BETWEEN THE DEVIL AND THE DEEP BLUE SEA

The situation facing some of the European Union's neighbours of the former USSR is just like that in which the West (the USA and the EU) and Russia assume the role of the devil and the deep blue sea. This struggle is never-ending. But since the formation of the Customs Union (CU), and especially after the election of Vladimir Putin, who put forward the idea of creating a Eurasian union among the former Soviet countries, it has become much tougher.  In the struggle to draw Moldova and Ukraine into the orbit of their geopolitical allies, the West and Russia are using more accessible political-economical means and resources capable of seriously affecting not only the foreign policy courses of Chisinau and Kiev, but also the intra-political processes in these countries.

A new president in Moldova

In the middle of March the deputies of the "For European Integration" alliance in the Moldovan parliament voted to elect Nicolae Timofti as the country's president. In his very first statement Timofti noted that Moldova's national idea could not only be one of European integration. The newly-elected president thereby made it clear that the country's foreign political course would be pro-western. The new president also addressed the question of Moldova's unification with Romania: "This is not prescribed in Moldova's constitution or in the governmental programme of the incumbent power, but the country's future belongs to future generations. And if they wish to amalgamate with Romania, what can we do about it? Or they may wish to align with Ukraine or Russia - we will not be around then, so they will decide." Clearly, Timofti is leaving this subject open although the country's constitution rules out such a scenario. But such a possibility could arise in the future. It could well become a reality if Moscow puts strong pressure on Chisinau who, having obtained firm guarantees from the West about Moldova's joining (as part of Romania) the EU, could spark the adoption of a new constitution providing for such an amalgamation. 

As regards the problem of the Moldova-Dniester conflict, Timofti noted that he has nothing against Russia and is in favour of resolving the conflict within the framework of international documents and the Moldovan-Russian agreements and on equal rights, even if Moldova and Russia are in different weight categories of influence on mainstream politics. Russia must remove its weapons from Moldovan territory because it is a neutral state. The army must be replaced by a civilian control commission in order to preserve peace without tanks and aircraft.

The new Moldovan president's speech met with acclaim on the other side of the ocean. During her meting in Washington with the Moldovan Foreign Minister Iurie Leanca, who spoke about his country's European path, US State Secretary Hillary Clinton noted that, in the US' opinion, Moldova could be described as an example of success in this part of Europe, and Washington firmly supports Chisinau's choice of European integration. Strangely, this exchange of pleasantries between Chisinau and

Washington did not vouchsafe the attention of the EU. Brussels kept a significant silence. Then Moscow made it clear that it found the complementary rhetoric in the dialogue between the US and Moldova completely unacceptable. On the day the Moldovan Constitutional Court endorsed Timofti's presidential powers, Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev said that states which have the status of observers within the framework of the Eurasia-EU inter-state council, including Moldova, could encounter problems if they joined the Customs Union. Some Moldovan experts saw this as pressure from Moscow. And Moldovan Foreign Minister Leanca made it quite clear that Chisinau was not contemplating the possibility of joining the CU. That said, Chisinau's basic arguments are the lack of a common border between Moldova and Russia (they are separated by a distance of nearly 1,000 kilometres) and also an official invitation to the CU. Besides, Russia, which accounts for about 18% of Moldova's foreign trade, is no longer Chisinau's number one economic partner as it once was. In this sphere first place today belongs to the EU with 50%, of which Romania takes up about 16%. And this proportion is steadily increasing. In the opinion of some Moldovan experts, Bucharest could also play a significant role in reducing Moldova's energy dependence on Russia. They believe that in these conditions playing the Romanian card would be Chisinau's sole patriotic and European choice: "Behind the shroud of bombast and abstract words about the state independence of the Republic of Moldova the equation is quite simple. It is either with Romania in the EU, or back to the USSR. There is no third choice," writes the MoldovaNova website.

But attitudes to the idea of unification are ambivalent in Moldovan society. On 25 March there were clashes in Chisinau between members of the Romanian Unionist (supporters of unification with Romania) "March of Unification" and supporters of Moldovan statehood, who gathered in the city centre to obstruct a procession of supporters of Bessarabia's unification with Romania. 

Transdniester Region - a junction between Moldova, Russia and Ukraine

Of particular interest in this context is the position of Yevgeniy Shevchuk, the leader  of the separatist regime in Tiraspol, who has spoken of Transdniester's intention to join the Eurasian Economic Community and the CU, and eventually to participate in the creation of a Eurasian Union. In mid-February the Gagauzia People's Assembly (parliament) came out with a statement in similar vein "On the Eurasian integration of the Republic of Moldova".

