Europe-EurAsia

There have been definite moves of late towards a dialogue between Turkey and the European Union. Although a fundamental change in the position of Brussels and the leading European countries on the question of Turkey's entry into the EU is out of the question at the moment, it is obvious that the Old World is increasingly thinking about what the consequences for it might be if the prospects of joining the European Union were finally closed to Ankara.

One of five unblocked, or Ankara receives a clear signal

The question of possible progress in the talks on Turkey's membership of the EU began to be raised after France, acting in the role of a European power which holds a very sceptical view of such a prospect, took the liberty of dropping a few curtseys towards Ankara. Official Paris, in the form of Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius, spoke of a readiness to strengthen friendly relations with Turkey and to lift the veto on five blocked chapters in the negotiations process between Ankara and the EU regarding the question of "regional policy and coordination of structural components".

Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, for his part, noted: "We have received a clear signal that France will lift its veto. It may be said that an important obstacle will be overcome in relations between Turkey and the European Union." There is no question that Paris' gesture is a fairly encouraging event from the point of view of Turkish-French relations and the possible revitalization of talks between Ankara and Brussels. At the same time, it is difficult to say at the moment whether a softening of France's position in the question of Turkey's membership of the EU will lead to the early achievement of this strategic objective, to which Ankara has been aspiring so persistently for the last 50 years.

In any event, as, for example, the Turkish Milliyet newspaper believes, changes in France's policy vis-?-vis Turkey in no way mean that it will give its absolute support for Ankara's efforts on its way to full-fledged membership of the EU. Indeed, the government of French President Francis Hollande has given no particular signs in this connection. 

Nor should one lose sight of one serious irritant in French-Turkish relations - the possibility of a possible second reading in the French parliament of a draft bill on the criminalization of the denial of the so-called "genocide of the Armenians". Ankara is bound to be concerned about the fact that a member of the Union for a Popular Movement, Valerie Boyer, again tabled for consideration by the French parliament a draft bill (improved, she said) providing for punishment for denial of the notorious "genocide" of one year's imprisonment and/or a fine of 45,000 euros.

Despite the quite understandable scepticism of the Turkish media and various world experts on the question of the prospects of Turkey's accession to the European Union, one cannot but notice that a number of leading European states that traditionally show a cold attitude towards Turkey have indeed started to show signs of softening their position. Not just France, but also Germany, an indication of which was the rather kindly statements in relation to Turkey by German Chancellor Angela Merkel. During her visit to Turkey Frau Merkel expressed the intention to re-launch a dialogue between the EU and Ankara and even bring about a substantial thaw in French-Turkish relations.

The main reason for such, if one may put it that way, pro-Turkish moods is, of course, Turkey's increasing role as a great regional power. The Europeans simply cannot help but come to terms with this fact. But, in addition to that, recent strong statements by official Ankara, which has expressed its readiness to cross out with its own hand at any moment its 50-year path towards European integration, have been much in evidence.

"Not the end of the world", or Manoeuvring between West and East

"A geo-strategic bomb" was how the Turkish media described recent statements by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan about Turkey's readiness to bid farewell to the European Union and join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Having accused Brussels of being unwilling to openly state its position on Turkey's membership of the EU, Erdogan said that this was "not the end of the world" for his country and that it would "continue to develop steadily outside the European bloc".

The SCO, mentioned by Erdogan as a possible option for Turkey's extra-European development, showed great interest in the Turkish prime minister's statement. In point of fact, last summer this organization took specific steps towards a rapprochement with Turkey which was offered the status of a partner-state in a dialogue with the SCO. It has not been ruled out that very soon Turkey will be given observer status within the SCO and this will enable it to take part in summit meetings of the organization at the level of heads of state.

Ankara, by expressing such a possibility, is indirectly demonstrating its desire to play an important role not only in Near Eastern, but also Central Asian politics. After all, by becoming a member of the SCO, Turkey would get the chance to seriously influence, along with Russia and China, the processes in this region, a task that would be extremely attractive for Ankara, especially bearing in mind that the Turkic countries of Central Asia are also a part of this structure. As the Austrian Standard newspaper writes, "in the new triumvirate Ankara would acquire the status of a patron of the Turkish-speaking republics".

At first glance, Russia, which has traditionally been wary of Turkey's influence on historic Turkestan, should have been sceptical about the prospect of Turkey's joining the SCO. However, Moscow is aware that on a number of key questions of global policy it is fated to if not an alliance, then partnership with Ankara. Especially if you consider that both Russia and Turkey, as great EurAsian powers, are essentially being rejected by the West as possible full-fledged participants in integration processes in a Euro-Atlantic context. Therefore, Turkey's possible rejection of an EU-accession policy, which in fact does not rule out that country subsequently joining the SCO, could at the end of the day lead to a situation where Moscow and Ankara become the locomotives of EurAsian integration. And for Russia this is much more important than the possible cost of an assumed deepening of relations between Turkey and the Central Asian countries. Especially as in the strategic sense these relations will not run counter to the traditional interests of Russia which is striving, above all else, to prevent an increase in the West's military-political presence in the region. That is precisely why the Kremlin does not object to Turkey's joining the SCO in the foreseeable future. It is not by chance in this connection that Erdogan made a point of saying that he had discussed this question with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Having said that, it is also obvious that Ankara's "Shanghai" moves could have consequences for the situation in the Southern Caucasus, too. Historically, any rapprochement between Russia and Turkey and a strengthening of cooperation between them has a healthy influence on regional security and contributing towards a resolution of conflicts festering in the Caucasus.

So, even if Erdogan is hamming up a bit the possibility of a "Shanghai" option, the European leaders cannot but recognize the fact that by closing the EU-entry door to Turkey, they are simply forcing it to turn its sights to the East which, of course, only plays into the hands of those world players who have a vested interest in restraining the European Union and preventing its extending its influence to the EurAsian regions.

At the same time, the EU is aware that "Shanghai" has been presented by Erdogan as a possible alternative to European integration not only to indicate Ankara's interest in the SCO but also, of course, to force the EU to act and accelerate the process of accepting Turkey into its ranks. It is precisely in this context that one should consider the new statements by the Turkish leaders that the EU and the SCO are not alternatives for one another and membership of one of these structures does not rule out membership of the other.

Along with this signal, the EU has also been forced to take into account the factor of Turkey's rapidly growing economy, cooperation with which is extremely important for the interests of the EU, which is continuing to suffer from the on-going debt crisis of the countries that make up the EU. Taking this into account, the statement by the Turkish Minister for EU Affairs Egemen Bagis that in an economic context the European Union needs Turkey more than Turkey needs the EU is by no means an exaggeration. 

This whole situation points, on the one hand, to Turkey being torn between the various vectors of its strategic interests. But, on the other hand, it is precisely Ankara's increasing role in the geopolitics of the various regions that gives it the opportunity to discuss in practical terms a shift in direction. Because whatever the outcome it will allow Turkey to play the part of a key player, either within the EU or the SCO. So, generally speaking, Turkey's geopolitical manoeuvring between West and East and between the prospects of integration within Europe or EurAsia is destined to demonstrate Turkey's increasing significance in world affairs.