TEST OF FRIENDSHIP

Azerbaijan and Afghanistan have stepped up their contacts of late. At the end of January Azerbaijan's Deputy Foreign Minister Araz Azimov visited Kabul where he met Deputy Prime Minister Karim Khalili, Foreign Minister Zalmai Rassoul, Mining Minister Wahidullah Shahrani and Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation Daud Ali Najafi.

The state of and prospects for relations between the two countries and bilateral and multilateral moves to establish peace, stability and development in Afghanistan were discussed at the meeting. And a few days later in Baku there was a meeting of high-ranking officials of the Istanbul process devoted to the ISAF operation and the withdrawal of NATO troops from Afghanistan. The use of Azerbaijan's transit potential by NATO was the main subject of the discussions which were closed to the press.

What is the reason for the active contacts between the two countries? One can understand the interest of Afghanistan and, in a broader sense, the international coalition in Azerbaijan. Baku has not only sent its own peacekeepers to Afghanistan but is also providing non-military aid by organizing training for Afghan civilian specialists, diplomats, and so on. NATO often makes note of Azerbaijan's great contribution to providing security and civilian construction in Afghanistan. However, Azerbaijan's transit potential plays just as important a role. In the past ten years Azerbaijan has become one of the most reliable transit countries for freight for the ISAF operation, proof of which is the fact that annually 35-40% of all NATO freight within the context of this operation passes through the republic's territory. Azerbaijan's transit potential will also be useful to NATO when the mission in Afghanistan is completed. One of NATO's main tasks today is to organize a withdrawal route for ISAF troops from Afghanistan before the end of 2014. The Afghanistan-Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan-Azerbaijan route is believed to be the most advantageous and potential route. William Lahue, the alliance's liaison officer for the Caucasus, admits that Azerbaijan is seen by the alliance as a potentially very important corridor for the future withdrawal of NATO troops from Afghanistan.

In this connection it may be no accident that from the second half of 2013 the international coalition plans to increase the volume of freight exported from Afghanistan via Azerbaijan. "The corridor via Azerbaijan is already being used, but commencing from the second half of 2013 the volume of exported freight will increase," Azimov noted. He said that Azerbaijan had provided this opportunity as part of its contribution to the peace process and the member-countries and partners of NATO are taking advantage of this transport potential.

One can therefore understand the interest of Afghanistan and the coalition in Azerbaijan. But what benefits can the republic expect from its active participation in the ISAF operation? First and foremost, this will undoubtedly enhance the young republic's international prestige as an active player in a solution to global security problems. But it is not just that.

The NATO countries are today discussing with the countries across whose territory the troops of the alliance are being withdrawn the possibility of selling at preferential prices its armaments used in Afghanistan or even handing them over to these countries. If one is to believe the western press, this question is already being discussed with Uzbekistan. British Defence Secretary Philip Hammond recently said that its army will sell to Uzbekistan part of its military equipment from Afghanistan in exchange for transit. "Uzbekistan will encounter serious problems in protecting its border with Afghanistan after 2014. It is a question not only of a struggle against the Islamic rebels but also against crime and drug trafficking," the head of the British Defence Ministry is quoted as saying in The Times.

The transfer of arms to the countries which will be chosen for the transportation of freight is seen as an added bonus to the payment for transit and other services. Along with military equipment there is expected to be a large volume of freight carrying non-military equipment which will travel though various routes, and this also entails considerable expenditure.

Clearly, Azerbaijan is also one of the countries across whose territory runs a potential NATO troop withdrawal route. When the troop withdrawal route is known the most important question left will be determining the reliability and security of the transit.

And this is where there are certain dangers. In this sense, Azerbaijan could be seen as one of the main targets for those who wish to prevent the transfer of NATO arms to the republic. For example, Armenia is worried about Azerbaijan building up its military potential and Yerevan will scarcely be happy if the republic obtains NATO arms as well.

In this situation it is not ruled out that Armenia will make attempts to discredit Azerbaijan as a stable country and a reliable transit route for NATO. In this sense the shooting and ceasefire violations that have become more frequent in Karabakh recently, as well as the attempt to open the airport on the occupied lands in violation of all international regulations, may be seen as a wish by Armenia and the forces behind it to exacerbate the situation in the conflict zone on Azerbaijani territory and thereby discredit this country in the eyes of its NATO partners. One can expect that as the deadline for the troop withdrawal from Afghanistan grows nearer the number of armed clashes on the troop contact line in Karabakh will increase.

Under such conditions Azerbaijan should take measures to prevent possible threats from Armenia. In this matter the republic is entitled to count on NATO's help, because these threats directly affect the interests of the members of the alliance as well. Representatives of Armenia's military command have been stating clearly and earnestly from time to time that in the event of a resumption of the war in Nagornyy Karabakh Armenian missiles could be launched at pipelines on Azerbaijani territory. In other words, Armenia is threatening the security of not only Azerbaijan, but also the Western countries that are using Azerbaijan's energy resources. The seriousness that Brussels attaches to threats to regional security may be gauged by the fact that the possibility of NATO's participation in safeguarding the energy infrastructure in the Caspian basin was a separate subject at an international conference held jointly with the alliance in Baku at the end of last year. The Azerbaijani side said at the conference that together with the many threats against Azerbaijan's energy infrastructure, the biggest threat comes from neighbouring Armenia, which has several times taken actions aimed at undermining this infrastructure, including the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum and Baku-Supsa pipelines. It was also noted that bearing in mind NATO's great experience in preventing such threats, Azerbaijan expects help from the alliance in safeguarding the security of its infrastructure.

Therefore, Azerbaijan, which has proved itself to be a reliable partner of the West in solving problems of military-political and energy security, has sufficient grounds to rely on reciprocal assistance from the alliance in eradicating the regional challenges emanating from problem neighbours, whether it be sabotaging freight transportation from Afghanistan or damaging the energy infrastructure. Whether NATO will want to take practical steps in this direction is another question. The experience of the war in August 2008 showed that the hopes of the countries of the region for practical help from the West are not always justified.