resolve the situation the Turkish authorities reconsidered and accepted Ocalan's initiative. For the current Turkish leaders it is important that according to the program the PKK is giving up its claims of independence for the region populated by Turkish Kurds. In addition, the "road map" represents a gradual settlement whereby fighting is to be stopped at the initial stages. This change in approach can't but please the Turkish Government.

It may be noted that at this stage of the negotiations the Turkish government and the PKK have displayed the political will to find a common denominator in order to begin a process that can at least put an end to years of hostilities. Despite the importance of this factor, this decision may cause serious opposition, which could lead to the loss of votes of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) on the one hand and to the split of the PKK on the other. This is said to be linked to the recent bomb blasts in the capital of Turkey Ankara. Marginal representatives of the PKK disagreeing with the position of their leader have tried to disrupt the negotiating process. Such incidents are possible in the future too, as the developments under the "road map" are deepened. There is also a risk for the ruling party. Its main opponents from the Nationalist Movement Party will not fail to take advantage of the situation to accuse the AKP of dismembering the state and surrendering national interests to separatists. Such criticism can yield results, given the specificity of Turkish society. The "collaboration" of the AKP with the PKK could cost it very dearly.

It is clear that the PKK and its main wing which has supported Ocalan's appeal will wait for adequate follow-up from the Turkish government. The PKK agrees to give up territorial claims of the secessionists, but will certainly require the status of autonomy. The question is what it will represent and what status the Government of Turkey can provide it.

The example of a Kurdish autonomy already has a precedent in northern Iraq, where, in accordance with the constitution of this country, a regional autonomy of the Iraqi Kurdistan has been established in its territory. Today the authority has broad powers. It has all the attributes of an independent state: constitution, parliament, army, border posts on the outer boundary, the flag and the anthem. The autonomy has the right to secede from Iraq if the central government breaches its obligations. Despite such powers and capabilities, it will hardly ever wish to exercise this right, but will use it as a political lever to put pressure on the central government in the event of disagreements. The Kurds of Iraq are more than satisfied with the current situation. They have full control of the region and, most importantly, sign contracts with foreign companies to develop oil and gas fields in the area. The independence of Iraqi Kurdistan will not give the region anything except for the fact that it will automatically be surrounded by potentially hostile countries: Turkey, Iran, Syria and Iraq. It is curious that such a solution may become a rare consolidating factor for countries that have a significant Kurdish minority and wish to prevent separatist sentiments. Not having access to the open seas, the Iraqi Kurdistan is doomed to failure and simply can not survive under such circumstances.

If the Iraqi autonomy can be an ideal precedent for Turkish Kurds as a form of their internal self-determination, it can not be acceptable for the Turkish government. The Turkish side will never agree to provide to its citizens of Kurdish origin with constitutional rights adequate to those in Iraq. Provision of the right to independence is out of the question, while the political autonomy should not reach a level at which Turkey would become a confederate state. The most viable option for the Turkish government is to provide the Kurds a cultural autonomy as a maximum, without defining the territorial boundaries and strengthening the powers of local authorities on territories inhabited by the Kurds. If the PKK retains its intention regarding political struggle and if there are not too many opponents of such a decision in the party, its further program will be focused on a consistent strengthening of support among the Kurdish population and the achievement of broad rights of individual and collective nature. Meanwhile, a first step towards peace and harmony has been taken, which is a very significant event. The only question is whether there is enough will on both sides, so that it becomes sustainable. The clock is ticking.