WHAT DID THE SUMMIT REVEAL?

The seventh summit of OSCE heads of states, held in early December in Astana, did not live up to expectations. Analyzing its results, most experts believe that the summit was a failure, primarily because of the vagueness of the final declaration.

It was expected that OSCE members would reach consensus on developing integrated measures for security and cooperation from Vancouver to Vladivostok. In this respect, the main subject of discussion in Astana was to be ways to resolve conflicts in this area, without which there is no point in talking about security, stability or full cooperation. That is why the post-Soviet countries, faced with aggression and separatist claims, were more interested in concrete results from the summit.

This also applies to Baku, which has long complained of the amorphous and flabby activity of the OSCE Minsk Group - the main moderator of the Nagornyy Karabakh conflict which has lingered for almost 20 years.

Some hope was inspired by the visit of an OSCE evaluation mission to the occupied Azerbaijani territories around Nagornyy Karabakh about two months before the summit, as well as by an intensive programme of visits to the region by the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs, who promised to prepare a document by the Astana summit that would facilitate a breakthrough in the Armenian-Azerbaijani settlement.

Failure to adopt a serious document on the conflict seemed possible in only two situations. If the co-chair countries had not prepared the promised document for some reason; this seemed unlikely since they had made quite encouraging statements; or if Armenia adopted a destructive stance, which has long since become the aggressor's trademark.

The summit, unfortunately, revealed that the first case applied. It became clear that the co-chairs had failed to draw up an acceptable document on the Nagornyy Karabakh conflict because of deep contradictions in their own geopolitical interests and a general lack of unity of approach to conflicts in the former Soviet and European areas.

This explains the intrigues that developed ahead of the summit: although initially it was expected that the OSCE evaluation mission's report on Nagornyy Karabakh would be announced before the summit, it was announced later that release had been postponed until next year. Thus, one of the most important issues, on which Armenia could have faced heavy pressure in Astana, was removed from the agenda. This point should be studied carefully and the mission must give a good explanation to justify its tardiness.

Some confusion in the work of the summit was caused by Moscow's pre-emptive statement that if the final declaration in Astana included points that did not suit it, then Russia would refuse to sign the document. What lay behind this warning from the Kremlin? Clearly, this statement emerged from the Georgian-Abkhazian, Georgian-South Ossetian and the Dniestr conflicts and had no direct relation to Nagornyy Karabakh. Moscow has repeatedly stated its commitment to a settlement of the Nagornyy Karabakh conflict within the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. Moreover, in the recent period, Russia has notably strengthened its position in negotiations on the conflict, almost leaving the other member countries of the OSCE Minsk Group in the shade.

Thus it seems unlikely that Moscow was not interested in adopting a serious document on Nagornyy Karabakh in Astana.

Rather, the problem lies elsewhere: the USA and Russia are no longer able to consider all conflicts in the former Soviet Union separately. That is to say, it is a matter of the great powers adopting a package agreement on these conflicts: either they are all solved on the basis of the principle of the inviolability of existing borders, or on the right of nations to self-determination (many mistakenly think that these two are mutually exclusive principles of international law).

The question of Georgia's territorial integrity is a major stumbling block in relations between the US, its allies and Russia. The Dniester problem, although it is not yet so acute, is also a negative factor in this relationship. Therefore, in any convenient situation, the West tries to put Moscow in an awkward position, focusing on the territorial integrity of these countries. Here, of course, a similar question arises about the inviolability of Azerbaijan's existing borders - a key country in the South Caucasus and the most important link in energy security for Europe. In this scenario, NATO faces a difficult choice: either it voices a unified approach to the issue of states' territorial integrity, which would strengthen confidence in the organization; or it ignores Baku's just demands and adopts a half-hearted document which mentions only Georgia and Moldova; or it does nothing and loses face. It is encouraging that the North Atlantic Alliance displayed a political will and chose the first option.

Since Moscow warned about the undesirability of some points that could be included in the final declaration before the summit in Astana, it became clear that difficult discussions awaited everyone in the Kazakh capital.

