IS THE ROAD TO LISBON GOING THROUGH DEAUVILLE?

It is no exaggeration to say that all NATO and the European Union (EU) member states are waiting impatiently for the next summit of the North Atlantic alliance in Lisbon, slated for 19-20 November. At this summit, NATO members are to approve a new Strategic Concept for the alliance to replace the one adopted in 1999.

An influential group of qualified experts, led by Madeleine Albright, was set up to carry out preliminary work on the new concept. In May this year the "wise men" presented their analysis and recommendations in a final document: "NATO in 2020: Guaranteed security, dynamic interaction".

The document states that one of the most promising directions for genuine cooperation between NATO and Russia is the establishment of a joint architecture for an anti-missile defence (ABM) system. NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen is an active supporter of this idea. He maintains that the Kremlin's involvement would provide the system with the best territorial coverage and would make it more effective. This new concept of European Defence, with Russia as an important element of the defensive system, is proposed by President of France Nicholas Sarkozy and German Chancellor Angela Merkel.

As this problem has long been one of the sharpest irritants in relations between Russia, the USA and NATO, on the other hand, then its resolution could help to establish an overall Euro-Atlantic system of security in the 21st century. And it is quite clear that in the Lisbon discussions on a new strategic concept for NATO, the question of cooperation between the alliance and Russia on ABMs cannot be avoided.

We should underline that Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev received an invitation to attend this summit from Nicholas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel at a tripartite meeting in Deauville in October, organized on the French president's initiative. Agreeing to attend the Lisbon summit, as well as not ruling out Russia's involvement in the project, Dmitriy Medvedev has, nevertheless, stressed that all will be decided when the alliance gives more detailed information: "It should be understood what capacity is envisaged for Russia's involvement in this system and in what manner agreements will be built. We can answer only after assessing this proposal."

Judging by the reactions of many western countries, they were not pleased with either the Russian president's rhetoric or the zeal of the French and Germany leaders in establishing close mutual relations with Moscow. That is to say, Nicholas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel's original separate agreement with Dmitriy Medvedev has caused a squall of discontent from many countries, especially the USA, allies of France and Germany in NATO and the EU.

Italian Prime Minister Silvia Berlusconi also regretted that he was not invited to the Deauville meeting. Moreover, Italy suspects that Berlin and Paris want to go over the heads of their NATO and EU allies to create a new European union with Moscow. But the participants have shown that they don't intend to change the format of tripartite meetings, thereby assuming for themselves the leading role on the European continent, and ensuring the continuation of "the big three" along with the G8 and the G-20.

This open challenge from Paris and Berlin provoked noisy complaint in the higher circles of the EU, some hours prior to the opening in Brussels of an important summit on 28 October. Viviane Reding, European Commissioner for Justice and Home Affairs, openly accused France and Germany of plotting to change fundamental agreements of the European Union.

In Deauville, Merkel and Sarkozy agreed on the establishment of a new structure and the introduction of new rules on financial regulation in the EU's euro zone, not ruling out a need for new coordinated rules to reconsider a number of arrangements included in the Lisbon agreement. Reding expressed her sharply negative attitude towards the methods adopted by the French and German leaders: "In my opinion, acting upon chimerical ideas on new agreements is irresponsible. All-European decisions aren't adopted in Deauville, especially between two EU countries. This is done in Brussels with all 27 member states of the union, on the basis of serious proposals that consider the interests of all 500m residents of the European Union."

Financial issues with an ulterior motive caused alarm in EU steering circles. The point is that the tripartite meeting in Deauville indicated a strengthening of cooperation between the three countries, which is especially important in view of France's future presidency of the G-20.

Merkel and Medvedev have assured Sarkozy of their support and are in favour of his project to reform the world's currency system. The French president also wants Medvedev to take part in the discussion of regulation of raw markets, which is one of the main problems of the French presidency ofthe G-20. Some experts assert that Sarkozy organized the summit and the negotiations in Deauville partly to prepare for France's presidency of the G-20 of the leading global economies.

In her turn, Merkel supports France on the regulation of the markets and supports discussions with Russia in the framework of the G-20 for more rigid rules in the financial sector. The leaders of France and Russia have also supported Merkel's proposal to set up a Russia-EU political committee chaired by S. Lavrov and C. Ashton during the summit between Russia and the European Union scheduled to take place on 7 December this year.

