ALL QUIET ON THE WESTERN FRONT

The 49th Munich security conference - an annual forum since 1962 - has been and gone. The participants in the conference have always been heads of state, representatives of governments and parliaments, security experts, political analysts and journalists. Significantly, the Munich conference has become a global platform for debating a wide range of present-day security issues and their interpretation. Whereas at the initial stage of this forum it was problems concerning the Euro-Atlantic region that were examined, since 1999 the range of issues and countries joining in the debate has increased considerably. The conference has broadened the perspective of the questions under discussion, transferring them from a strictly military plane to a broader one, including various forms of security. Today, the Munich security conference is a forum of world importance where traditional and asymmetric forms of security are debated. Russia, the countries of Eastern Europe, China, India and Japan are now invited to the forum.

As expected, the main issues of the current security conference were the Iranian nuclear problem and the Syrian crisis. The topicality of both issues is driven, first and foremost, by the fact that they have turned into a kind of extended process where suitable reactions are made to events as they develop. In other words, the Munich conference has merely become another platform for more debate. That said, the discussion did not touch upon the likelihood of forming a new concept and strategy for resolving problems. For example, a settlement to the conflict in Syria is linked to the ultimate departure from power of Bashar Assad and his associates. Confirmation of this was the participation in the conference of Sheikh Mouaz al-Khatib, the leader of the Syrian armed opposition. At the same time, representatives of the incumbent Syrian leadership were not invited to the conference. And the debates on the Syrian problem were based more on the failure of the UN Security Council to play a more active part in resolving the conflict, and more precisely supporting the armed opposition in the question of the overthrow of the incumbent Syrian leadership, because of the position of Russia and China. For his part Foreign Minister Lavrov said that Russia will continue to stick to its positions on questions of resolving the crisis in Syria. To coin a phrase, the Munich conference offered nothing new or unexpected. Basically, no-one expected anything sensational on Syria at the forum. The speeches were more of a formal nature and were a kind of rhetorical review of the state of affairs at the present time and the positions of all the parties involved.

The discussions on Iran's nuclear programme were more lively. Unlike the Syrian question, an official representative from Iran also took part in the conference and the debate. Foreign Minister Ali Akhbar Salehi claimed that sanctions had been imposed despite the west lacking any proof of secret activities by Iran in the question of creating nuclear weapons.  Despite the fact that the sides did not change their positions, their very willingness to continue the dialogue on this question could be described as a plus. In short, Salehi spoke about the next round of talks with the "six" international mediators which is due to take place in Kazakhstan on 25 February. For his part, US Vice President Joseph Biden announced that the US was ready for a dialogue with Iran. Iran reciprocated: Salehi said that Iran was prepared to have talks, seeing the US' proposal as "a step forward" in the attempt to resolve the problem. Despite the statements by the two sides, one should not be too optimistic regarding a radical change in the West's strategy in the Iranian question, which is to prevent that country from trying to develop its own nuclear weapons. Biden made this clear when he said that, along with diplomatic steps, the US would continue its policy of sanctions against that country. Iran's reaction was what one has come to expect - Salehi again accused the US of duplicity in its approaches and unwillingness to have an equilateral dialogue.

Then, of course, there was the subject of Russia. Broadly speaking, the most dramatic event in the history of this conference in its new format is still the speech by President Vladimir Putin at the forum in 2007, which provoked controversy among western experts who were quick to speak about the possibility of a resumption of the cold war. However, despite the debate that ensued, this speech did not have any serious political consequences. In the wake of this, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's speech at the last conference, although it reminded one in its content of Putin's speech, was received by the audience as a purely declaratory speech, including components of claims based on Russia's perception of the current world system. His speech did not meet with the same response as Putin's did six years ago.

At the same time, the subject of Russia was one of the focal points of the forum. During the debate Russia referred quite frequently to the "shale revolution" in the USA. In the opinion of experts, in the next few years the US could overtake Russia in oil and gas production. It is expected that, with the increase in production of these resources, the US will start exporting them to world markets. The growth of volumes of energy resources in the markets could lead to a reduction in prices for them. Because Russia's basic revenue comes from the sale of oil and gas, in the medium term its revenue could be substantially reduced. So, one can expect a change in Russia's energy strategy and a reduction in its political consequences on the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in general.

Behind-the-scenes discussions between Biden and Lavrov also drew the attention of the participants in the Munich forum. An important subject of these discussions was future cooperation between the US and Russia on a number of questions in which the two countries hold different positions. The foundations for joint discussion of key problems in the international arena were laid four years ago also in Munich when US Vice President Joseph Biden used for the first time the term "reset" regarding relations between the US and Russia. At the time the new US administration began to be more closely concerned about Russia's interests, which was not the case when George Bush, junior, was in power. In short, both countries have been able to work together successfully on a number of questions, although there are differences on Afghanistan, on Syria, Iran, ABM and nuclear weapons reduction. The discussion of these questions has not led to any rapprochement in views between the two sides, and the sides have agreed to differ.

Another subject discussed at the Munich security conference was the situation around Mali. The main role in the question of resolving this problem is being played by France which in January this year intervened directly in the situation that had developed in that country by sending its troops there. French troop units were sent in to support the Mali government in its struggle against extremist groups who had seized northern Mali and had begun to attack government troops in the central part of the country. According to media reports, the joint operations of Mali government forces and French troops, which numbered 3,000, have been very successful. A number of towns have already been liberated by joint efforts.

Despite the topical nature of this theme, it has remained in the shadow of the Syrian and Iranian problems, and at the same time none of the participants in the conference from the outset expected any radical changes in views and positions on them. One of the reasons for this is that the situation in Mali is not a key one in shaping the structure and the interpretation of the present-day international system and is perceived as a political problem. Furthermore, the immediate players in the events - French Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian and Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius - did not attend the Munich forum.

Among other main topics of the latest Munich conference were ways to a settlement of the financial crisis in the Eurozone, a prediction of the development of American-Chinese relations and the post-revolutionary situation in the Arab world. In general, the discussions were not concentrated on issues concerning a change in world law and order and the transition to a multi-polar structure, and a possible direct confrontation in this aspect between the West and Russia. If there were differences in views on specific problems they were not a reason for direct confrontation.