"CALLS FOR A NEW WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST ARE AN ADVENTURE"

Istanbul University Professor Ilter Turan headed this university in 1993-1998. He taught at various universities in America and England. In 2000-2009, he was chairman of the Turkish Political Science Association and deputy chairman of the International Political Science Association. He is the author of numerous works on comparative politics, Turkish political life and foreign policy in Turkish and English. A recognized scholar in the field of international relations, Ilter Turan has met with the leaders of several countries, including US President George W. Bush and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev. The experienced expert's opinion on current issues of the international agenda and his predictions will certainly be of interest to our readers. We started our conversation with him from the most painful issue for Azerbaijan - the Nagornyy Karabakh settlement.

- First of all, it would be interesting to know your opinion about the international situation around the Nagornyy Karabakh conflict?

- Now we are seeing no change in the settlement of the Nagornyy Karabakh problem. In spite of the elections held in Armenia, no political changes have occurred. No matter how hard Turkey tries to expose the subjective position of France in the Minsk Group, it has been unable to alter the composition of the mediators. In addition, given the assumption that the new French President Hollande will be conducting a foreign policy different from his predecessor Sarkozy's, it can be argued that Ankara will take a wait-and-see position on Paris. On the other hand, the EU and the US have focused their efforts on what they think are more relevant issues in other parts of the world. As an example, we can specify the uncertain situation in Iraq, growing tensions in Syria and Iran's attempts to acquire nuclear weapons. In addition, the EU and the US are preoccupied with their own economic problems. In this respect, I do not think that the Karabakh settlement will take one of the first places in the foreign policy of these countries. In Russia, the government is essentially unchanged. In other words, it is difficult to suppose that the political position of Russia on Nagornyy Karabakh will undergo major changes. Therefore, we have no reason to expect quick changes in the resolution of the Nagornyy Karabakh problem.

- What can you say about the Armenian preparations for the 100th anniversary of the so-called "genocide"? Can Turkey enter into negotiations with Yerevan again in order to lift the international pressure on this issue?

- I can say that the current situation is evolving, unfortunately, in a way that is more favourable for Armenia. After the recent events in the French Senate, Turkey was forced to fight a very uphill battle to prevent the adoption of a law criminalizing the denial of the "Armenian genocide". The fact that the law passed by the Senate did not come into force is not the merit of Turkish diplomacy, but a result of the fair position of the Constitutional Court of France.

When considering the processes preceding this, it is clear that the Armenian leadership is not going to change its position in return for economic benefits. They sacrifice the economic well-being of their people and persist in their policy. In this respect, the struggle of both Azerbaijan and Turkey against the Armenians will continue beyond 2015. One thing is extremely crucial here. If the Armenians fail to secure the adoption of a law recognizing the "Armenian genocide" in their main bastion - US Congress - before 2015, their position will considerably weaken. After all, one and the same question cannot be on the agenda forever. Therefore, the main target of the Armenians is 2015. I think after this date, people's interest in this issue will subside.

The opening of the border between Turkey and Armenia and related processes are not independent or isolated issues. Had it not been for problems parallel to it, Turkey would have opened its border. However, at this time Armenia has occupied a significant part of the territory of Azerbaijan and eludes discussions on this issue in every way. Naturally, in this situation it is impossible to turn a blind eye and open the border. It is known that certain talks were previously held with Armenia. Watching this process, I then suggested that during the negotiations, the parties will take certain obligations and pursue their goals and objectives. But then I realized that I was wrong. At the time, I was convinced that in response to the opening of the borders, Armenia will withdraw from at least five of the occupied districts surrounding Nagornyy Karabakh and start discussing the status of the remaining territories. But later it became clear that Armenia seeks only to open the borders without even thinking about making a concession in response. Consequently, this process was stillborn.

- What changes can we expect after Vladimir Putin's return to the Russian presidency?

- The leading figures in Russian foreign policy have not changed. In other words, if there are changes in foreign policy, they can occur as a result of a change not in persons, but in conditions. It is hard to believe that the policy of Russia, for example, with regard to Armenia will undergo changes. Ultimately, I do not expect any change.

- What do you think about our other neighbour - Iran and the ongoing processes around Iran?

