RIYADH'S INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL INTRIGUE

Shiites have staged mass protests in the east of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), where the lion's share of the country's oil reserves and industrial facilities are concentrated. The riots began after the funeral of Shiite activist Muhammad al-Filfil, who was killed in clashes with security forces in connection with the arrest of Nimr, the leader of the Shiite Muslims. The demonstrators threw stones at government buildings and police, to which the latter responded with rubber bullets.

At first glance, it all resembles the events in countries affected by the "Arab spring". On the one hand, the decisive action of Saudi rulers can be understood, because the supporters of radical Shiite leader Nimr are demanding not equal rights between them and the Sunnis, or reunification with Bahrain, which lies to the east of the KSA, but the establishment of a Shiite state here. That is to say the protesters' actions can be considered as pure separatism. However, the KSA authorities do not want to negotiate even with the moderate part of the Shiite population. Instead, they are sending special forces of Bedouin tribes to the eastern provinces. Of course, the protests by the Shiites, who comprise less than 10 per cent of the total population of the country, cannot be considered a major problem for the authorities. The Shiite factor may be one of the levers for rocking the situation - no more. The country's political life is experiencing events that represent a stronger threat than the Shiite uprising. Analysts believe that these events are only a fragment in a series of interesting events both inside and outside the country.

Many princes, one heir

According to the Western media, all conditions are right for the "Arab spring" to start in the KSA. Among them are mass arrests of political opponents of the government, an authoritarian regime, corruption in all sectors of the population, citizens' dissatisfaction with the regime, etc. At the same time, the KSA has such a particularity as the transfer of power within the royal dynasty. After the death of Crown Prince Sultan Abdul Aziz last year, King Abdullah devolved many of his powers to family members for health reasons and the de facto head of state is Naif bin Abdul Aziz - a governor who holds conservative views and opposes any reform. But because of Naif's death in less than a year, a question arose about the effectiveness of the transfer of power in the country. The thing is that in the KSA, power is transferred not from father to son, but from brother to brother. The founder of the Saudi royal dynasty Abdul Aziz has 18 sons, many of whom are old. In this connection, the system of transfer of power in the KSA operates in parallel with backstage games and intrigue. To address this issue, the "Allegiance Council" was created by order of the king in 2006.

For many years, the crown prince has been a representative of the most influential al-Fahd clan of princes (named after the eldest of the seven brothers - King Fahd, who died in 2005, or, in other words, "The Sudairi Seven").

The appointment of Crown Prince Salman Abdul Aziz was accompanied by controversy and was not accepted by all members of the family. Thus, the prince in exile, Taalal Abduz Aziz, who is known for his revealing statements about the KSA government, said that the appointment took place contrary to the procedures of the "Allegiance Council" and only on the personal initiative of King Abdullah.

Analysts predict that the new heir to the throne will continue the rigid and conservative policy of his predecessors in domestic policy. But in foreign policy, he will be conducting a policy of rapprochement with Washington and Tel Aviv in contrast to the former Crown Prince, who accused the Israeli intelligence services of preparing the 11 September attacks.

After his appointment, the prince met with CIA Director David Petraeus, with whom he discussed the tensions in the eastern part of the country.

It is noteworthy that after the meeting, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the longtime Saudi ambassador in Washington, was appointed head of the KSA intelligence service. Experts believe that the prince is more inclined to take decisive action, has extensive contacts in Washington and is on friendly terms with former US President George W. Bush. In all likelihood, his foreign policy priorities will be countering the Iranian threat and coordinating efforts to support the Syrian opposition.

Foreign policy: money and faith

The vectors of foreign policy can be defined for convenience by two main lines, which often coincide with each other. This is aspiration to leadership in the Muslim world and energy policy. Relations between Saudi Arabia and other countries are considered from these two angles.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is considered to be a traditional and the most loyal US ally in the region. Even the notorious events of 11 September, when the participation of Saudi nationals in the terrorist attack was proven, did not spoil relations between the two countries. However, the latest developments in the region suggest that not all is so rosy in relations between the US and Saudi Arabia. For example, after the military intervention in Libya, where the cost of a barrel of oil is much cheaper than in the KSA, the West is no longer so dependent on Saudi oil. It turns out that by supporting the "Arab spring" in the long-term, the KSA may harm its own interests. Realizing this, the KSA is diversifying oil supplies. Following the signing of an agreement between China and the KSA on cooperation in the oil and gas industry and a contract for the construction of a giant oil refinery in Yanbu - a Red Sea port city, which is scheduled for commissioning in 2014, Riyadh became the main trading partner of China in the Middle East and North Africa. Specialists from the United States are worried about the fact that the KSA can stop selling oil in US dollars and switch to calculations, for example, in yuans or euros. This would be an unprecedented disaster for the US economy. In 1973, Saudi Arabia signed an agreement with Washington on the sale of its oil in US dollars in exchange for protection from neighbouring countries and the purchase of American weapons.

