A KARABAKH SETTLEMENT

2011 was a decisive year as regards the possibility of reaching a practical outcome to the four-year round of talks to settle the Armenia-Azerbaijan and Nagornyy Karabakh conflict on the basis of the Madrid principles proposed by the Minsk Group of the OSCE. Unfortunately, advantage was not taken of the "window of opportunity" provided by the absence of elections in both Azerbaijan and Armenia to achieve a compromise in a settlement to the conflict.

There are no grounds for reproaching the mediators for not working hard enough. There were quite a number of visits by the co-chairs of the Minsk group to the region, meetings between presidents Ilham Aliyev and Serzh Sargsyan involving Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev in Sochi and Kazan, and also intensive talks between the heads of foreign ministries. But nothing was achieved. The Armenian side decided not to accept, even with provisos, the official revised version of the Madrid principles which had been officially proposed back in the summer of 2009 at the conference of foreign ministers of the OSCE in Athens. Two of the 14 elements that make up the Madrid principles remain a stumbling block at the talks - the duration of the referendum and its framework, and the essence and content of the "interim status" of Nagornyy Karabakh in the period until its final status is defined.

As far as a referendum is concerned, back in January 2010 at the talks in Sochi Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan issued an ultimatum demanding (Wikileaks, doc. 10Baku134) that the final document should indicate not only the possibility (or right) to hold a referendum, but also a specific timeframe as well as a date for this act of expression of will. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev takes a directly opposing position in this question and basically rules out everything that might lead to the secession of Nagornyy Karabakh. He leaves room for the possibility of defining the status of Nagornyy Karabakh consistent with the expressed will of the population in the future only after the establishment of a lasting peace and the return of the refugees. In this instance it is too early to speak about specific dates for a referendum and what it should include. With regard to "interim status", the Armenians are insisting on a specific wording that would formally establish Nagornyy Karabakh's independence without an official declaration. Clearly, this is unacceptable to Azerbaijan.

At the meeting of presidents Aliyev, Sargsyan and Medvedev in Kazan this summer, Russia, stooping to Sargsyan's supplications, inserted into the text of the document to be considered by the sides corrections which took into account some of his demands. Naturally, we put forward counter observations, in response to which the Armenian Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandyan raised hell and accused the Azerbaijani side of wrecking the adoption of the document. And yet it is Nalbandyan, together with Serzh Sargsyan, who have been delaying for over two years through endless amendments the adoption of the so-called revised Madrid principles officially presented by the Minsk group in the summer of 2009 at the OSCE foreign ministers' conference in Athens.

Following the failure of the meeting in Kazan, Moscow made an attempt to come up with an agreed text, sending Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to the region with a personal note from President Medvedev, and then invited the Azerbaijani and Armenian foreign ministers for consultations. However, the efforts to get the sides to reach a compromise and sign a framework agreement came to nothing. The question naturally arises: "What now?"

Baku, through its foreign minister, Elmar Mammadyarov, has on a number of occasions proposed moving on to the next stage of talks, i.e. immediate work on the text of a peace agreement. This autumn, at the OSCE foreign ministers conference in Vilnius, he said: "The conflict itself is many-sided and very complex and there are a great many questions on confidence-building measures. There is the very serious military factor, armed clashes, troops must be withdrawn, destroyed land must be rebuilt, displaced persons must be returned and major financial problems must be resolved. Therefore, mindful that this is quite a complex process, we believe we should not be obsessed with principles, but we should start work on a major agreement. These are the nuts and bolts of what we are now discussing together with the co-chairs." There is a basis for this, because last year at the OSCE summit in Almaty the Azerbaijani and Armenian presidents signed up to the L'Aquila, Muskoka and Deauville statements of the presidents of Russia, US and France in which the three basic principles and six elements of a compromise settlement to the conflict were promulgated. 

For their part Moscow and Yerevan are insisting that some kind of memorandum should be initiated beforehand on some of the agreed points and on those in which talks need to be continued. But this does not quite meet with Azerbaijan's interests. After all, the signing of a document in such a form would bind Baku to the non-use of force in conditions where the Armenians have the opportunity to drag out the talks on a peace agreement and, consequently, avoid liberating the occupied territories.