Thus the results of the Deauville meeting can be summarized as follows: French diplomats have proposed the creation of a new zone of cooperation on the economy and security to include the European Union and Russia, and German officials have confirmed that they agree with Russian participation in the EU committee on political issues and security, which is responsible for developing the alliance's foreign policy. As we see, Paris and Berlin have obtained Moscow's promise to support their aspirations, including Medvedev's participation in NATO's Lisbon summit.

But, as is necessary in big-time politics, Russia, expects certain mutual returns from France and Germany. That is to say, the Kremlin's wish to create a Berlin-Paris-Moscow axis has own price. And this price has a direct bearing on the reconstruction of the Trans-Atlantic architecture of the security system. The transatlantic security agreement proposed by Medvedev provides for non-interference of external forces in the resolution of ethnic disputes, excluding international intervention in conflicts, first of all, on post-Soviet territory, including the North Caucasus plus Chechnya. And the expansion of military alliances such as NATO is declared to be a threatening development.

Although this topic was not discussed further in Deauville, the President of Russia intends to raise this issue seriously in Lisbon. Many western countries, and especially the USA, blame Paris and Berlin for such boldness from Moscow; saying that their behind-the-scene games with the Kremlin have, in their opinion, split NATO and the EU. On the eve of the tripartite meeting in Deauville, Washington expressed its discontent that France and Germany dared to discuss European security with Russia without its participation: "Since when has discussion of European security taken place without the USA?" The USA, which is the founder and main guarantor so far of the reliable system of European security, is very jealous and suspicious of such actions by the "old guard" of Europe. The White House sees behind it an attempt by Paris and Berlin to squeeze the USA out of Europe, or at least to severely limit Washington's geopolitical influence in the Old Continent. The Deauville meeting reminds Washington of the alliance between the then leaders of Germany, Russia and France - Gerhard Schr?der, Vladimir Putin and Jacques Chirac - who came against the 2003 war against Iraq.

A European Security Council, which Merkel and Medvedev want to create, would devalue the Russia-NATO Council dominated by the Americans. After American representatives showed their discontent with the French and German meeting with Russia - without the USA - and negotiating on security issues before the NATO meeting, France and Germany tried to calm Washington, assuring it that there was no anti-American implication in the tripartite meeting.

The German chancellor declared that the purpose of the Deauville meeting was to develop cooperation between NATO and Russia, "as the cold war has ended forever". But, in her opinion, a new "architecture of security" should not create an obstacle to cooperation between the USA and Europe within the limits of the North Atlantic alliance, which has invited Russia to a special session to be held during the November summit of the alliance. In a word, the creation of the Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis doesn't at all mean a cooling in mutual relations between natural allies within the scope of NATO and the EU.

Although it is clear that such soothing sentiments are not nearly enough either for the USA, or for its newly-emerged European allies from among the countries of the former socialist camp, with whom France and Germany behave quite inconsiderately. These countries are irritated especially because Paris and Berlin have so quickly forgotten Moscow's behaviour during the August 2008 events in Georgia.

In the meantime, Moscow is trying with all its might to build its own separate mutual relations with Europe's leading countries (Germany, France and Italy). Despite the obligation to speak to Russia with one voice, the various EU countries conduct bilateral negotiations with Russia whenever possible (especially on favourable business contracts), and assemble under the EU umbrella only when necessary.

This gives Russia great opportunities to play one country against another. In its turn, the political establishment in Russia doesn't believe that the EU is really set for the serious negotiations on "rigid" security that Russia demands. Moscow is disappointed with the West because of its behaviour after the fall of communism that should have meant a complete withdrawal of "cold war" policy. Moreover, the Kremlin expected to preserve its status of parity with the USA in the world arena, no casting of doubt on its territorial integrity and administration of its internal affairs without intervention or criticism from outside.

The special irritating factor is persistent attempts by the West to become stronger on post-Soviet territory and plans for further expansion of NATO at the expense of the former Soviet republics. Moscow sees this as an intervention in its internal affairs. Thus, constant indignation from the West has strengthened the propensity of Russian leaders to think within such concepts as "superpowers" and "spheres of influence" and that international relations are a zero-sum game in which benefit to others means defeat for Russia.

The USA and the majority of EU members are, therefore, sceptical about Moscow's proposal for a new "architecture of European security" which practically gives Russia a veto on all NATO operations in Europe. For them the principle of the unity of European and American security, so fundamental during the cold war, is a basic value.

