TEHRAN UNDER PRESSURE

The "Iran issue" remains one of the most critical factors in international relations.  There is every reason to believe that in the coming year, this problem will approach solution.  The only question is the form and nature it will take.  Recent events show that, unfortunately, the prospects for a non-peaceful resolution remain a possibility.

US sanctions and the British ambassador

As for sanctions, the new US anti-Iran sanctions must be noted first and foremost.  As has happened many times before, Washington cites Tehran's refusal to halt its nuclear and missile programmes and its support for the radical, Lebanon-based Hezbollah movement as the reasons for introducing new sanctions.  This time around, two Iranian banks, an insurance company, a freight company and the state-owned shipping company of the Islamic Republic of Iran are included.  Accused of having ties with the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution, these organizations will from now on be banned from any relations with the US financial system, and all assets of the "banned" Iranian companies will be frozen in the United States.

It is worth noting that the tightening of the US's unilateral sanctions against Iran took place soon after talks between the Iranian delegation and "the six" (five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany) on 6-7 December in Geneva.  The sides agreed that a new round of talks on Iran's nuclear programme would take place in late January 2011, in Istanbul.  In this context, Washington's decision should be regarded as ratcheting up the pressure on Tehran to coerce the Iranian side into greater pliability at talks which stand a good chance of being resumed after a lengthy hiatus.  The talks were suspended in 2009 when Iran brought its second uranium enrichment facility into operation.  In June 2010, the UN Security Council passed a new anti-Iran resolution, initiating tougher sanctions against the country as it refused to comply with the international community's demand to suspend uranium enrichment.

In the absence of talks, the conflict between Iran and the West escalates further.  The current crisis in relations between Tehran and London is one manifestation.  The National Security and Foreign Policy Committee of the Iranian Parliament approved a draft law to sever all ties (political, cultural and economic) with Britain.  This decision followed the publication on the web site of the British embassy in Iran of an article by British Ambassador Simon Gass on the human rights situation there.  The ambassador accused the Iranian authorities of "depriving the people of their fundamental freedoms" and drew attention to the numerous arrests of human rights activists.  "Nowhere are lawyers, journalists and NGO workers, who place themselves at risk to defend their compatriots, under greater threat than in Iran," wrote Simon Gass.  He was soon summoned to the Iranian Foreign Ministry, where he was told that interference in Iran's domestic affairs was inadmissible.  A number of influential Iranian politicians demanded that the diplomat should be expelled from the country immediately for his "insulting and humiliating fusillades" against Iran and that relations with Britain should be downscaled.

Gass's move was the last straw, as it were, and it exhausted Tehran's patience, already long tested by British policy.  And London's tough position on the Iranian nuclear programme is not the only factor here.  Tehran accuses London of openly supporting the Iranian opposition and of provoking mass disorders in the country last year.  Relations between the two countries were further strained recently by Tehran's accusations that the British intelligence service MI 6 was involved in organizing the 29 November terrorist actions in the Iranian capital in which nuclear physicist Majid Shahriari was killed and laser physicist Fereydoon Abbasi was wounded.  The Iranian authorities also accuse the British, US and Israeli secret services of sponsoring the terrorist organization Jundallah.

This is why the decision of the Iranian parliamentarians cannot be regarded as a sudden fit of temper.  Mohammad Karami-Rad, spokesman for the parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, said that "committee members condemned the recent statements by the British ambassador in Tehran and other hostile steps which have been taken by the British Government against our country throughout history."

The anti-British draft law was sent for final discussion and approval to the Presiding Board of the Iranian Parliament.  Of course, the Board might not approve the decision to sever relations with Britain.  However, one thing is clear:  under increasing pressure from the West, Tehran is, for its part, showing its readiness to achieve its final goal and develop its nuclear programme, even at the expense of relations with any Western country.

Indeed, Iran's international situation is increasingly unenviable, especially as not only the Western powers are standing tough against Tehran; other leading players in the international political arena are also demanding transparency in Iran's nuclear programme.  During Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev's visit to India, the leaders of both countries urged Iran to comply with the provisions of UN Security Council resolutions and ensure the required level of cooperation with the IAEA.

Domestic political factors

Against the backdrop of this exacerbation of the "Iran problem," internal political struggles are also intensifying.  Only this time, the opposition's protests and demands for reform are replaced by growing discord within the Iranian leadership.  The sacking of Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki and the appointment of Ali Akbar Salehi  as acting foreign minister, he is the country's vice president and head of the Iranian Nuclear Energy Agency, was symptomatic here.  Mottaki's inability to prevent the introduction of new anti-Iran sanctions by the UN Security Council was listed among the main reasons for his dismissal by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.  However, some analysts argue that Ahmadinejad simply did not want to continue working with Mottaki, who is regarded as being close to Parliamentary Speaker Ali Larijani.  Larijani is considered to be the future presidential candidate from the conservative forces.  There is also talk of increasing support for Larijani from Iran's spiritual leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

To all appearances, the discontent among top-level Iranian clerics with Ahmadinejad's activities stems from his attempts to broaden his powers, often manifested in his actions and statements in the international arena.  Nepotism is also mentioned among Ahmadinejad's serious shortcomings, and the Iranian president's excessive patronage of his son-in-law Rahim Mashai is cited as proof.  It should be remembered here that soon after the presidential election in Iran in June 2009, Ahmadinejad appointed Mashai as his first deputy - although there is a post of vice president in Iran.  This move angered the conservative elite, who pressurised Ahmadinejad into changing his decision and appointing Mashai chief of the presidential staff.  However, this did not alleviate the conservatives' growing irritation with the president, although he is actually a representative of their political camp.

In the mean time, the burden of sanctions is increasingly noticeable throughout the Iranian economy.  The Iranian Government's decision to limit subsidies on fuel and food is one result.  Ahmadinejad said that reducing the subsidies was the "largest-scale major surgery" on the Iranian economy in the last 50 years.  However, this type of "surgery" means a quadrupling of petrol prices and a reduction in bread subsidies.  It is not surprising, therefore, that immediately after the publication of the government's decision, policing was stepped up in Tehran's streets.  Riots in Iran are unlikely at present; however, the unpredictability of political and socioeconomic processes in that country parallels the uncertainty surrounding Iran's nuclear programme, which is holding the world in suspense.  And, pessimistic as this might sound, the year 2011 will probably be no less dangerous in terms of possible contingencies in the "Iranian crisis" than were preceding years.