A FRIENDLY COMMONWEALTH?

The CIS anniversary summit in Dushanbe can hardly be described as celebratory. Despite its 20th jubilee, the Commonwealth of Independent States has yet to become a cohesive organization and a fully fledged subject of international law. The main reason is the profound differences between some CIS members and their vision of the future of the organization. For this reason, the absence of the presidents of Azerbaijan (Prime Minister Artur Rasizada was delegated instead), Belarus (Alexander Lukashenko) and Uzbekistan (Islam Karimov) is seen by some experts as an indication of scepticism towards the organization. Moreover, the CIS is entering the third decade of its existence with losses - Georgia discontinued its membership of the organization in the aftermath of its war with Russia in August 2008. Nevertheless, the hosts of the summit, in particular President Emomalii Rahmon, praised the work of the CIS and said the organization had played an important part in resolving many problems. He also expressed confidence that the potential of the CIS had not been exhausted and that his country was ready to move further in strengthening the Commonwealth.

Concerns were also voiced over sufficient integration within the Commonwealth. Even Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev, having said that there is no alternative to the CIS on the territory of the former Soviet Union, began his speech with criticism. He said the statements about the poor implementation of the obligations adopted within the CIS are often quite legitimate. Despite the criticism, the final statement of the summit has a life-affirming ending. "We, presidents of the CIS countries, are optimistic of the future and express a desire to improve efficiency and further develop our Commonwealth as an influential regional intergovernmental organization," the statement says, albeit largely as a nod to political etiquette. Despite the frequent adoption of similar statements, the CIS has not succeeded in ridding itself of the internal strife, which has a variety of causes and interpretations. In this regard, a debate among Russian analysts on the eve of the anniversary summit is indicative. For example, an expert of the Carnegie Center in Moscow, Aleksey Malashenko, made the following comment for Nezavisimaya Gazeta on the supposed reason for the Azerbaijani president's absence from the summit: "The fact that Aliyev has taken this step is bad for Russia because it loses the image of a mediator in the eyes of its partners and comes across as a lobbyist for Armenia. The fact that this is done by Aliyev, a prudent and intelligent politician, shows (from the standpoint of Aliyev himself) what he has been driven to. It is also sad for the CIS, which is marking its 20th anniversary without Georgia." Of course, this is Malashenko's personal opinion to which he is certainly entitled, even though the Azerbaijani president has not made official statements disclosing the reasons for not participating in the summit. But as soon as Malashenko expressed his opinion, the Regnum news agency, branded as a mouthpiece of Armenian propaganda, posted a lengthy article by V. Akopyan and M. Kolerov headlined "The policy of surrender or what Russia has driven its neighbours to". Accusing Malashenko of political short-sightedness, the authors remind him of the Russian military base stationed in Armenia and Armenia's membership of the same defence bloc as Russia. Azerbaijan, headed by its President Ilham Aliyev, according to the authors, is a member of GUAM, an organization designed to accelerate the already progressive decentralization of the CIS, and a party to energy projects "alternative" to Russia, such as Nabucco. After all these insinuations, the authors ask a sacramental question, "Why would Russia lobby for Baku? For it not to drop out of the CIS?" The article boils down to the fact that Russia, for the sake of a "strategic alliance" with Armenia, should sacrifice its relationship with all CIS countries to please its "outpost" in the South Caucasus.

Meanwhile, Baku is not asking anyone to lobby for its interests. The only thing Azerbaijan has been seeking from Russia and other countries mediating in the Karabakh settlement for many years is the exercise of international law and the abandonment of its policy by the aggressor state Armenia. Therefore, reasons for the amorphous nature of the CIS should be sought elsewhere, not in the policies of Baku, not to mention Nabucco and GUAM.

According to the plan of the CIS founders (Russia, Ukraine and Belarus), the organization was to legalize a civilized divorce of the former Soviet republics. It was clear even then that the idea is hardly implementable because the centres of separatism in some republics, skilfully fanned by the central authorities of the Soviet Union, and Armenia's territorial claims made this task daunting. And the Russian Federation itself was on the threshold of a parade of sovereignties. Nevertheless, the CIS was legally established in the Belovezhskaya Forest. All of the former Soviet republics except for Armenia agreed to the divorce, recognizing the inviolability of existing frontiers.

Meanwhile, the foreign political priorities of post-Soviet Russia in the 1990s were to build relations with the West and start integration into the European community. Sometimes it appeared that Moscow had lost interest in its neighbours that had until recently formed a single federal state. The only thing the Russian authorities were succeeding in, as regards the CIS in those days, was full support for separatists on the territory of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova. It was then that Armenia occupied not only Nagornyy Karabakh, but also seven surrounding Azerbaijani districts. Some political circles in Russia periodically expressed territorial claims on Ukraine in relation to the Crimean Peninsula, while Russia itself faced serious separatist movements in its own territory.

Other countries of the former Union set the objective of integration into Europe as well, which did not help cement relations within the CIS either. The West, taking advantage of the situation, began to strengthen its own position in the region.