Despite the loyalty of the new heir and the appointment of Prince Bandar as head of the intelligence service, an unfavourable scenario is also possible for the Americans. In this case, they will benefit from the dissatisfaction of the Shiites who live in the regions, where most of the energy is produced, from the despotism and political system in Riyadh and from the fact that the dynastic system may lose legitimacy, resulting in one of the main instigators of the "Arab spring" becoming its victim.

In addition, if Saudi Arabia quits the US political orbit, Qatar, which has been rapidly expanding its influence in the region recently, could come to Washington's aid. With huge financial and informational resources (Al Jazeera channel), Qatar, like the KSA, claims to be the leader of the Sunni world. Although statements and political actions demonstrate the political solidarity of the two countries' establishment, in fact, there is some hostility between them. The two countries are competing with each other on issues such as support for the "anti-Asad" forces in Syria, radical Islamic movements throughout the world and opposition to Iran.

According to experts, the overthrow of Assad's Alawite regime has a geopolitical sense for the KSA. The Alawite regime in Syria provides Iran with access to the Arab world and reduces the influence of Saudi Arabia. Even without the existence of the Iranian factor, Syria as a secular Arab country with a powerful army would be a threat to Riyadh, in comparison with the internal political system of which Syria seems to be just 'a haven of democracy'. Do not forget that the KSA supports the armed opposition in Syria for the sake of its own energy interests.

One reason for the KSA's bitter opposition to the Assad regime is that, along with Qatar, Riyadh plans to build an oil pipeline through Syria and Turkey. After the embargo against Iran came into force on 1 July and Tehran threatened to block the Strait of Hormuz, the countries of the Arab Peninsula strongly need this alternative option for energy delivery.

Of course, it's easier to agree not with Assad, who is backed by Iran and Russia (both countries are also influential exporters of energy and therefore, competitors of the KSA), but with the government that will come to power in Syria with the support of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey.

The positions of the KSA and Iran clash on many issues, and the civil confrontation in Syria is only one of them. In response to Iran's nuclear programme and the growing military power of the Shiite state, Saudi companies began the construction of the largest military base in the Persian Gulf, sparking protests from Iran. Tehran has not forgotten WikiLeaks cables compromising the Saudis because of their attempts to persuade the Americans to attack Iran's nuclear facilities. The Iranian president's statement that the deployment of large military forces near the Iranian border in close proximity to Gulf oil deposits will be regarded as "the beginning of hostilities and will receive an adequate response" can be considered Tehran's response.

At a recent security conference in Manama, Iranian Foreign Minister Salehi said that Iran will not use weapons against its Muslim neighbours, to which the influential Saudi Prince Turki al-Faisal laconically said "It will!".

In addition, representatives of Riyadh accuse Tehran of supporting Shiite unrest in the eastern provinces of Saudi Arabia and in Bahrain. Despite the claims of the Shiite leader Nimr that no one supports them from outside the country, the existing political establishment of the KSA links the tensions to interference by other countries.

In this context, the diplomatic skirmish between the KSA and Russia is quite interesting.

Immediately after the dispersal of the Shiite demonstrators, the Russian Foreign Ministry came up with an official statement that "the KSA government should not allow a confrontation, including on a religious basis, and should ensure compliance with generally accepted human rights, including rights of expression, peaceful assembly and association as required by the law".

In response, the KSA government called the statement "flagrant and unjustified interference in the internal affairs of Saudi Arabia". It is noteworthy that the diplomatic "exchange of courtesies" occurred against the backdrop of the publication of the rating of the world's top 25 oil and gas companies, where Russia's Gazprom lost leadership to Saudi Arabia's Aramco, while third place went to the National Iranian Oil Company. At the same time, Russia has not forgotten that the KSA supported Chechen bandit formations and the fact that the political establishment of Saudi Arabia plays a major role in strengthening fundamental (Salafi) Islam. The conflict in Syria is only one front where the interests of Russia and the KSA clash.