“PROBLEMS NEED TO BE SOLVED”

The latest initiatives of Russia for political and economic integration in the post-Soviet space could not fail to attract the attention of analysts. While in the political and economic terms the idea is to create a Eurasian union, with the reform of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) Russia seeks to bring together the former USSR countries in the military sense. However, will Moscow have the capability for new integration projects with long-term prospects? To find an answer to this and other questions we interviewed the director of the Russian centre for public and political research, Vladimir Yevseyev. 

- Russian politicians note that years 2013-2014 will become the finish line in the process of Eurasian integration. That is, intensive preparation is beginning, which includes forming the regulative and legal basis, for signing on 1 January 2015 the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union. Which countries will eventually become members of this project? 

- The basis for the Eurasian union is the Eurasian Economic Community comprised of five states: Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The idea of a common economic space proved impossible because this project envisaged the participation of Ukraine, but Kiev rejected integration processes and in essence it all boiled down to three countries: Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus. Not only Vladimir Putin, but also Nursultan Nazarbayev are the leaders of "Eurasianism". It is completely obvious now that Moscow, Minsk and Astana will participate in the Eurasian Union. But the calculation is that all countries that are members of the Eurasian Economic Community will participate, that is Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan will join as well. The Eurasian union is the same as the Eurasian Economic Community but with closer cooperation and openness of the countries. Other, unexpected members may join. Three countries - Armenia, Ukraine and Moldova - are observers in the Eurasian Economic Community. It is possible that a country outside the former USSR will be a member of the Eurasian union. The success of the union depends on the effectiveness of the Customs Union, which yields positive results. In particular, the trade turnover between Kazakhstan and Belarus surprisingly increased. This is surprising because their mutual economic links were weak. It seems that the Customs Union has proved its worth. There is also the matter of joining the World Trade Organization. Due to political reasons Belarus will not be able to join the WTO, but Kazakhstan may.

Speaking about the prospects of the Eurasian Union we would very much like to see Azerbaijan in it. But so far the situation for this is unfavourable. Russia and Azerbaijan still have some issues to settle, including the lease of the Qabala radar station. I hope that these issues will be resolved.

Many unresolved issues have accumulated between Moscow and Baku, including Russian military aid to Armenia and others. In the long-term it would be a wise step for Azerbaijan to join the Eurasian project, since Azerbaijan is more Eurasian than Armenia. But it remains a fact that two hostile states cannot be in the Eurasian Union. 

The start of the full-fledged realization of the project is envisaged for 2015. But I do not believe that the Karabakh conflict can be settled by then. As long as the Karabakh conflict remains unresolved simultaneous membership of Baku and Yerevan in the union is not realistic.

There used to be a lot of hope for the integration of Turkmenistan, including within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. But the leadership of this country displayed no interests in integration process. Furthermore, such faraway players as Mongolia may participate in the Eurasian Union. 

- But Armenia cooperates within the framework of various programmes with NATO. The leaders of this country during visits to the West talk of the "European prospects of the Armenian state". Given this, how suitable is Yerevan as a partner for the Eurasian union?

- Indeed, cooperation with NATO is increasing. But with the Nagornyy Karabakh issue unresolved Russia is much more important for Armenia than NATO. This also has to do with the presence of Russian military bases in Gyumri, with the joint air defence, with Russia's commitments to protect Armenia. In addition, Russia plays an important economic role as there is Russian property in Armenia. 

- Can Armenia participate in the Eurasian Union before settlement of the Karabakh conflict? 

- It is clear now that the Karabakh issue will not be solved in the next two or three years. Armenia has chances to become an observer with the Eurasian Union. But in this case Azerbaijan will not participate. Therefore, it all depends on settlement of the conflict. I believe it makes sense for Azerbaijan to take part in these integration processes. For example, this can open the road to implementing projects, such as laying a gas pipeline under the Caspian Sea, having optimal conditions for the transport of energy carriers through Azerbaijan and so on. There are two problems on the path of Azerbaijan joining the Eurasian Union: Armenia's participation and the resistance of the West. It is obvious that the West is not interested in integration processes in the post-Soviet countries. The West counters such processes with "mythic" projects of gas pipeline networks, such as Nabucco, that lack real content. Even in the long-term membership in the Eurasian Union is very beneficial for Azerbaijan. In the long term, when Azerbaijan will largely be a transit country and not a producer of energy carriers, Baku's participation in the project will allow Baku to derive large dividends. It is quite possible that the situation may change by that time and Azerbaijan will be able to take more active part in processes that Russia initiates.

