HOPES DASHED

Unfortunately, the OSCE Minsk Group's efforts to bring Baku and Yerevan closer together around the so-called Madrid principles have been in vain.

Contrary to expectations, the Armenian side did not accept, even subject to reservations, the revised version of the Madrid principles which were officially proposed as early as summer 2009 at the OSCE foreign ministers summit in Athens.  Although the Armenians requested time for consideration earlier this year in remarks and notes at the trilateral meeting of Presidents Medvedev, Aliyev and Sargsyan in Sochi, Yerevan has never given a clear-cut "yes" or "no" and without this, it is impossible to begin work on a framework peace treaty.

Obviously, the illegitimate President Serzh Sargsyan, who does not feel secure in his presidential tenure, needs elections only to prolong the status quo.  A resolution of the conflict without legalizing the secession of Nagornyy-Karabakh from Azerbaijan and seizing a sizeable chunk of Azerbaijani territory on the pretext of the need for a "corridor" to boot, is unacceptable to Sargsyan and his team.  After all, at stake for them is not Nagornyy-Karabakh at all, but all Armenia, which was seized by a clan from Karabakh and is exploited in its venal interests.  Should the Madrid principles be adopted (they very much resemble the Minsk Group's "phased plan", whose adoption resulted in the enforced retirement of President Levon Ter-Petrosyan in the late 1990s) they will be called to account not only by Armenian radicals, but by the whole nation for their unrealistic and unfulfilled promises.  As a result of this unproductive policy, Armenia has lost 12 years of peace and development and finds itself outside the large-scale regional projects - on the other hand, the Karabakh clan, which has privatized political power in Armenia, has become fabulously rich.

However, concluding from this that the diplomatic efforts were useless and 2010 was wasted time, is not fully justified. Let me remind you that on 20 May 2010, the European Parliament passed a resolution based on the Report on the need for an EU strategy for the South Caucasus by Bulgarian MEP Evgeni Kirilov.  In particular, the resolution reads that an "interim status can be proposed for Nagornyy-Karabakh, and the final status of Nagornyy-Karabakh is to be determined in the future by a legally-binding expression of will, the right of all internally-displaced persons and refugees to return and international security guarantees," which will bring about peaceful coexistence and cooperation among the Armenian and Azerbaijani peoples."  The document urges, "withdraw Armenian troops from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan."

The NATO summit in Lisbon, which Serzh Sargsyan decided not to attend, turned out to be just as disappointing for Armenia. Clause 35 of the declaration adopted at the summit reads: "With our vision of a Euro-Atlantic area at peace, the persistence of protracted regional conflicts in the South Caucasus and the Republic of Moldova continues to be a matter of great concern for the Alliance. We urge all parties to engage constructively and with reinforced political will in peaceful conflict resolution, and to respect the current negotiation formats. We call on them all to avoid steps that undermine regional security and stability. We remain committed in our support of the territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty (highlighted by the author) of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova, and will also continue to support efforts towards a peaceful settlement of these regional conflicts, taking into account these principles." As is clear from this passage, the heads of NATO member states have ignored the "right to self-determination," a principle to which Armenians appeal all the time to veil their territorial claims, and therefore, their hopes of using the so-called "Kosovo precedent" for their own purposes are groundless.

At Azerbaijan's demand, a fact-finding mission of the OSCE Minsk Group was sent to the territory occupied by Armenians, and report summarizing its work will be sent to the parties next month. Based on the assessments and conclusions of this report, Azerbaijan can put to a vote at the General Assembly an appropriate resolution condemning the Armenian occupation of the Azerbaijani territories, which is against international law, and their actions which cause damage to our country.

Finally, the statement adopted in Astana during the OSCE summit on the Nagornyy-Karabakh conflict in the 3+2 format is also important. Heads of delegations from the OSCE Minsk Group member countries - Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev, French Prime Minister Francois Fillon and US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, together with Armenian and Azerbaijani Presidents Serzh Sargsyan and Ilham Aliyev, agreed that  the time has come for more decisive steps in resolving the Nagornyy-Karabakh conflict. The Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents confirmed their readiness for final regulation of the conflict in accordance with the principles of international law, the UN Charter and the Final Helsinki Act and on the basis of joint statements by Russia, France and the United States made on 10 July 2009 in Aquila and on 26 June 2010 in Muskoka.

The fundamental Madrid Principles envisage, in accordance with statements made by the US, French and Russian presidents in Aquila and Muskoka:

- Restoring Azerbaijani control of the territories surrounding Nagornyy-Karabakh;

- Granting interim status to Nagornyy-Karabakh and providing guarantees of security and self-governance;

- Opening a corridor between Armenia and Nagornyy-Karabakh;

- Determining in the future the final legal status of Nagornyy-Karabakh on the basis of a legally binding, compulsory expression of will;

- Upholding the right of all the internally displaced persons and refugees to return to their homes;

-  Providing international guarantees of security, including peace support operations.