Trying to maintain its influence, Russia initiated the creation of a military and political alliance, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). There was still some hope that within the framework of this organization and with the help of Russia, the most powerful post-Soviet country, it would be possible to resolve ethnic conflicts, in particular to curb the territorial claims of Armenia against Azerbaijan. Unfortunately, that did not happen. As a result, in 1997 (three years after the entry into force of the Collective Security Treaty), Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova signed a charter to establish a regional organization - GUAM. From 1999 to 2005, Uzbekistan was also a member of it. In April 1999, when the presidents of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan signed a protocol on the extension of the Collective Security Treaty, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Uzbekistan refused to participate in it. Then, at the request of Uzbekistan, it was decided to restore the country's membership of the CSTO in August 2006. Of course, that did not mean that the relationship among members of the military and political alliance would become ideal. In February 2009, leaders of CSTO countries endorsed the establishment of a Collective Rapid Reaction Force (CRRF) to resist military aggression, conduct special operations to combat international terrorism and extremism, transnational organized crime and drug trafficking, and to tackle emergencies. In June 2009, a meeting of the Collective Security Council held in Moscow passed a decision to create the CRRF. However, Belarus refused to participate in the session, and although the decision was passed by other member countries, it was illegitimate. Apart from Belarus, the document was not signed by Uzbekistan. In October, Belarus signed the documents, while the position of Uzbekistan remains unchanged.

One important detail should not be overlooked. According to the document adopted, collective forces can be employed to repel armed aggression against members of the CSTO. And Yerevan immediately announced to the world that henceforth CSTO member-states, especially Russia, have obligations and must stand up for the aggressive policy of Armenia in the event of renewed hostilities in the Nagornyy Karabakh conflict. And all this is taking place against the background of the majority of member-countries who oppose the use of the CRRF in ethnic conflicts. Leaders of these countries do not want to be hostage to Armenia's predatory appetites. Nevertheless, the CSTO secretary general, Nikolay Bordyuzha, has repeatedly spoken in unison with the position of Armenia.

A serious challenge for the CIS and relations within the organization was posed by the events of August 2008. None of the leaders of these countries supported the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia which has been recognized by Russia. Even its "strategic" ally and "outpost", Armenia, denied this service to its patron. In this context, a remark by an analyst of the Russian Institute of National Strategy, V. Goryunov, is worth noting. "The Armenian logic demonstrated to the world is even worse than the notorious female logic. Armenia's situation is similar to Russia's. What Yerevan is doing today is called double-dealing, and Russia should react to that. Globally, Sargsyan's statement is good. This is the moment of truth for Russia. It is time to understand who our real allies are and who has simply come out for a walk, what the CSTO is and who should really be in it." But unfortunately, Russia did not heed Goryunov's words, focusing on the "ungrateful" CIS partners. This disappointment mixed with indignation was confirmed by an eloquent statement by then first deputy speaker of the Russian State Duma, Lyubov Sliska. "Russia should decide for itself whether it needs a CIS where everyone remains tight-lipped and acts aloof," she said. Isn't it this approach that is undermining the CIS from within? Is the neutral position of CIS countries on the Russian-Georgian war more detrimental to the future of the Commonwealth than its dismemberment into the CSTO, EurAsEC and CES?

The paradox is the fact that Moscow has started to exert pressure on Belarus over the recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This is how the relationship between allies turned sour. Russia also has uneasy relations with Ukraine. These ties did not rise to the desired level even after the victory in the Ukrainian presidential election of Viktor Yanukovych, known as a pro-Russian politician. He has signed an agreement to extend the Russian Black Sea Fleet's presence in Sebastopol for another 25 years in exchange for a reduced price for Russian gas. But some time later Kiev started demanding a revision of the price, considering it unfair. Moscow, for its part, demands acquisition of at least half of the shares in Ukraine's gas transmission system, following the same tactic that had been successfully used in relation to Belarus. Simultaneously, the pressure on Kiev is mounting, the creation of a free trade zone of the CIS is being blocked and attempts are being made to coax Ukraine into joining the Customs Union established by Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan.

A similar situation is observed in the implementation of alternative energy projects. Russia's energy policy proceeds from its economic and national interests. At the same time, Moscow is trying to maintain its monopoly on the transportation of energy resources from the entire post-Soviet area, which makes little contribution to the strengthening of relations between the states within the framework of the CIS. Let's also have a look at the issue of developing and strengthening relations with the West, Europe and NATO. For example, Moscow is not very enthusiastic about the EU's Eastern Partnership project in which CIS countries are involved. However, Russia itself is pursuing a policy of rapprochement with leading EU countries. On the other hand, while occasionally offering NATO various options of cooperation, Russia has expressed strong dissatisfaction with the Partnership for Peace program in which other CIS members are also involved. 

Vladimir Putin said in a speech when he was president that Russia's foreign political priority is the CIS. For the sake of objectivity it should be acknowledged that, unlike the Russian government of the 1990s, the current Russian leadership pays more attention to post-Soviet republics. But again, unfortunately, it often uses the old vicious tactics which were once skilfully exploited by the central authorities of the USSR. Today, Russia is rightfully considered the most powerful and influential country in the former Soviet Union in all respects. It can lead integration processes within the CIS. But to do this, it first has to contribute to the solution of all ethnic conflicts in the region in line with international law and respect for the territorial integrity of any state.

Only such steps can strengthen Russia's geopolitical influence in the former Soviet Union, making it a true leader of the CIS. And relying on such authority, Russia may even initiate (of course, with the support of other CIS members) the creation of an organization like the European Union. Otherwise, the prospects for the CIS are rather dim.