A SEALED BORDER

The closer we get to the centenary of the events of 1915 in Ottoman Turkey, which the Armenians recognize as nothing short of genocide, the more emotions are building up. But the things happening around this "significant date" and the statements being made do not answer the main question: will Turkey loosen its position on the subject of the "genocide" and, consequently, the opening of Armenia's borders against the interests of fraternal Azerbaijan?

Alarming signals from Turkey

The Turkish leadership at the highest level has always spoken about being faithful to its commitments not to open the border with Armenia until it removes the very reason for the closing of these borders, i.e. it liberates the occupied Azerbaijani territories. Statements about the firmness of this position from the president, the prime minister and other Turkish leaders are still being made. However, the steps taken in this context do not always conform to these statements.

In particular, a number of forums have been held lately attended by representatives from Turkey and Armenia on improving bilateral relations. There was a meeting of representatives of the media of both countries on the subject "A sealed border: the future of the Turkey-Armenia border", organized by the University of Ankara and the Hrant Dink Foundation. The theme running through all these meetings was the idea of how good it would be if the borders opened at least tomorrow.

Another alarm bell sounded following reports that the post of advisor to the Turkish prime minister had been filled by his old friend, Etyen Mahcupyan, an ethnic Armenian, although the new advisor was rapidly transformed from an object of delight to an object of criticism: to the surprise of his associates Mahcupyan said President Recep Tayyip Erdogan could not take part in the events to mark the centenary of the "genocide of the Armenians" due to be held in Yerevan.

However, Turkish diplomat Ahmet Unal Cevikoz's comments that in all these 20 years the closed Armenia-Turkey border had not led to any progress in the Karabakh question and therefore there was no point in keeping it closed to the detriment of both countries came like a bolt from the blue. "We need new rules of the game," he wrote in Hurriyet Daily News, pointing out that in order to confirm its positions Turkey could come up with a new initiative to break the impasse. "This could be done by opening the border with Armenia and using Armenian-Turkish and Armenian-Azerbaijani relations," stressed the Turkish diplomat, who played an immediate active part in the process linked with the signing of the Zurich protocols on an Armenian-Turkish reconciliation.

It will be recalled that Cevikoz used to be Turkish ambassador to Azerbaijan, and such a statement coming from a man who could hardly be accused of antipathy towards Baku, is quite something.

Turkey is not the first country to encounter pressure over the "Armenian question". And this pressure, especially coming from Ankara's western partners, is not only real, but is increasing as 24 April draws nearer. "Turkey could review its relations with the US if the authorities in that country raise the question of the events of 1915 next year," Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said. The Turkish side had grounds for such a categorical statement. Relations between Ankara and Washington have seen better days. Clearly, the Turkish side has no guarantees that the US' leaders, evidently angry at Turkey's reluctance to fully support America's military campaign against the extremists of Islamic State, will act in April as they did before, i.e. they will not acknowledge the "genocide of the Armenians". At least, the representatives of the Armenian lobby make no secret of their hopes that the day marking the centenary of the "genocide" will be a special one in terms of the US' assessment of these events.

Azerbaijan needs to weigh up any option in order to prevent events developing against their interests, which so far it has done successfully. Keeping Armenia in isolation is one of the main elements in Azerbaijan's Karabakh strategy. Meanwhile, international attempts to break this blockade are being made not only in a Turkish-westerly, but also in a northerly direction.

A Georgian window for those short of breath

Last week Russian President Vladimir Putin received the Abkhaz separatist leader, Raul Khadzhimba. The Russian media said one of the surprises of the meeting in Sochi was Putin's proposal to fully restore the rail line from Russia to Armenia through Georgian territory (trains currently run from Russia only as far as Sukhumi)."We believe it is possible, together with other partners, to consider and with common consent to implement such a project, for example, as a transit rail link to Sukhumi and Tbilisi and on to Armenia. We believe that the implementation of projects of this kind will undoubtedly help to create conditions for the development of cooperation between all the interested parties in the region," Putin said.

Russia's desire to draw its outpost Armenia out of international isolation is understandable. But there can be no talk of restoring railway communications without Georgia's consent. Paata Zakareishvili, Georgia's Minister for Reconciliation and Civic Equality, believes that a line can be drawn under the implementation of the Abkhaz rail project but only because Putin and Khadzhimba have decided the future of the project without taking into account Tbilisi's position. "We have never been against it, because it has been in Georgia's state interests. But Putin killed this idea stone dead as soon as he said that the railway would open at the initiative of Russia and Abkhazia. So long as occupied Abkhazia is regarded as the initiator of this project, the railway will not function," Zakareishvili said the day after Putin's statement in Sochi.

In other words, Georgia has nothing in principal against the restoration of the rail link with Russia and its extension to Armenia. The incumbent leadership in Georgia, unlike its predecessors, has shown itself to be a proponent of a "soft line" in its relations with Moscow, i.e. it prefers to solve problems in relations with its northern neighbour through dialogue and cooperation. How effective this approach is in solving the problem of Georgia's territorial integrity is another question, especially in the light of a number of statements by Russian leaders that the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is irreversible and not open to appeal. However, the confidence with which the Russian leader expressed his optimism regarding the opening of the railway leads one to believe that Moscow still has means of persuading Georgia.

It would appear that border emotions are subjecting the strategic Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey alliance to another test. In recent years Baku, in a situation that has been difficult for Tbilisi and Ankara, has more than once proved its loyalty to its commitments within this alliance. Will Turkey and Georgia be able to do the same by overcoming external pressure? Statements by the leaders of these countries give reason for optimism, but now is the time to turn words into deeds.