THE ICE WAS NOT BROKEN IN SOCHI

On 23 January, Sochi hosted a meeting between the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia with the mediation of Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev. It was the tenth meeting in this format in recent years in order to seek a peaceful settlement to the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagornyy Karabakh conflict. Eight months have passed since the crucial but unfortunately fruitless meeting in Kazan. During this time, not only was there no rapprochement between the conflicting parties, on the contrary, incidents on the temporary ceasefire line became even more frequent and confrontational rhetoric intensified. Trips to the region by the Minsk Group cochairs also failed to revive the negotiations. The growing tension and the risk of war caused concern and a desire to resume the interrupted dialogue between Presidents Aliyev and Sargsyan.

The attempt to organize a meeting of the presidents of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia with EU President Herman Van Rompuy during the summit of the EU and Eastern Partnership countries last autumn in Warsaw was rejected by Serzh Sargsyan. He also responded negatively to the proposal to organize an Armenian-Azerbaijani summit brokered by the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Catherine Ashton. It became obvious that in the absence of his Russian patron, the Armenian president feels uncomfortable in the negotiations, as he is aware of the vulnerability of his position which is contrary to international law. But it is not only that.

Serzh Sargsyan and his team have nothing to show their voters ahead of the parliamentary elections to be held this spring. The economy has not yet overcome the 14-per-cent decline since the crisis of 2009. Living standards are falling, and corruption, contrary to promises, is still rife, while people are leaving the country en masse in search of jobs and better lives. Serzh Sargsyan and his team are not ready to take responsibility for the decision that suggests the withdrawal of Armenian forces from the occupied Azerbaijani territories and to expose themselves to fire of criticism from radical nationalists. Therefore, he was not particularly interested in resuming the negotiations, but he could not say no to Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev either.

The meeting in Sochi was held in a trilateral format. The joint statement adopted at its end noted that "... as a result of intense negotiations, progress was made in agreeing the basic principles of the Nagornyy Karabakh settlement... Given the importance of beginning work on a peace agreement, the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan expressed their willingness to accelerate the achievement of agreement on the basic principles, taking into account the work that has been done so far". Ilham Aliyev and Serzh Sargsyan, the statement reads, praised the mediatory efforts of Russia and other countries cochairing the OSCE Minsk Group (France and USA). They expressed the hope that "Russia, the United States and France will continue to play an active role in the settlement until the establishment of a final peace and stability in the region".

The document expressed support for confidence-building measures in the context of the Nagornyy Karabakh conflict - the development of cultural contacts between the parties. In this regard, the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan declared their readiness to further promote dialogue among intellectuals, and scientific and social circles. The presidents noted the report of the OSCE Minsk Group on the mechanism they developed together with the personal representative of the OSCE chairman-in-office for investigations along the ceasefire line and issued instructions to continue this work.

As follows from the declaration that was adopted, there was no real progress in the Karabakh settlement process, as was predicted by the vast majority of local and foreign analysts, although we cannot say that the Russian Foreign Ministry made no effort to prepare the Sochi meeting. Armenian Foreign Minister Eduard Nalbandyan and Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov were invited to Moscow. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigoriy Karasin discussed the problems of the South Caucasus, including the Karabakh settlement, with US Deputy Secretary of State William Burns. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, in an attempt to present a positive aspect, said: "The parties displayed a common understanding that in order to secure further progress - and it is evident - it is necessary, as the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan said with the support of Dmitriy Medvedev, to move away from maximalist positions." But from any point of view, this cannot be seen as real progress in the settlement process.

Some Armenian and Russian commentators are trying to present the trilateral meeting of the presidents in Sochi as a tool to ensure the status quo existing in the region. But to avoid any illusions, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev clearly stated at a government session dedicated to the results of 2011 ahead of the Sochi meeting that negotiations cannot be solely "for the sake of preventing war". During a visit to a military unit stationed directly on the front line in Goranboy District, he spoke even more specifically about the fact that Azerbaijan will comprehensively strengthen its military capability in order to be ready to use force to liberate the occupied territories. So the meeting in Sochi did not save the Armenians from the growing diplomatic, military, economic and information pressure from Azerbaijan, which is more and more difficult for them to withstand.

The meeting in Sochi was important for the Azerbaijani and Armenian presidents in terms of consultations with their Russian counterpart Dmitriy Medvedev on the alarming situation developing in connection with the Iran's nuclear programme and the risk of the Iranian regime engaging in a military confrontation with Israel, the United States and NATO. It was also important to discuss issues concerning bilateral relations with Russia. According to information for the media, Medvedev had an uninteresting conversation with Armenian President Sargsyan. As for Presidents Aliyev and Medvedev, they discussed the important issue of cooperation in the context of participation in the work of the UN Security Council and sanctioned the signing of a protocol between SOCAR and Gazprom on doubling the supply of Azerbaijani gas to Russia and increasing its volume to 3 billion cubic metres a year.

Summarizing, we can conclude that the mediation in the Karabakh peace process carried out personally by President Dmitriy Medvedev during the last three years has not produced results primarily because of Yerevan's stubborn unwillingness to withdraw from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan without legalizing the secession of Nagornyy Karabakh. We cannot say that Dmitriy Medvedev did not display willingness and goodwill. It may be noted that Moscow took certain actions to sober the Armenians up. Thus, contrary to the evident displeasure of the Armenians, Moscow began to supply Azerbaijan with modern heavy weapons (S-300 missile defence system, Mi-35 helicopter gunships, armoured personnel carriers, etc.). At the same time, Russia refused to allocate new loans to Armenia, which had requested 500 million dollars for the reconstruction of the Nairit factory, and said that Russia's state companies are considering abandoning trust management of the Metsamor Nuclear Power Plant and the Armenian railways. However, all this is apparently not enough for sobering up the Armenian military and political elite and society.

The crisis of mediation in resolving the Karabakh conflict can be observed not only in the futility of Russian efforts, but also in the inefficiency of the OSCE Minsk Group instrument itself. In recent years, Washington has largely distanced itself from active and proactive involvement in the settlement process and has behaved as Moscow's "second" in this matter. Azerbaijan seriously doubts France's impartiality after the adoption of the law criminalizing the denial of the so-called "Armenian genocide". As a consequence, not only opposition and independent analysts, but also the ruling circles have been calling for a review of the role of the Minsk Group. For example, the deputy chairman and executive secretary of the ruling New Azerbaijan Party, Ali Ahmadov, told Trend that "without the establishment of specific timeframes, the functioning of the OSCE Minsk Group is ineffective". According to Ahmadov, sometimes there is an impression that the Minsk Group was created not to settle the conflict, but to drag it out. "If this organization failed to take serious steps to resolve the conflict in 20 years, it would be good if it decided to disband. Or a timeframe should be defined for the OSCE Minsk Group within which it must take concrete steps to resolve the conflict. If it cannot do so, it means that this organization fails to carry out its mission," he said.

Apparently, it is time to mobilize all available instruments to exert pressure on Armenia, including the UN General Assembly and Security Council. It is evident that as long as the great powers do not change their indulgent-conniving attitude towards the Armenians and international organizations do not outline the fundamental contours of the conflict resolution, it will be impossible to force Yerevan to abandon hopes of legalizing the seizure of land and to withdraw from the occupied Azerbaijani territories. Therefore, Azerbaijani diplomacy should focus not on the negotiations and the search for a compromise with Armenia this year (it is impossible to reach agreement with Sargsyan like with his predecessor Kocharyan), but on changing the position of the great powers and international organizations, as well as tightening the Armenians' isolation from all regional projects and the benefits of cooperation.