Bearing in mind that Armenia faces a round of elections (parliamentary and then presidential elections will be held in 2012), it is unlikely that Serzh Sargsyan and his inner circle are ready for any compromises which take into account Azerbaijan's lawful interests and demands. This is obvious even by his reluctance to have meetings and talks. For example, at the September summit of the EU and the eastern Partnership countries in Warsaw, Serzh Sargsyan refused to have a meeting in the format of the three presidents of the South Caucasus plus the president of the European Union. He also failed to take up a proposal by the EU's high representative for international affairs and security, Catherine Ashton, to organize a special meeting of the presidents. Clearly, without Russia's participation in the talks, Serzh Sargsyan feels very uncomfortable, because he realises the vulnerability of Armenia's position in the conflict.

The situation is developing in such a way that one should not expect any new initiatives from the broker countries. French President Nicolas Sarkozy is more concerned about his own re-election which is due to be held in the spring of 2012. The criminalization of the denial of the so-called "Armenian genocide of 1915" by the French National Assembly, which adopted a corresponding draft bill, may bring Sarkozy the votes of the Armenian diaspora but will make him extremely unpopular as a mediator. In this connection, there have justifiably been calls in Baku and Turkey to remove France altogether from the co-chairs of the Minsk group. Especially as that country's former representative, Bernard Fasier, has completed his seven-year stint as co-chair of the Minsk group and has made farewell visits to Baku and Yerevan. It has been announced that he will be replaced by the French ambassador to Ukraine, Jacques Faure.

Russian President Medvedev, following the failure of the Kazan meeting and the announcement that he would not be standing for a second term, has apparently lost interest in Karabakh. However, in a recent interview for AzTV, he said: "In my view, this could be the only conflict in the post-Soviet space which could be settled right now." In Medvedev's opinion, there can only be a compromise solution. "Everything depends on the goodwill of the sides, of their possibility and their wish to listen to each other's arguments and, I say frankly, there are no easy solutions. Agreement can only be reached on the basis of compromise. In other words, each side must travel its own path. Russia will continue to contribute to this," he stated. Then Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov noted in an interview for Interfax: "We intend to continue vigorous efforts towards a political settlement to the conflicts in the CIS, especially in Nagornyy Karabakh and the Dnestr Region."

Whether all these pronouncements will turn into specific actions is difficult to say. It is clear that the attitude of Vladimir Putin, who has been nominated and will most likely be elected the new Russian president, to the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict is substantially different from the position of Dmitriy Medvedev, who has personally made great efforts to kick-start the settlement process. Independent remarks made by Vladimir Putin lead one to regard him as a supporter of retaining the existing status-quo. Only time will tell if this is the case. All that is clear at the moment is that in the next six months the problem of a Karabakh settlement is hardly likely to be among the priorities for the powers-that-be in Russia.

Nor has there been any special activity or desire to come forward as the main moderator in a Karabakh settlement on the part of the US. If the process is to be kick-started tough pressure must be put on the parties in the conflict. Bearing in mind the high degree of Washington's interest in supporting Azerbaijan when it comes to transit to Afghanistan, energy projects and Iran, the Americans cannot put pressure on Baku. And President Obama's administration does not want to pressurize the Armenians, either, because there will be elections in autumn 2012 and he needs to win the support of the influential Armenian diaspora.

By force of inertia the co-chairs of the Minsk group are completing their visit to the region and warning of the risks of a resumption of hostilities, proposing a tightening of the mechanism for investigating violations of the cease-fire regime and calling for an intensification of the dialogue between the civilian communities of the conflicting sides, but in reality this is not advancing the settlement process.   It is clear that the failure of the Minsk group's efforts is causing dissatisfaction and a lack of confidence in its work both in the government and among the public at large in Azerbaijan.

The presidents of the US, Russia and France all agreed in Deauville that the endless protraction of the talks and continuing status-quo are unacceptable. This is also the position of the European Union, which was expressed by Catherine Ashton: "Maintaining the status-quo in Nagornyy Karabakh is unacceptable, as is any attempt to solve the conflict or influence the talks process by the use or threat of the use of force." The legalization of seizure of territories and separatist aspirations is not supported in the international arena. The vigorous activities by Azerbaijani diplomacy to explain the situation that has developed in the region and to debunk false Armenian propaganda are beginning to yield results.