- Although Iran, on the one hand, emphasizes that it is not seeking to acquire nuclear weapons, on the other hand, it is making efforts to bring its capacity to enrich uranium to a level that allows it to create these weapons. In addition, Iran is arming itself rapidly, improving its missile systems for the delivery of nuclear weapons to the target. My prediction is that having the capacity to produce nuclear weapons does not mean their production. It is just that after Iran acquires such power, it will be very difficult to make a conventional attack on it, because this country will be able to acquire and protect itself with nuclear weapons if necessary. But even if Iran has nuclear weapons, it does not mean that it is able to unleash a nuclear war.

If you pay attention to statements by Iranian leaders, you will see that they prefer anti-Israeli rhetoric most of all. However, the possibility of a nuclear attack on Israel is not convincing. Indeed, the use of these weapons will be deadly for the Palestinians as well. In addition, according to many estimates, Israel now has about 100 nuclear warheads, some of which will be in full alert for a possible attack from Iran. That is to say even with the considered scenario, Israel will be able to deliver a crushing blow to Iran. On this basis, we can conclude that Iran's nuclear power will be designed to protect against a conventional attack.

As for the likelihood of an attack on Iran, we can recall periodic appeals by the leaders of the State of Israel about the need to immediately implement such an action. However, observations indicate a lack of consensus on this subject in Israel. Both former heads of Israeli intelligence and some army generals believe that an Israeli attack on Iran is an adventure. There are many factors that logically justify the extreme difficulty of such a step. For example, the inability of Israeli planes to cover such long distances, the lack of information about the location of Iran's nuclear facilities, as well as the likelihood that some of them will not be affected even by the most powerful bomb. In addition, we must not forget that Israeli military aircraft will have to fly through the air space of not-so-friendly countries. All of these factors are evidence that an attack on Iran is a very risky move and a real adventure. Because of this, Israel's intention to attack Iran is gradually declining. In turn, Iran is interested in participating in discussions. I think Iran's desire to return to the negotiating table can serve tactical and strategic objectives. In tactical terms, it can buy time, and in strategic terms, to spend this time on bringing the process of uranium enrichment to a level that allows it to build nuclear weapons.

- Can the international situation surrounding Iran undergo major changes after the change of power in one of the leading nations of the West - France. In general, what impact will the election of Hollande as French president have on political processes in Europe and the Middle East?

- The next day after the elections in France, we witnessed political disagreements between Germany and France. Hollande seeks to resolve problems not by American methods, i.e. savings and spending cuts, but by emissions. But as Europe is not America, Germany will suffer the most from it, as it will also be affected by the inflation that will occur after the new money is put into circulation. Therefore, Europe will face serious problems. European countries, which are obliged to live frugally, do not want to cut their expenses even at a time of recession. A striking example of this is Greece and France. Following their example, in Spain and Italy, the harsh economic measures of the governments will also face strong resistance. Therefore, in her statements, Mrs Merkel speaks about her willingness to cooperate with France only within the framework of the already planned programmes and in compliance with the previously-approved conditions. In such circumstances, Europe is likely to be preoccupied with its own internal problems for some time. Therefore, we can assume that, in comparison with the previous period, France will be more passive in foreign policy.

- Since we mentioned the Middle East, how do you assess the situation in Syria after the latest parliamentary election there? According to some experts, the tension in relations between Turkey and Syria has reached a point that increases the likelihood of Turkey declaring a war?

- In the current situation in Syria, we have no reason to take the results of the elections there seriously, because you cannot talk about normal elections when voting takes place, on the one hand, under the roar of gunshots, and on the other, under the current pressure on the opposition. In this country, the confrontation with the authorities is continuing. However, it is not known whether the processes taking place in Syria will end in the overthrow of the Assad regime. Since Syria is not a very rich country, its economy is highly dependent on other countries. Taking into account that the economy of Syria is in an extremely difficult situation due to the embargo, we can say that the Assad regime will find it very difficult to continue to govern the country in its present form.

Although Turkey is clearly opposed to the Assad regime, the declaration of war against Syria is out of the question. This is possible only if there is an international coalition, the UN adopts a relevant decision and NATO agrees to take full responsibility.