- In the middle of December at the summit of the heads of CSTO member states documents that will reform this military alliance are expected to be adopted. What will the CSTO turn into? 

- There is a high likelihood that very soon the need in the CSTO will rise sharply. By 2014 the USA plan to leave only some 25,000 servicemen and several thousand  civilians in Afghanistan. They will be concentrated in five military bases. In this situation it makes no sense to talk of any large-scale military operation. These will mainly be logistical and air support missions. They will have to give up on large-scale military operations. And here various scenarios of how the situation in Afghanistan will develop are possible. There are worst-case scenarios given the weak authority of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, the high level of corruption in his government and the inadequate trustworthiness of the Afghan armed forces and police. A change of government, loss of control over a portion of the country or even separation of the north of Afghanistan are possible here. The return of Taliban to power does not mean that they will immediately set on seizing Tashkent, but it is symptomatic for movements such as Taliban to "spill over". At minimum they create the negative background for security in the region. Drug trafficking, export of weapons, recruitment of militants - these are the pillars of the Taliban movement. The danger is primarily to Tajikistan.

In this situation it is possible that the Russian military presence in Tajikistan will have to be increased as it will have to work on completely realistic military scenarios. That is the CSTO will have to specifically protect people.

So far the CSTO has played a formal role for Russia. In reality the CSTO had an insignificant power and it was only used for minor operations, such as cutting drug trafficking routes. We could not talk about CSTO as a major military force because we could not use it during the bloody event in Kyrgyzstan in 2010. Now it has to be an organization with real military power. Potentially, as the US troops in Afghanistan are reduced fivefold the role of CSTO in Central Asia will increase.

But CSTO requires a reform. For example, Uzbekistan is a member of the organization but it constantly blocks decision-making.

May be we will have to give up on consensus in the decision-making mechanism. CSTO has to be reformed in accordance with the changing geopolitical conditions. Without this it will be impossible to defend Tajikistan. But Uzbekistan believes that it will have enough power to protect itself against Taliban. 

We could believe this if Uzbekistan was strong enough domestically, but we cannot forget about its internal problems. Turkmenistan, for its part, believes that it will be able to deal with Taliban. This certainty has to do with Ashgabat's earlier agreements with Taliban. It is possible that Turkmenistan will manage to negotiate this time too, but Uzbekistan will hardly be able to avoid problems with Taleban. Islam Karimov (president of Uzbekistan - Ed.) should not rely on Americans. Troops that leave Afghanistan will not come to Central Asia. Europeans are waiting with impatience for the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan and Americans fail to understand what tasks they are dealing with there. In any case given the processes under way the role of CSTO is objectively increasing and Moscow understands this.      

- You talked about possible tensions on Russia's southern borders, but there is not much stability within the Russian Federation itself, including in the North Caucasus. 

- It would be simpler to say that Wahhabis from Saudi Arabia are at work there. But in reality the situation in the North Caucasus region is very complex. The militants in each of these republics have their internal social base and they are partially self-reliant in terms of funds. In the majority of cases source of funding are internal and the local authorities are unable to close external and internal sources either because the authorities are too weak or they just prefer to negotiate with the militants.

From this point of view I do not believe that the problem of instability in the North Caucasus will be resolved in coming years. Much blood has been shed on both sides and social problems have gone unresolved for many years. True, the region has been turned into a separate federal district, but the issue was not resolved. To a certain degree the process of national revival is under way there and this also leads to increased tensions. Subjective reasons include the high level of corruption in Russia. And of course there is external influence. Everybody knows how the power was taken in Arab countries. Naturally, there is a desire to repeat this in the North Caucasus region. What is more, people know how to fight in this region and it is not simple to resolve this host of problems. Each of these republics has its own peculiarities.