STICK AND CARROT

Europe and Belarus are once again on the "diplomatic warpath". This is how we can describe the last sharp deterioration of relations between the European Union (EU) and Belarus. The parties' rhetoric is dominated by excessive rigidity, leading to an exchange of diplomatic demarches.

Brussels and Minsk were not on friendly terms with each other after the presidential elections in Belarus held in December 2010. Then, the well-known events called the "Arab Spring" began in some countries in the Middle East and North Africa. Supported by the West, the Belarusian opposition considered this point suitable for an "orange revolution" in their own country, which would put an end to the rule of "Europe's last dictator", as President Aleksandr Lukashenka is referred to. But this desire never came true. Attempts by the opposition to organize mass actions of civil disobedience ended in violent clashes with police and arrests of several leaders of the radical opposition. Since then, this issue has turned into an instrument of political pressure on Minsk in the hands of the West, although the US and the EU prohibited the entry of Lukashenka and several representatives of the Belarusian authorities into their territory.

In January 2011, Poland banned him from entering its territory once again. In April of that year, the EU Council extended the travel ban on Lukashenka and 35 other officials until 31 October 2011. Ahead of the recent presidential elections in Russia, Minsk was visited by the Czech Foreign Ministry's Ambassador at Large P. Mares, who estimated the current state of relations between the EU and Belarus as a deadlock. The main objective of the Czech official was to find out when and under what conditions Minsk can make steps towards the EU? Apparently, Mares and Lukashenka, who had not given up the tactics of playing a balancing act between the East and the West, failed to come to a common denominator. Mares said that the isolation of Belarus would not help anyone. There is only one capital that will take advantage of this situation. It is obvious that he was referring to Moscow, which, after the return of Vladimir Putin to the Kremlin, will try to bind Minsk to Russia's foreign policy even more firmly. This disposition is not in the interests of the West, which was so irritated by the Customs Union and the Common Economic Area, where Russia's authority is unquestionable, and by Putin's idea of the Eurasian Union.

Mares's botched mission led to the fact that in late February, the EU Council approved the decision of the EU Council of Foreign Ministers, according to which the list of officials "banned" in the EU increased by another 21 representatives of the Belarusian authorities. Thus, the "black list" of the EU includes 231 persons, including Lukashenka himself and his older sons. All of them, according to Brussels, are guilty of political repression and suppression of democratic rights and freedoms in Belarus. In March, the EU is also preparing to extend sanctions to Belarusian business representatives, who are the financial pillar of "the Lukashenka regime".

It is noteworthy that despite the tightening of sanctions, the EU did not cross the red line, of which Lukashenka warned recently. Only 21 persons were added to the "black list", although, according to preliminary information, it was planned to include 135 people in it. According to some analysts, this is an indication that Brussels has no confidence about which approach to the Belarusian question is the right one. A mechanical escalation of sanctions will not lead to anything good.

Europe, faced with serious financial problems, lacks gunpowder for a battle with Lukashenka, and it would certainly be happy to cling to any concession by Minsk in order to begin a more flexible game, especially as the EU does not see eye-to-eye on the Belarusian issue. In particular, it became known that Slovenia saved the Belarusian businessman Y. Chizh from becoming persona non grata, though he has a reputation in the West for being "Lukashenka's purse", because of the fact that the Slovenes are cooperating with Chizh's company Triple in Belarus. The economies of Lithuania and Latvia also strongly depend on economic relations with Belarus. The Netherlands is actively cooperating with Minsk in buying Belarusian oil products. Even Malta, which introduced a fine of 116,500 euros or a prison term of up to 5 years for violating EU sanctions against the Belarusian regime, has registered a firm called Samuel International with the trading director V. Peftiyev (another "purse of Lukashenka", according to the West).

In response to the EU sanctions, Minsk recalled the representative of Belarus in the EU and its ambassador to Poland, and recommended that EU ambassadors "go to their capitals for consultations". After that, an emergency meeting of the Committee on Political Affairs and Security in Brussels decided that EU countries would show solidarity and recall their diplomatic representatives from Minsk. In addition, Brussels and Washington once again made a strong statement on the Belarusian authorities. The foreign ministers of the "Weimar Triangle" (a military alliance of Poland, Germany and France) expressed support for the Belarusian dissidents fighting for the democratic development of their country, and discussed the possibility of introducing further sanctions against Lukashenka, if his regime does not stop persecuting dissenters. Polish Foreign Minister Sikorski declared his readiness to resume dialogue with Minsk as soon as political prisoners are rehabilitated. German Foreign Minister Westerwelle, who accused Lukashenka of establishing a dictatorial regime, said that the unanimous response of the EU is a strong gesture of support for democracy, and Brussels should not disunite its ranks when it is necessary to protect human rights.