Russia is particularly irritated by Western pressure to re-admit the OSCE observer mission to the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict zone. The Kremlin believes that this is impossible because, following the events of August 2008, Abkhazia and South Ossetia gained "independence" and automatically left the list of conflict zones. Moscow was not going to add anything new to its positions in Astana, let alone allow alternative views into the final declaration.

In short, Moscow believes that the question of Georgia's territorial integrity is closed, as proved by debates on the issue in Astana, as well as the move by the Russian delegation. Following the advance warning from the Kremlin, the presidents of the United States and France - two countries co-chairing the OSCE Minsk Group - refused to take part in the summit, which can also be regarded as a silent protest to Moscow. Obama and Sarkozy's refusal to attend the summit reduced its significance at once. It became clear that no major change would be achieved on the Nagornyy Karabakh conflict. The disagreements between the West and Russia a priori doomed the OSCE's Astana summit to failure. After clarifying these realities, the emboldened Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan announced his participation in the summit, although it had been rumoured that he might refuse to travel to Astana. Now Sargsyan was confident that Armenia would not be subjected to serious pressure from leading members of the OSCE and the Minsk Group co-chairs.

As for Azerbaijan, on the very first day of the summit, President Ilham Aliyev said it was unacceptable to have further delay in settling the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. In their speeches, Turkish President Abdullah Gul, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi also emphasized that, in this case, it was high time for decisive action; the co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group agreed. In a joint declaration, Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev, French Prime Minister Francois Fillon and US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, joined by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan, also noted that it was time to take more decisive steps to resolve the conflict. The presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan confirmed their readiness for a final settlement of the Karabakh conflict in accordance with the principles of international law, the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, as well as on the basis of joint statements made by Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev, French President Nicolas Sarkozy and US President Barack Obama in L'Aquila and Muskoka. Although such a vague statement cannot fully suit the Azerbaijani side, I think that the mention of the Muskoka statements by the presidents of the countries co-chairing the OSCE Minsk Group clearly favours Azerbaijan. This document is not about the self-determination of Nagornyy Karabakh, about which the Armenian side speculates, but about self-rule within Azerbaijan. But, unfortunately, the co-chair countries did not show the necessary political will, as was the case at the OSCE Lisbon Summit in 1996. The extremely amorphous position of these countries in Astana was salvation for the aggressor Armenia and a sign of the OSCE's weakness as a major regional organization. This was evidenced by the summit's final declaration, which was adopted after a 10-hour debate.

Speaking generally about the desire to solve the protracted conflicts in the former Soviet Union, the OSCE summit did not adopt a particular document or action plan directly related to possible solutions.

In principle, the OSCE has not yet manifested itself as an organization able to play a key role in resolving the conflict. Its activity was visible only in establishing cooperation in the post-conflict period. An analysis of OSCE expenditure shows that conflicts in the former Soviet Union are not a priority. Only 1.4 per cent of the OSCE budget is spent on the settlement of the Nagornyy Karabakh conflict - that is mostly travel expenses for the co-chairs' visits to the region. The question arises: how appropriate was it to begin the settlement process within the OSCE? We can assume that, firstly, this format was imposed on the conflicting parties by the leading countries of the OSCE. Secondly, all three countries co-chairing the OSCE Minsk Group are permanent members of the UN Security Council, which inspired great hope for a speedy settlement of the conflict in this format. Perhaps, after the summit in Astana, Baku will make every effort to bring this process under the auspices of the UN, which has specific mechanisms of pressure on the aggressor. Events show that the OSCE is engaged not in addressing the issue, but in imitation.

On the other hand, it is time to clarify the vague principle of the right to self-determination. International law should clearly define boundaries of this principle which everyone interprets differently.

Today this principle does not contribute to the settlement of disputes, but causes new conflicts and separatist aspirations. That is why a single mechanism should be developed which clearly identifies situations in which the application of the principle is legitimate.