GRAPPLING WITH THREE CHALLENGES

Petro Poroshenko's election as president of Ukraine late last month could be assessed to a certain extent as a Pyrrhic victory. Gaining 54 per cent voter support, Poroshenko also inherited quite a number of challenges and he has to respond to three of them urgently. The problem of economic recovery and pulling the country off the brink of likely bankruptcy directly depends on successful response to those challenges. 

The first challenge relates to international recognition of the presidential election results which provides the basis for legitimizing Poroshenko himself, his future team and Kiev's foreign policy. In this context, Poroshenko has complete mutual understanding with the West which supported the change of power and recognized the legitimacy of Kiev's foreign policy. But this is not the case with Moscow. 

Back in April, during his annual phone-in with citizens, Russian President Vladimir Putin admitted the possibility of cooperation with P. Poroshenko and Yu. Tymoshenko in case they won the presidential polls. At the same time he pointed out the need to adopt a new Constitution of Ukraine and launch debates on federalization and decentralization of power in that country. Speaking at the St Petersburg international economic forum two days before the election, the Russian president said that Moscow would respect any choice of the Ukrainian people. He also added that the Russian side hoped for a truce in south-eastern Ukraine after the election. Those words by Putin were unambiguously interpreted both in Ukraine and in the West as a guarantee of Russia recognizing the election results. At the same time, the conditions were ignored that Ukraine was to meet for Moscow to agree to recognize the election and cooperate with the winner. 

First is federalization of Ukraine on which the pro-Russian forces in the south-east insisted. Second is termination of the anti-terrorist operation (ATO) in Luhansk and Donetsk Regions without any preconditions and dialogue with them on the territorial structure of the state. Third, recognition of the election and the new authorities as legitimate by the Ukrainian people themselves including the part of the population demanding federalization. 

However, Poroshenko's very first statement on the need to continue the ATO more efficiently and against tight deadlines in order to ensure the territorial integrity of the country showed that official Kiev had no intention to take Moscow's conditions into account. Further developments in Ukraine and the new Ukrainian authorities' steps just confirmed that it would be quite a problem for Moscow and Kiev to come to a consensus. Despite incessant calls from the Russian side, Kiev is pacing up the ATO. As a result, refugees streamed into Russia from south-eastern Ukraine. Meanwhile repeated detentions of Russian journalists and, quite recently, the death of two staff members of the VGTRK Russian TV and Radio Company in Ukraine, radicals attacks on the Russian embassy in Kiev, offensive words by former acting Foreign Minister Andriy Deshchytsya addressed to Putin during the disorders aggravated the tensions in Russian-Ukrainian relations even more. 

Moscow is also unhappy with Poroshenko's statement on Ukraine's European choice and desire to sign the economic part of the EU Association Agreement as early as 27 June. Its political part was endorsed by the new Ukrainian authorities back in March. Putin has already warned that, in this case, in order to protect its domestic market, Russia will have to cancel zero rate customs duties on import. The unsettled problem of Russian gas prices for Ukraine is also adding fuel to the fire. 

The second challenge for Poroshenko is related to Ukraine's domestic political situation. Serious differences may arise between him and other political groups that essentially strengthened their positions during and after the latest Maydan protests. We all have fresh memories of former Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko threatening with a possible third wave of revolution. It is notable that statements by representatives of the radical camp sometimes echo the attitude of Yuliya Tymoshenko. In addition, the radicals who played an important role in the revolutionary events have no intention to leave Maydan. They are protesting now and again against the new authorities blaming them for lacking determination in holding the ATO. 

This shows that Poroshenko will face quite a lot of difficulty building his mutual relationships with other political forces demanding preferences for their services in the change of power. An early parliamentary election that Poroshenko promised to call before the end of this year could somewhat clarify this matter. On the other hand, just that election could play a nasty trick on the new Ukrainian president. 

According to the latest social surveys, the Fatherland party led by Yuliya Tymoshenko, Ukraine's most ambitious politician, is the odds-on favourite for the Supreme Council polls (over 20 per cent). Of special importance in this context will be constitutional reform to determine the form of government in Ukraine. If it is a parliamentary-presidential republic in which the West is much interested, Poroshenko will have to put up with a serious reduction of his powers. It should be noted that currently in effect is the constitution of 2004 to which the Supreme Council decided to return after the latest Maydan protests. 

It is remarkable that Arseniy Yatsenyuk who was kept by President Poroshenko in his post as acting prime minister, came up in parliament back in April with the initiative to essentially cut the presidential powers in this country in favour of the prime minister. It is unlikely that the proposal of A.Yatsenyuk who is so admired by the West was a coincidence or his private initiative. 

Promises from international financial institutions and western states to help Ukraine as much as possible are mainly focused on A.Yatsenyuk. Once speaking over the phone to US Ambassador to Kiev Geoffrey Pyatt, US Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland said that Yatsenyuk would suit Washington as a candidate for the post of Ukraine's prime minister. On this basis, one could suppose that Poroshenko will hardly venture giving up a constitutional reform in favour of the Ukrainian prime minister. It is another matter who will benefit more from it: Tymoshenko or Yatsenyuk who is her fellow party member at the moment? 

The third challenge is lurking in wait for Poroshenko in his relations with fellow oligarchs. Apart from voter support, there is a consensus of oligarchs around him. At least for a short time, well-known oligarchs such as Rinat Akhmetov and Dnipropetrovsk Region governor Ihor Kolomoyskyy have come to terms with him. But how long will that consensus last? Will Poroshenko prove able to keep equal distance from all the oligarchs? Thus for instance Kolomoyskyy is actively involved in the ATO providing a lot of funds and setting up his own battalions against supporters of federalization. In all likelihood, he does not even need any favour from Poroshenko. Some experts say citing Kolomoyskyy himself that his habit is to take whatever he needs. Therefore specialists are not ruling out the possibility that Kolomoyskyy may even challenge the president himself. Especially given that the eccentric oligarch has nothing against cooperating with Yuliya Tymoshenko. 

Thus, this is just the beginning both for Ukraine and for its newly elected president. Time will tell whether President Poroshenko proves able to stand his ground under the heavy burden of power.