As we can see, nothing is said about the possibility of Nagornyy-Karabakh seceding from Azerbaijan in the discussion about its status, whereas the liberation of the occupied territories and the return of the displaced persons and refugees are worded quite unambiguously.

The international community, in the form of its most influential organizations and countries, has outlined in 2010 the political and legal parameters of a resolution of the Nagornyy-Karabakh conflict. However, for a number of reasons, and not least because of their unwillingness to spoil relations with influential Armenian lobbies, the US and French governments do not want to put Yerevan under strong pressure and have left the job of persuading Serzh Sargsyan to Russia. And Moscow, to all appearances, is into double dealing.

On the one hand, Russian Federation President Dmitriy Medvedev and the Russian Foreign Ministry display great energy, organizing trilateral meetings and pushing the sides to compromise. On the other hand, in striving not only to bargain for its Armenian outpost, but also to promote its own geopolitical and economic interests, which are unacceptable to Azerbaijan, Moscow is in no rush to accelerate a resolution.

It appears that Russia is not averse to limiting itself to symbolic steps which cannot progress a Karabakh solution, and this is also utterly unacceptable for Baku. This has become evident to other member states of the Minsk Group too; they pointed out in the statement adopted in Astana that they intend to step up their own mediation efforts. So Russia's solo on the Karabakh issue, observed this year, will probably give way to trilateral initiatives with the participation of France and the United States.

The absence of real progress in regulating the Karabakh conflict causes profound disappointment among Azerbaijanis and increases the number of people who have lost faith in the talks and call for an end to the OSCE Minsk Group's mediation services and for liberation of the occupied territories by force.  However, while the guns are silent, there is still a chance for peaceful regulation. It is important not to succumb to emotion and irritation, to exercise constraint and to continue the policy of building economic, diplomatic, information and even military pressure on Armenia.  Azerbaijan has the ability to do this. Its growing economy, sizeable financial reserves, developing military-industrial complex, increasing defence budget, which is to double in 2011 to reach $3 billion, the completion of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway and other projects - all this must finally swing the balance in Azerbaijan's favour.

Although Armenia does not admit this, they have less room to manoeuvre now. Lines of communication between Russia and Armenia remain closed, especially for military logistics purposes. Recovery in the Armenian economy, after the unprecedented 14% fall in 2009, is slow (only 2% growth) and the financial situation continues to worsen. In 2011, Armenia's foreign debt will reach $3.9 billion and might rise to $4.4 billion. Many highly qualified analysts, including former Prime Minister Grant Bagratyan, former Yerevan mayor Vaagn Khachatryan and others, say that despite official statements and forecasts, the country is sliding implacably toward default. Indirect evidence for this is that Armenia's reserves fell by $160 million in 2010. But what will happen when expenditure on servicing foreign debt triples in 2012 and when new loans are refused or linked to political demands?

Armenia's reliance on the Collective Security Treaty Organization was proven to be in vain at the latest meeting of that organization in Moscow. And Yerevan has no resources of its own to maintain military parity with Azerbaijan. The belief in salvation from Russia is weakening. Serzh Sargsyan's statements about a readiness to recognize the "independence of the Republic of Nagornyy-Karabakh" should Azerbaijan resume military operations, indicates that he realizes that war is drawing near. But at the same time, no matter how decisive his statements sound on first hearing, Serzh Sargsyan effectively proves that there will be no "recognition" of Nagornyy-Karabakh without the green light from Moscow.

In the absence of real progress on a peaceful resolution of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, increased military tension is inevitable. This will manifest itself in growing military budgets, an arms race, intensified and hostile rhetoric, more frequent military exercises and a spike in the exchanges of fire and incidents on the front line. Presumably, the mediating countries and other forces interested in a peaceful solution are still able to prevent the development of the situation along a negative scenario. To achieve this, it would suffice to coerce Armenia into direct acceptance of the Madrid principles, rather than indirectly, and to discuss and develop a peace treaty.

The mediating powers will have to do this, not only because it is in their interests, but also to free Armenians from the burden of confrontation with Azerbaijan, which is too heavy a toll for their demographic and economic potential. After all, if the status quo is maintained and lines of communication remain blocked, many important projects, whose implementation suits the  interests of Russia, the USA and the EU, will not be carried out or will be associated with great risks. And finally, supporting excessive Armenian ambition and missing very tangible benefits in Azerbaijan is hardly a rational policy for any country. So the search for a peaceful resolution will continue, but in the context of growing strength and pressure from Azerbaijan.