The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), at its October 2011 session, adopted a resolution entitled "National sovereignty and statehood in current international law." According to the resolution, the assembly urges all member-states against recognizing or supporting in any way the actual authorities of territories which have emerged as a result of unlawful secession, especially those which are supported by foreign military interference. At the first session of EURONEST (the Parliamentary Assembly of the European Union and the countries of the Eastern Partnership programme) there was no support for the attempt by the Armenian delegation to include in the resolution a clause on respecting the right of nations to self-determination which is camouflaged by separatist aspirations.

In December the Mexican Senate adopted a statement which says that "on 26 February 1992 the Armenian armed forces attacked the civilian population of Xocali in Azerbaijan's Nagornyy Karabakh region and during the events, which have been implicitly described by international organizations as genocide, hundreds of people were killed because of their ethnic affiliation". It also touches upon the process of resolving the Armenian-Azerbaijani and Nagornyy Karabakh conflict, it discloses the essence of the Madrid principles, and it also points out the occupation of the Azerbaijani territories by Armenia and the importance of the return of refugees and forced migrants to their lands. Earlier, the Italian Senate expressed its attitude to the Karabakh conflict, and the Lithuanian Sejm is currently reviewing a draft resolution.

The correlation between armed forces and economic potential has seen an even sharper turn for the worse for the Armenians. This was vividly shown by the military parades held this year by both Azerbaijan and Armenia. New military hardware was shown off in Baku. Apart from the C300 divisions the Azerbaijani army has acquired MI-35 helicopter gun ships from the Russian Federation, unmanned military aircraft have been assembled, and other weapons. The Armenian parade was notable for the illogical participation of the Russian military in it and the march-past of Armenian priests.

The problems in the Armenian economy are building up. Moody's agency has changed its forecast for the long-term rating of the default of the Armenian issues body in foreign and national currencies from "stable" to "negative", whereas Standard & Poor's has increased Azerbaijan's long-term and short-term sovereign credit ratings from BB+/B to the investment level BBB-/A-3. The forecast is "stable". Another world rating agency - Fitch - earlier presented a similar picture.

The reduction in Armenia's rating means that the authorities and banks in that country should not count on any major borrowing on the international finance markets. The deadline for paying old debts is approaching and Armenia has nothing to pay them with. It will be difficult for it to restructure the debt. Consequently, the authorities will have to reduce the already low social payments and find the money to serve the debts from the miserly Armenian budget. This means a strengthening of thoughts of migration, a further exodus of the population from Armenia and a reduction in the call-up contingent to a critical minimum.

The baneful situation of the policy conducted by the current ruling elite in Armenia is starting to be realized not only by the leaders of the opposition ANK, led by former president, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, but also many eminent representatives of the Armenian diaspora abroad. For example, the well-known singer and Armenian ambassador to Switzerland, Charles Aznavour, who could hardly be accused of prejudice, in December 2011, while on tour in Moscow, made these confessions to Life Showbiz which are bitter for the Armenians: "Domestic genocide is now taking place in my country. I believe this is politically unacceptable. By not allowing Armenia to breathe, its government is depriving its own country of young people, and they are leaving. And in this sense the problem has no longer become a political one, but a universal one. It must be resolved quickly."

Earlier, in October 2011, just before the visit of the French President Nicolas Sarkozy to Yerevan, Aznavour said in an interview for Nouvelles d'Armenie magazine, that the mafia is getting weapons with impunity and the numbers of the population are dwindling. "My only desire is that something good is done for the small handful of people who still live there. How many people are left there? They speak of 2.3 million. Officials speak of 3.6 million, but this does not correspond to reality. In a short time the numbers will drop to 1.8 million, and then to one million," he said.

Whether there will there be a sobering up in Armenia or nationalist moods and slogans such as "we must be tolerant and overcome deprivations in the name of the unification of Nagornyy Karabakh" will prevail will be shown by the struggle at the parliamentary elections. As far as Azerbaijan is concerned, then if the simulated nature of the mediatory efforts of the Minsk group continues, we will have to start to think about transferring the question to the agenda of the UN Security Council. This can be done. After all, the alternative is a new war which no-one needs.