TOGETHER OR APART?

When President Obama announced the successful completion of the operation in Iraq, many wondered whether the game was worth the candle?

At the beginning of the US and its allies' military invasion of Iraq, statements and projections about a future democratic and stable country and the model of development in one of the largest oil producers in the world were popular. But today, after the departure of the US, the situation, to put it mildly, is not the way it was promised to the Iraqis.

The administrative system in the country is based on ethnic and religious contradictions. In the main part of Iraq, there are still armed conflicts, bombings and kidnappings. In addition, the formation of new federal districts in the provinces is under way, while the administrative and political future of the country is moving towards uncertainty and chaos. Ensuring public security is also impossible in Iraq because of the political restructuring of the security bodies, while a strong army is not being created due to the threat of a military coup. At the same time, political groups have armed groups to achieve their goals. The Iraqis are glad the Americans left, but are sceptical about the future.

Domestic players

In the period ahead, such complex and almost unsolvable issues as relations between the central government and Kurdish autonomy, the future of Kirkuk and other disputed territories, the creation of new federal districts, as well as the effectiveness of the influence of regional countries on Iraq will determine the country's future.

The Iraqi Kurds opposed centralism before everyone else and created their own federal districts. The Supreme Islamic Council of Iraq advocated the establishment of a federal district in Basra as early as 2005-2009. Recently, this proposal was voiced by some circles again.

After the US invasion, the majority of Sunnite Arabs were against federalism. Nevertheless, over the last 6 months, when power in Baghdad was taken by Shiites, Sunnite Arabs demanded the creation of their own federal districts in some areas of Iraq. They became disillusioned with "fair elections" that became a real obstacle in their way to power in the country.

Such an approach in Iraq comes from the tradition of the central government. As a rule, those who control the government in the country provide absolute power over the other political groups. For this reason, the question is not whether the Sunnites in this case are opposed to the centralization of power, but who has this power.

In general, all the political groups in Iraq, except for Kurds, are supporters of centralization. But when they cannot take the reins of power, they begin to oppose it and demand autonomy. Yet in light of recent events, we can predict that the positions of the Sunnites might change depending on changes in the balance of power in the government. If the position of the Sunnites strengthens, Shiite Arabs will be unwilling to obey the centre and demand broad autonomy.

Thus, despite all the other internal problems, the number one task in Iraq is the centralization of power, which can be established either democratically or by force of arms.

The strengthening of the central government in a democratic way is possible in the event of the victory of "pro-centrist" Arab nationalist coalitions, who, rejecting Kurdish demands for federalism, oil, and disputed borders, will lead a legal fight against separatist manifestations.

However, in Iraq there is no political organization that is able to pursue a policy of "Arabization", ignoring sectarian conflicts. The Sunnites and Shiites are competing with each other. Accordingly, each of these groups separately is interested in supporting the Kurds. Another barrier is the constitution, by which changing the current federal system and creating a centralized structure requires the support of two thirds of each of the three federal districts. Of course, this possibility will be rejected by the Kurdish provinces in the north.

With regard to the military way of centralizing the country, politics in Iraq is still in the shadow of weapons. The Dawa Party and the Turkmen Front are the only political forces in the parliament of Iraq, which do not keep armed groups. But since Dawa is in power, the Interior Ministry units are subordinate to it and have the right to conduct military operations throughout the country except for the Kurdish provinces. In the event of an open or secret alliance of pro-centrist armed forces against separatists, the main problem will be the lack of arsenals of weapons and munitions, as well as the lack of organization and a single doctrine for the conduct of a phased or total armed fight. In addition, in order to begin "gathering Iraqi lands under one roof" by force, there is a need for a good reason - for example, the declaration of independence by the Kurds. The support of regional powers, which are currently not very interested in a centralized Iraq, is also important.

Meanwhile, disintegration processes in Iraq seem more likely. Since the main cause of conflicts between political factions in Iraq is political interests and economic benefits, it can be assumed that the Sunnites and Shiites will deliberately try to weaken the central government so as not to share political power and economic benefits with the centre, having superiority over their territories.

Experts assess the situation inside Iraq as unstable and fragile. There is a very high likelihood of the current situation turning into chaos and civil war. Although it is impossible to accurately determine the trends and causes of the alleged conflict that may lead to civil war, the facts that are available are enough to make some predictions.

Prospective centres of civil war in Iraq can be mostly northern and central regions of the country. In the north, potential sources of conflict could be Mosul, Kirkuk and Diyala.

The second major centre of the alleged conflict can be Baghdad. For the desire to control the capital can provoke the Sunnites and Shiites to return to 2006-2007 no matter how the leaders of these groups officially deny this.

If the country splits, the issue of how Iraq will split and into what groups will become relevant. If the conflict still begins from the centre of the country, we can say with confidence that it will split into three or more parts. A split in the north will be confined to the formation of no more than two territories and will not spread to the rest of the country.

The signal for the start of military operations in northern Iraq could be an announcement on the full independence of the Kurdish autonomy and Kurdish attempts to seize the provinces of Mosul and Kirkuk, disputes over oil resources in the north, the invasion of the "disputed territories" by regular Iraqi army units, reduction of budget expenditure for the Kurds , etc.

After the Western invasion, the Kurds acquired heavy weapons, combat experience, knowledge, experience of guerrilla warfare and are strong enough to cope with the Arabs even if they force an alliance. In addition, in the event of a protracted conflict, they will be supported by the UN and other international organizations that may intervene in favour of the Kurds during the fighting. Unlike the Arabs, who do not want interference from Western countries, the Kurds rely on the West, hoping for support if they proclaim their independence.

External players

Thus, the most significant factor that can influence the situation in the north and everywhere will be the regional balance of power and the position of the parties concerned. The countries that can be hurt by the partition of Iraq most of all are Turkey, Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

The possible creation of an independent Kurdish state in neighbouring Iraq affects the security of Turkey. In light of the events occurring in the north, the problem of Kurdish separatism in Turkey is particularly important - more important than ever in history.

Therefore, Ankara is interested most of all in a centralized Iraq and in a crackdown on separatist processes. At the present time, when the territorial integrity of Iraq is actually symbolic, Turkey is trying to maintain the balance between domestic players in the neighbouring country and is "putting its eggs in different baskets".

The split of Iraq and the emergence of a new Shiite state with huge oil reserves seems very attractive to Iran at first sight. Especially as this new state, surrounded by other Sunnite Arab countries, will desperately need Iran. However, it is a double-edged sword: the emergence of such a state can prevent Iran from becoming the leader of the Shiite world, especially when you consider that such holy cities as Karbala and Najaf are in Iraq.

To maintain the regional balance with the Arab countries, Israel has long dreamed of creating a Kurdish state. Because of its "hostile" Arab environment, Israel has always tried since its establishment to build relations with non-Arab Muslim countries of the region like Iran, Turkey and Ethiopia. After the 1979 revolution, Iran turned into an enemy of Israel, and in recent years, the latter's relations with Turkey have also deteriorated. In this context, the importance of the Kurds for Israel is growing even more. But, on the other hand, the split of Iraq may lead to a union and maybe even the formation of a single state as a result of a union between the Sunnite Arabs of Iraq and Jordan, one of the main rivals of Israel.

Based on these assumptions, we can see the fine line between whether the regional powers will provoke the split of Iraq or, conversely, try to maintain the territorial integrity of the neighbouring country, if such a threat is close to reality.