In the first ten days of March a meeting of a pressure group for the organization in Moldova of a referendum on joining the CU and signing up to the agreements on the endorsement of the Eurasian Economic Community was also held in Chisinau. The organizers of the plebiscite approved a proposed date for this to be carried out - 18 November 2012. Such attitudes clearly run counter to official Chisinau's course towards European integration, because the state's simultaneous participation in a free trade zone with the EU and the CU is impossible.

According to some of the Russian media, the latest "Barometer of Public Opinion" poll in Moldova, taken in November 2011, showed that the number of citizens who believe that Russia should be the main strategic partner and who prefer joining the CU to integrating with the EU was of a magnitude greater. But the main stumbling block in the way of Moldova's European integration is the unresolved Transdniester conflict, by means of which Moscow is putting strong pressure on Chisinau. In this context Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev's appointment of Deputy Prime Minister Dmitriy Rogozin as the Russian president's special envoy for the "Transdniester Moldovan Republic" (TMR) is a more than demonstrative act. The appointment to this post of a person responsible for questions of the military-industrial complex in the Russian government and who evidently prefers to take a tough line in a dialogue with the West shows that the Kremlin has no intention of giving up such a strong trump card in its geopolitical stand-off with the West.

Moreover, the Russian Security Council has adopted a decision to render aid to the Transdniester Republic to the tune of $150m. The Moldovan foreign minister expressed his surprise and concern at the actions of Moscow which did not discuss and agree Rogozin's appointment with Chisinau beforehand. Moldovan political analyst Viktor Zhosu, who is well-disposed towards the Kremlin's decision, is confident that Russia will thereby want to increase the effectiveness of its policy in the region. But Julian Kifu, the Romanian presidential advisor on strategic issues, security and foreign policy, described this appointment as an equal challenge to the EU and the US: "Moscow has undertaken Transdniestrian issues seriously and long term, and this signal cannot pass unnoticed without an appropriate response. Romania must make an appropriate response and address the problem of security on the eastern border of the EU and NATO at the highest political level. The EU must put an end to the new European tendency 'to turn politics into bookkeeping' and to bring the main issue - security - back on the agenda. The time has come to put aside excuses and the defensive positions we took and to speak decisively and openly about our interests and the legitimacy of discussing the question of security in the east."

Interestingly, Yuriy Zbitnev, the chairman of the Ukrainian Civil Constitutional Congress, proposes his own unique solution to this tricky situation. In his letter to Comel Ionescu, Romania's ambassador to Ukraine, in order to establish a positive dialogue between the authorities and society in Ukraine, Moldova, Romania and the Russian Federation, and also to help develop democracy and European integration, he proposes the following solution: Moldova to Romania, and the Transdniestr Republic to Ukraine. But however things develop, Chisinau is unlikely to ever agree to such a proposal. And Kiev, which has for some years been under tough two-way pressure from the West and Russia, will hardly take such a proposal seriously, especially when you consider that Ukraine, on a level with Russia, is part of the "5+2" format for a settlement to the Transdniestr conflict in the capacity of a guarantor.

Ukraine's old problems

Official Kiev is currently more concerned about normalizing its relations with Moscow and Brussels, and in this context the EU is demonstrating a tougher position than Russia. Brussels is accusing the Ukrainian authorities of violating democratic principles and persecuting the opposition (leading figures of the "Orange Revolution"). Europe is confident that Ukraine is a patient in the school of democracy. The EU, which has organized frontal pressure on Kiev in all directions, is demanding the release of former prime minister, Yuliya Tymoshenko, and the former Ukrainian foreign minister, Yuriy Lutsenko. Furthermore, a demand is being put forward about ensuring their participation in the parliamentary elections which take place at the end of October this year. Otherwise, Brussels threatens to refuse to sign the agreement on Ukraine's associate membership of the EU, including creating an all-embracing free trade zone.

The EU is unhappy about the sentence imposed on former Prime Minister Tymoshenko, who is accused of exceeding her authority by signing the Russian-Ukrainian gas agreements, as a result of which huge damage was caused to the country's budget. Brussels sensed that Kiev's actions were politically motivated and that the criminal case was fabricated. The Ukrainian authorities, ignoring Brussels' demands, initiated new criminal proceedings against Ms Tymoshenko.

