PARACEL MOTIVES

The South China Sea has become a hotbed of tension in the international arena, caused by a flare-up in relations between China and Vietnam. But is a military clash between the two bulwarks of socialism on the Asian continent a possibility?

Relations between Beijing and Hanoi deteriorated at the beginning of May when the oil drilling platform Hai Yang Shi You 981 arrived in the region of the Paracel Islands escorted by Chinese warships. In retaliation at attempts to prevent the deployment of the rig the Chinese vessels, with air support, drove away Vietnamese patrol craft and fishing boats.

Both China and Vietnam believe they are the owners of the Paracels. The Vietnamese maintain that the area around the islands, which cover a 200-mile exclusive economic area, belongs to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) in accordance with the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. But Beijing insists that the Paracels lie in the territorial waters of the Chinese People's Republic.

Meanwhile, the quarrel over who owns this territory, like the Spratly Archipelago nearby, is assuming the nature of a multi-national conflict in the South China Sea. Apart from the main protagonists - China and Vietnam - Brunei, Malaysia and the Philippines also lay full or partial claim to the Paracels.

The matter is all about the area's rich and substantial hydrocarbon resources. Oil reserves here are estimated at about 125bn barrels, which are equal to half the oil fields of Saudi Arabia, the world's biggest. And gas resources are put tentatively at 16 trillion cu m. So it is not surprising that Beijing's tough decision caused an outburst of anti-Chinese emotion in Vietnam. There were clashes and protesters in various parts of Vietnam destroyed the industrial buildings and warehouses of over 100 enterprises. And in the heat of the moment not only Chinese, but Singaporean and South Korean plants came under fire, too. Over a dozen Vietnamese and Chinese citizens were killed in the disturbances and nearly 100 Chinese were injured, according to the Chinese Foreign Ministry. Beijing was forced to send five ships to Vietnam to evacuate its people.

Hanoi did promise that those who caused the disturbances would be punished and confirmed that the Vietnamese police had arrested more than 800 people. And there is every reason to believe that by so doing Vietnam is making clear that it has no interest in seeing an escalation of tension. The main reason behind this is that China is Vietnam's biggest trading partner (annual trade turnover is 50bn dollars). Vietnam, which lags some way behind industrially, depends a great deal on cheap produce from China.

But there is another historical and psychological undercurrent to Vietnam's relations with China. Vietnam was under Chinese rule for almost a thousand years, from about the middle of the 10th century, and even after the triumph of communism in both countries Hanoi was unable to achieve full equality in relations with Beijing. The relative normalization of diplomatic relations between China and Vietnam in 1991 failed to prevent minor skirmishes in the dispute for the territories in the South China Sea. But at the same time the Vietnamese have always been obsessed with a fateful sense that China is stronger than them and cannot be beaten.

The likelihood of a full-scale military conflict in the South China Sea is remote. However, in the ongoing Chinese-Vietnamese stand-off one possibility is discernable: if Beijing steps up its actions Vietnam will be forced to turn to third countries for support. These could only be the USA and Japan - China's main rivals in the Asia-Pacific region. The USA expressed its readiness to support the countries of the region back in January of this year when Beijing tightened its control over the South China Sea. The new navigation regulations imposed by the Chinese have restricted the rights of fishing boats of other states in the region. Henceforth, in order to fish they must request official permission from the authorities of the South Chinese island province of Hainan. Washington has criticized Beijing's decision as "a provocative and potentially dangerous act", because "there are no grounds whatsoever for China's far-reaching maritime claims".

Given the escalating conflict around Paracel Islands, the United States, to all appearances, does not mind giving if not direct, then indirect support to Vietnam. Especially as Washington already has a basis on which to develop its partnership with Hanoi. Although there is still memory of the Vietnam war running between them, the USA and Vietnam have in recent years been expanding their military cooperation. Incidentally, despite China's protests, US warships have since 2013 anchored at Vietnamese ports - in Da Nang and Cam Ranh. The USA and Vietnam have even held a number of joint military exercises.

If we give this issue a broader glance, it is obvious that the USA is set to support any anti-Chinese sentiments in northeast and southeast Asia. Its motivation is clear - it is to the advantage of the Americans that the ever-strengthening China is stuck as deeply as possible in sorting out its territorial disputes with its neighbours, for example, with the same Japan, which is the USA's priority ally in the region.

Tokyo's demarche against the background of the Chinese-Vietnamese confrontation is noteworthy. Japan has said it is ready to set up new military posts on three islands not far from the Senkaku archipelago, which Beijing regards as its territory and calls its Diaoyu Islands.

And here we come to perhaps the most fundamental aspect of the unfolding geopolitical story surrounding Paracel Islands. The aspect is Beijing's determination to intensify considerably its activity in this exceptionally important region, which many observers view as nothing but expansion. China is sending a clear signal that it will implement in practice its sovereignty over all of the islands and the waters of the South China Sea.

This tough approach is linked, first of all, with the fact that China's growing ambitions as a potential superpower do not fit into the regional realities that took shape during the Cold War. China as one of the leading global economies, as well as power No 1 in the foreseeable future, is dissatisfied with its secondary role in the Asia Pacific Region - hence its ambition to of the territorial expansion as a confirmation of its bid to regional leadership.

Apart from this, by establishing its control over the South China Sea China is strengthening its energy independence. The calculation is that by strengthening its pressure on the neighbouring countries, including Vietnam, and concentrating promising oil and gas deposits into its hands China will restrict the regional influence of its strategic allies such as USA, and primarily, Japan who are heavily dependent on petroleum supplies.

At the same time, obvious risks for China persist. The infringement on the interests of the neighbours is certain to push the latter to form an alliance with Washington which, for its part, will try to use the regional feuds in its strategic interests. The confrontation between Vietnam and China is profitable for the USA also because it will scatter the forces of both sides who operate under the banner of Socialism and essentially view the USA as a strategic opponent. In addition, Washington aims to significantly increase its military and political role in Asia Pacific and the fact that it created the Asian sector of the American anti-missile defence from Japan to Australia is a confirmation of the fact.

Therefore, apparently the geopolitical struggle in this fast developing region of the world will become increasingly tough.