"THE RISK OF WAR REMAINS"

There seems to be no possibility of any major progress for the time being towards a peaceful settlement of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, said Mikhail Vinogradov, Russian political analyst and president of the "St.Petersburg Politics" Foundation, in an interview for our magazine.  He bases his pessimism on the fact that the parties in the conflict are still not prepared to compromise. He also holds the Minsk group of the OSCE responsible for the lack of progress. The only benefit arising from international mediation, he believes, is that there have been no combat operations in the conflict zone. At the same time, Vinogradov thinks that mediation towards a Karabakh settlement will continue this year, especially by the Russians. 

- Compared with the other two co-chairing countries of the OSCE's Minsk group, Russia has been very active in the settlement process of the Karabakh conflict. The year has only just begun but Russia has already brokered one meeting at foreign minister level between the parties to the conflict. Does this mean that Moscow will be just as active on this issue in 2011 or, in a year of elections to the State Duma, will most attention be focused on domestic political issues?

- I don't think the election will make a big difference. The domestic political situation in Russia is difficult but not so difficult that foreign policy will be ignored. Basically, one should not think of a direct link between the elections and foreign policy. Besides, Armenia-Azerbaijan relations are not significant in Russia as far as the election is concerned, or at least they will not affect how the election pans out. Russia has, first and foremost, a vested interest in there not being a war in the region. Therefore, if the situation teeters on the brink of war or, on the other hand, Moscow feels that there is a chance of progress in the talks between Yerevan and Baku, it will be more active in peacemaking. Generally speaking, the feeling is that the best that can be achieved is the prevention of war. Significant progress in the territorial dispute between Azerbaijan and Armenia does not seem possible at the moment.

- How would you describe Russia's political aims in the Southern Caucasus?

- First of all, Russia doesn't want a war in this region which could draw Moscow in, directly or indirectly. That is why an escalation of tension leading to an outbreak of hostilities must be avoided at all costs. The outcome of the Karabakh conflict: whether maintenance of the status-quo, an exchange of territories or one country swallowing the region, is of no significance for Russia.

-  Some people are of the opinion that a settlement of the Karabakh conflict will reduce Russia's importance to Armenia and Azerbaijan…

- First of all, a solution to this problem does not appear likely at the moment. Secondly, Georgia is more important to Russia than relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan. Moscow currently has close relations with Baku and Yerevan. Therefore the subject of Karabakh is not a tool to manipulate the countries of the Southern Caucasus like the question of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in attempts to influence Georgia. Moscow's tactics in Abkhazia and South Ossetia are not being employed in the Karabakh question. So I don't think that Russia fears that a solution to the Karabakh conflict might reduce its influence in the region.

- Talks within the framework of the OSCE's Minsk Group have been going on for over 16 years. How advisable would it be to alter the format of the talks?

- No-one has vetoed new formulae for talks on a settlement to the conflict. It is to the Minsk group's credit that there have been no hostilities, but it is to its discredit that there has been no progress in achieving a peace agreement. A settlement seems out of the question at the moment, and at best one can say the conflict has become frozen.

-  What do you think of the US' efforts to resolve the Karabakh problem? And what is behind Washington's passivity on the issue?

- Clearly, the Karabakh problem is not of major importance to the White House. They, too, do not want a resumption of war. Generally speaking, the South Caucasus is not a priority region for the US. Russia has always had a greater focus on the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict.

- How great is the risk of a resumption of war in Karabakh this year?

- There is always the possibility of that. There have been exchanges of fire and military rhetoric between the sides in Karabakh, So, the possibility is there, but it is not great.

- But is there still the likelihood of a compromise being found between the principal of territorial integrity and the right of a nation to self-determination?

- These two ideological phantoms lie beyond the scope of real politics. Politics is an area of compromise. I think the most rational solution to the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict is an exchange of territories, but this does not square with the principles of territorial integrity or the right of peoples to self-determination. At the same time, the public in the warring countries are not prepared for this option.

- The Armenian opposition is planning to organize nationwide anti-government protests on the anniversary of the bloody events of March 2008 in Yerevan. The opposition's main demand is for the authorities to resign. How might a hypothetical fall of Serzh Sargsyan impact on Armenia-Russia relations?

- Russian support is not the only influence on the Armenian authorities. There is the immediate strength of the Karabakh clan itself, which currently dominates in Armenia. Almost without exception, Russia attempts to back the incumbent power. Sometimes this is done without enthusiasm, as was the case with Kyrgyzstan. If there is no great 'allergy' then the Kremlin is prepared to cooperate with any political force which may come to power in Armenia, although the incumbent Armenian authorities are the ones most suited to Moscow.

- As you are aware, Jose Manuel Barroso, the head of the European Commission, who reached certain agreements on Caspian gas supplies to Europe, visited Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan quite recently. Bearing in mind Moscow's negative attitude towards the "Southern Corridor" project being lobbied by the EU, how might the implementation of the Nabucco project affect the situation in the Southern Caucasus?

- The Nabucco project could be an irritant in Russia whatever the circumstances. However, Russia has different kinds of relations with its foreign partners in the energy sphere. For example, Russia's relations with Ukraine in this area have always been bad; at the same time the Turkmen authorities have been allowed to get away with quite a lot. Of course, Russia does not welcome this project, but there will not be any radical change in its relations with Azerbaijan. There are doubts in Russia as to its economic feasibility. I also do not believe that Nabucco can in any way move things forward to a Karabakh settlement.