TWO MEN IN A BOAT

The media have written extensively about the disagreements within the ruling Russian tandem of Putin-Medvedev and speculated on their potential, and even inevitable, rivalry for the presidency in the 2012 elections. However, the outcome has been routine. The 12th Congress of the United Russia Party has put an end to the protracted political intrigue. The question of the future president was answered in a very straightforward manner, in the spirit of the late Boris Yeltsin, with an ordinary reshuffle.

In the 2012 election Vladimir Putin will run for the presidency, while Dmitriy Medvedev will lead the party in the Duma election in order to head the government afterwards. United Russia was promised participation in the formation of the cabinet, provided, however, that the party is radically renewed from top to bottom. In his speech Putin pointed to a longstanding arrangement within the "tandem" regarding the "configuration of power". 

Gleb Pavlovskiy, a political consultant who helped Putin win the 2000 election and who was an adviser for Medvedev before dismissal in May, asks, "Medvedev never intended to say no to the nomination for a second term. So what happened? Has he come under pressure? Or has he been offered something he could not refuse? In any case he did not explain his refusal." Perhaps the age factor has played a role. Putin is 58, while Medvedev is only 46, so even after two six-year presidential terms Medvedev will be as old as Putin is now. 

Some experts believe that Medvedev's term as prime minister is unlikely to be prolonged. Others do not rule out the possibility that Medvedev will not even become prime minister, but will resign from his post as president after the parliamentary election and take charge of the Russian State Duma where he will prepare a package of important reforms. This, incidentally, would allow Putin, the incumbent prime minister, to assume the duties of president before the election.

Putin did not deliver a keynote address, but promised to raise various benefits and even write off some tax arrears. The "People's Programme" supposedly prepared by experts on the basis of suggestions from almost one million citizens, was not even mentioned. Instead, it was stated that party members will follow the brief, if not parsimonious in terms of their content, speeches by Putin and Medvedev at the congress.

It seemed that the "Putin or Medvedev" dilemma, which held most of the Russian elite in suspense and led to uncertainty among business and investors, has been overcome. But things are not so straightforward. There is a brewing undercurrent of dissatisfaction and disappointment within the elite that the secret agreement belittles political and state institutions.

Quite impressive, albeit somewhat unexpected, has been the manifestation of this discontent by the competent and authoritative minister of finance and deputy prime minister, Alexey Kudrin, who made a public statement right from Washington that he does not want to associate himself with the future government of Medvedev because of fundamental differences on fiscal policy. Medvedev's response to this was defiantly tough - Kudrin has been dismissed from his posts. But it may well be that the expression of discontent, both within the elite and the general population, will not end at that. Meanwhile, the stock exchange and financial markets are showing signs of nervousness. The share prices of Russia's leading companies continue to decline, the outflow of capital from Russia has intensified and the rouble is losing weight. But on the face of it, there seem to be no good reasons for that.

Perhaps future historians will try to unveil the behind-the-scenes commitments, agreements and other circumstances that have led to the decision announced at the United Russia congress. Now it is important to assess its immediate political implications. What will Russia be like under the new presidency of Vladimir Putin? How will Russia build relations with its neighbours? Will Moscow continue to actively deal with the Karabakh settlement or will the new president lose interest in the problem and shift the mediating function onto diplomats, or even accept the nomination of Paris or Washington for the role?

Most Western analysts and media commentators have given negative assessments to the prospects of Putin's presidency, forecast growing authoritarianism, rejection of reform and conservation of the existing oligarchic-bureaucratic regime. In short, stagnation and decline are predicted. They also provide some justification. But positive scenarios should not be ruled out either. The new version of Putin will differ substantially from the Putin of 2000. He has gained tremendous experience, regained control over the country, has great authority and public support. The need for reform in Russia is obvious. Perhaps the Putin-Medvedev reshuffle was necessary if only because reforms could have led to the loss of control under the relatively "weak" Medvedev, as he is described by a number of Russian analysts. This happened under Gorbachev in the USSR. But Putin's "strong hand" can mitigate the risks and ensure the implementation of reforms while maintaining stability.

As for Russia's foreign policy, it will certainly change stylistically under Putin. Everyone knows the Russian leader's propensity for catchy, emotionally charged phrases, a tough and confrontational style of articulating his own position and Russian interests. But the content of this policy will change little. After all policies, especially foreign, are "the art of the possible". Therefore, Putin's foreign policy will be determined not by sovereign claims, but by Russia's ability to carry the policy out, the position and power of countries involved, as well as the support or opposition of other superpowers, especially the USA, the EU, China, etc.