The USA, as well as the overwhelming majority of NATO and EU member countries, is confident that it is important to talk to Russia collectively. Security initiatives should be discussed first in a bilateral manner within the NATO-EC structure, after which a common position should be presented to the OSCE.

And the idea latent in Medvedev's plan that Russia should have a right of veto over all decisions by NATO or the EU on security should be rejected. But Paris and Berlin are convinced that the establishment of closer connections with Moscow will make it more predictable.

France's decision to sell Russia the Mistral-class amphibious assault ship, which was adopted by NATO, brought protest from many members of the North Atlantic alliance, although Paris doesn't perceive it as a potential threat. Some German politicians and diplomats are confident that within ten years Russia could become a member of NATO. In their opinion, the opening of such a prospect will induce Russia to change. Individual German diplomats have also said that while inviting Russia to joint activity, it is impossible to use the security measures on which Poland is insisting: proposing a concrete plan to the alliance in case of an attack on new member states. This plan first of all concerns the security of countries adjoining Russia.

And without a feeling of security, new members of NATO aren't going to agree to rapprochement with Moscow. First of all, these countries exactly don't agree with Nicolas Sarkozy, who is trying to earn brownie points as the European leader who believes that, contrary to the opinion of post-communist countries, Russia no longer poses a threat to the world and to Europe and that it is impossible to provide for European security without Russia's support.

These countries suspect that the Germans, French and Russians have already secretly agreed among themselves on major European issues. Although Russia is neither a member of NATO nor the EU, the pressure it exerts is strong enough to play a strategic role in these structures.

And the Lisbon agreement, European solidarity, the general economic and foreign policy of all EU member states - are only slogans for small countries, for whom only insignificant issues remain. The selfish policy of Germany and, in particular, of the French president, not only breaks European unity, but also threatens Europe as it is. After all, the Russians have never hidden their strategic targets for Europe. Key decisions will be accepted within the limits of a Moscow-Berlin-Paris triangle.

This is a clear threat to the sovereignty of all other EU countries, the USA and NATO. All this proves that there are serious disagreements between the USA, their newly-emerged European allies and some "old residents" of Europe in their approaches to separate questions of principle.

The persistent aspiration of Germany and France to involve Russia more closely in all-European affairs is already regarded by many as an obviously anti-American policy. Such zeal is especially surprising from the President of France who at the very beginning of his presidency was nicknamed "Sarkozy American".

Given this, what is the reason for such a metamorphosis? We assume that there are some explanations. The fact is that despite the illusory unity between Germany and France, there are serious disagreements on some important questions, personally between Merkel and Sarkozy. Not wishing to become an indifferent observer of rapprochement between Berlin and Moscow, Sarkozy, by joining to this "duumvirate", is trying to control Germany's hypothetically dangerous course and to neutralize it by means of Russia.

The second point is that Sarkozy has obviously sensed weakness in the White House administration and personally, in US President Barack Obama. And the weakness of the incumbent US authorities, especially in foreign policy, is becoming more and more clear. The impression today is that Washington has voluntarily sidelined itself from important issues by switching over to minor squabbles in its foreign policy.

Otherwise, it is impossible to explain the fanatical obstinacy shown by the USA on the question of unblocking the Turkish-Armenian border at any cost and discussion of the "genocide of Armenians". As though, there are no more important issues for the American political elite. It is also necessary to consider the "reset" in mutual relations between the USA and Russia. It is obvious that Berlin and Paris don't want to build mutual relations with Moscow by looking back to Washington or to other members of the EU.

They are unlikely to follow the principle: "What is allowed to Jupiter is not allowed to the Bull", initiating their own processes to "reset" with Moscow. And, maybe, even much more successfully than the USA itself, as the process of "reset" in Russian-American mutual relations has obviously got a problem, with Republican Senators disrupting ratification of the START-3 Treaty.

Analysis of the tripartite meeting in Deauville and reactions to it by the USA and other members of the EU, shows that there could be serious geopolitical changes in Europe. Moreover, the leading players in this process sometimes cannot hide their manoeuvres and plans.

At the same time, one cannot yet say with confidence today which way events will develop. At least, before the end of the NATO summit in Lisbon. Only after that it will be possible to answer the question: "What road has Deauville taken to Lisbon?"