The president of Belarus, who termed the recalling of EU ambassadors "absolute hysteria", was more than harsh: "At the forefront of this hysteria are two types of politicians or even two characters from politics. One minister is living in Warsaw, the second - in Berlin. If one of our neighbours is all of a fidget, it is clear. I'm telling you that the map is already drawn as far as Minsk, and the territory of Poland is already there... As for the second one, who is either lesbian or gay and was shouting about dictatorship... On hearing this, I thought: It is better to be a dictator than a gay." Lukashenka accused European politicians, who sanction Belarusian judges and law enforcement officials, of trying to destroy Belarus as a state. Minsk did not confine itself to a war of words. Belarus refused to participate in a meeting of foreign ministers of member states of the EU's Eastern Partnership programme and the Visegrad Group, which was held in Prague on 5 March. At the same time, the Belarusian authorities began to prevent opposition member from going abroad.

Interestingly, through European Parliament Vice-President Jacek Protasiewicz, Brussels hinted that the EU does not intend to permanently burn bridges in the dialogue with Minsk: "We specifically decided to approve the resolution on Belarus after two weeks during a meeting in Brussels ... We decided to give time to think, first of all, to Minsk, because Minsk started it all. Perhaps, they will become sober in these two weeks." The European official also recalled that the conditions for the return to dialogue remain the same, i.e. the release of political prisoners.

However, the Belarusian leader is not going to completely damage his relations with the EU, which allows him to skillfully manoeuvre in the dialogue with Moscow, which regularly makes strong statements against Lukashenka.

Moscow, meanwhile, is skillfully using the current situation in its own interests. Back on 24 February, the presidents of Russia and Belarus issued a joint statement on the inadmissibility of EU and US economic sanctions against Minsk, saying that they confirm the inadmissibility of economic pressure or coercion in international relations. A similar statement was also made on behalf of the allies of Belarus in the Customs Union - Russia and Kazakhstan. "The European sanctions are an obstacle to the work of the Customs Union and Single Economic Area. Such measures create artificial barriers to trade, unreasonable barriers to economic interaction between economic entities in the territory of the Customs Union/Single Economic Area," the statement said.

It should be noted that Moscow has better tactics of squeezing maximum benefit out of such situations than Brussels. During the last two years, Russia, which is the largest trading partner and creditor number one of Belarus, has taken a series of economic steps, which turned out very handy for returning Minsk into the orbit of its economic and geopolitical interests. Despite the fact that ahead of the presidential elections in Belarus at the end of 2010, Moscow, in unison with the EU, torpedoed Lukashenka, also accusing him of establishing a dictatorship, after the election, it changed its wrath to mercy. In late November 2011, Russia rendered economic assistance to Belarus. In 2012, Moscow gave Minsk a discount on gas, setting the price at around 165.5 dollars per 1,000 cubic metres (for neighbouring Ukraine, this price is 416 dollars). Also, Moscow provided Minsk with a loan of 10 billion dollars to build a nuclear power plant.

Of course, these steps by the Kremlin are not dictated by naked altruism. In exchange for privileges and loans, the Russian gas monopoly Gazprom, which previously owned 50 per cent of Beltransgaz, bought the remaining part of the capital of the Belarusian gas transportation system for $ 2.5 billion, which resulted in Russia taking full control of the gas pipelines going through Belarus to Europe.

In the most difficult moment for the Belarusian authorities, when the IMF turned down Minsk's request for a loan of $ 5 billion, Moscow quickly changed its policy of "stick" to a policy of "carrot" and gained its tactical victory in the geopolitical confrontation with the West, which is using its "carrot" to lure the Belarusian opposition.

In solidarity with the EU, the IMF mission has already left Minsk. In April, the head of the IMF office, N. Kolyadina, will leave Belarus. Ahead of his departure, the head of the IMF Mission, Chris Jarvis, told reporters that negotiations for a loan can only be held after guarantees of reform from President Aleksandr Lukashenka personally. But this is not the main obstacle. Allocations must be supported by member countries of the IMF. With the current relations between the West and Belarus, Minsk can hardly hope for success. And a loan from the EurAsEC Anti-Crisis Fund, under the terms of which it is necessary to privatize assets worth 2.5 billion dollars, is looming on the horizon. In this context, Belarus may need to sell oil refineries, oil pipelines and chemical companies, on which Russian oligarchy has long had its designs. Moscow is already eyeing Belaruskaliy, one of the largest producers of fertilizers. By the way, China is also eyeing this unique facility, and it has already given Belarus a credit of $ 1 billion on favourable terms. The two countries' leaders are also discussing a Chinese loan of more than 15 billion in return for the participation of Chinese businessmen in various investment projects in Belarus. The West seems to be trying to bring about regime change in Belarus with the lowest expenses on the Belarusian opposition (this tactic was quite successfully tested in some countries), and then include Minsk in the orbit of its allies. Figuratively speaking, three players are vying for the soul of East European Belarus: the West (EU and US), Eurasian Russia and Asian China. Today, the positions of Moscow and Beijing appear to be more preferable in this struggle. And the diplomatic war between Brussels and Minsk is of greater benefit to Russia and China than to the West and Belarus itself.