It is clear that declared policy changes are closely monitored in the neighbouring capitals. The reaction of the Armenians is worthy of note. Hardly had the world's media circulated the news about the nomination of Putin as presidential candidate when they came up with a myriad of comments which, along with the expression of feelings of loyalty, boil down to unsolicited advice to the Russian leader regarding the correction of Russian foreign policy in the South Caucasus.

The political analyst and deputy director of the Caucasus Institute, Sergey Minasyan, predicts that "under Putin Russia will maintain a more assertive policy in the South Caucasus and proceed from Armenian interests. As we know, President Putin had a more pragmatic approach to the region than Medvedev." Considering the fact that Armenia and Russia are military and political allies, and Putin will try to strengthen Russian influence in the Caucasus, this course will also proceed from the priorities of Armenia's security, he said. With regard to the possible change of Moscow's policy on the settlement of the Karabakh conflict, Minasyan said, "Pressure on parties to the conflict will continue to grow in terms of preventing a new war, and in general, Russia will try to freeze the process."

The deputy chief editor of Regnum news agency, Vigen Akopyan, promptly published a programme article pretentiously headlined "Russia's foreign policy needs new Putin-style dynamics". According to him, the West, as well as some of Russia's neighbours to the south and east, can already adjust their foreign policies because there is no more intrigue in the Russian political field and, consequently, no hope of achieving local donations and concessions from Russia in the international arena by using the administrative excitement and uncertainty. Therefore, according to Akopyan, Russia's external adversaries are soon expected to enhance their activities on issues and interests that were muted due, as it turns out, to President Medvedev's non-existent ambitions.

From Baku, the situation and prospects of Russia's policy towards the South Caucasus, specifically the Karabakh settlement, are, of course, seen differently than from Yerevan. Indeed, Putin's attitude to the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict was significantly different from the position of Medvedev, who has put a lot of personal effort into getting the process off the ground. Some of Vladimir Putin's statements were interpreted as support for the preservation of the status quo. It is not ruled out that the Armenian intransigence in the negotiations, which became an obstacle to reaching a compromise, relied on Putin's tacit recommendation not to rush to accept the proposals of the Minsk Group mediators.

Perhaps the reason was not only geopolitical, but also personal motives. Clearly Putin did not want Medvedev to take the credit for being a "peacemaker". The West would have certainly inflated the importance of this success. It might have even nominated Medvedev to the Nobel Peace Prize in order to kindle his ambition and encourage him to get out of Putin's "shadow". But after the expected election of Putin as president his attitude to the settlement process is likely to change. After all, the international community has come to understand that the status quo in the Karabakh conflict must change. This was clearly said in a statement by the presidents of the United States, Russia and France. In essence, the form of a compromise has also been found. The fruit, as they say, is ripe. If so, why can't Putin try on the laurels of a "peacemaker" himself and improve his international image? Given Armenia's dependence on Moscow, this is quite possible.

Time will tell. But one can assume with high probability that the Kremlin reshuffle will not significantly affect the nature of Russian-Azerbaijani relations, and they will continue to develop on the basis of mutual interests. Objectively, all of Moscow's important interests in the South Caucasus are eventually associated with Baku. Over the past decade not only Russia but also Azerbaijan have strengthened. No pragmatic leader, and Vladimir Putin is certainly one, will sacrifice economic relations and the political support of our country for selfish Armenian interests.

P.S. The statement by the ruling Russian tandem has proved the forecast of our magazine right - Putin and Medvedev will continue to work together.

 " ... No-one will ever see an open political showdown. The president and the prime minister are strongly tied to each other. The overthrow of either of them will automatically affect the other.

At the same time, of course, significant events that could severely hit Medvedev may occur during this year. And Putin can then stand up to his full height, because he is still perceived as a symbol of the unification of Russia and of the relatively well-fed years.

But on the other hand, Putin may become president for 12 years, and after that Medvedev, a young and talented politician, will still have a good chance of returning to the Kremlin.

So perhaps Putin and Medvedev will continue to move in tandem. The fact that they have developed an excellent mechanism of interaction can hardly be doubted. So why break it?" an article headlined The Kremlin Riddle, published in Region Plus (2011, No 127), said.