It should be pointed out that a close study of the Tymoshenko "gas" affair reveals some interesting details. The Russian-Ukrainian "gas agreements" for which Tymoshenko has apparently been charged, were signed after the latest "gas conflict" between Kiev and Moscow at the beginning of January 2009. Europe, which receives 80% of the volume of Russian gas that flows through pipelines across Ukraine, found itself in a tough situation, because owing to its failure to reach an agreement with Kiev, Moscow stopped supplying gas to Ukraine, restricting supplies to the volume intended for Europe. But, the Russians claim, Ukraine began to draw off natural gas from this volume for its own requirements. So, Europe, having put strong pressure on Kiev, forced it to sign an unremunerative treaty whereby Ukraine agreed to pay European prices ($500 for 1,000 cu m) for Russian gas. Interestingly, at that time Brussels did not show any particular concern about the enslaving conditions for Ukraine. Was not the EU's current tough position over the Tymoshenko affair caused precisely because the details of the Russian-Ukrainian gas agreements cast a shadow on Europe's attractive image? Even the main reason, which forced Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych to embark on a long-term extension of the treaty with Moscow on the deployment of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol for another 25 years, for which he was sharply criticized by the West, was to all intents and purposes dictated by the conditions of these agreements. Indeed, Yanukovych decided to take this step mainly in order to obtain a certain discount for Russian gas (the current price if $416). 

Ukraine is today holding complex talks with Russia on new price concessions for gas. By all accounts, unless there are serious changes in Kiev's foreign political course, Moscow is not prepared to meet it half way. Russia has clearly stated its conditions: certain economic preferences only in exchange for entry to the CU and participation in the Eurasian Economic Union. Yanukovych, for his part, is currently restricted to an indefinite promise on granting Russian the status of a second state language. Also, some agreements in the sphere of military and military-technical cooperation were signed between Russia and Ukraine in the first ten days of March, although this is clearly not enough for Moscow. But, in all likelihood, the Kremlin is patiently awaiting its hour of triumph. Anatoliy Hrytsenko, the chairman of the Ukrainian parliamentary committee for questions of national security and defence, and leader of the Civil Position organization, claims that Russia is in no hurry and is not reducing its gas price: "Putin feels confident and is waiting for Yanukovych to get down on his knees and submit 'constructive proposals': this is our gas transportation system, here are other strategic facilities you can choose - take what you want, but give us money, give us credits." What is the EU offering to counter this? Some dubious agreement about Ukraine's associate (without guarantees for full-fledged) membership of the EU and ideas about permanent "Orange Revolutions".

Furthermore, Kiev is accusing the EU of seriously damaging Ukraine's positions as a transit country by supporting the Russian "Southern Stream" project. And this, in turn, narrows down Kiev's room to manoeuvre in a dialogue with Moscow, which at the end of the day could reverberate on the EU itself. After all, Kiev, which is accusing Europe of adopting a "head in the sand attitude" and being indifferent to the fate of Ukraine, which has become disenchanted with the West, might accept the Kremlin's conditions.

In the opinion of some western analysts, the EU is losing its eastern flank to Russia for one simple reason: it might offer much less than Russia. The non-specific prospect of integration with the West, contained in the Eastern Partnership programme concocted by Poland and Sweden, cannot take away Moscow's proposals. How can you compare several hundreds of millions of euros from the Eastern Partnership budget, divided between the six states of the programme which could be received on certain conditions in the distant future, with the several billion dollars which Moscow will definitely give? The experts asking themselves this question describe the EU's policy towards Turkey, Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova as "geopolitical myopia". 

Berlin and Paris, the initiators of the shaping of the EU's common foreign policy, have so far been unable to offer an effective joint geopolitical strategy: Germany's foreign policy has traditionally been too self-interested, and France's too irrational. Therefore entry to the EU of such countries as Turkey and Ukraine with a multi-million population, clearly does not conform with their geopolitical and economic interests. Furthermore, Berlin and Paris, not wishing to upset their smooth mutual relations with Moscow, have no intention of sacrificing their own interests by getting sucked into a war with it, protecting their eastern post-Soviet neighbours.

Brussels' humble silence over the latest exacerbation of relations between Chisinau and Moscow is in all probability dictated by precisely such an approach. In the tone of the two leading countries of the EU, the "young" members (Poland, Czech Republic and Lithuania) of the pan-European home are also heaping sharp criticism on Ukraine. It has not been ruled out that hiding behind this is also a certain "jealousy" of these countries at the hypothetical contenders for membership of the EU who could retract some of the "fatherly love" of the pillars of Europe. But such a policy has led to a situation where the countries on the EU's eastern flank have found themselves between the devil and the deep blue sea. Does such a situation meet with Europe's strategic interests? This sacramental question must be answered in Brussels.