"BASE" YEAR,

In September, activity surrounding the Nagornyy-Karabakh conflict and South Caucasus (SC) has intensified.  The almost simultaneous visits by the co-chairmen of the OSCE Minsk Group, the EU's special representative Peter Semneby, Andrzej Kasprzyk, Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office on the Conflict Dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference, and Tina Kaidanow, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Caucasus, Central Asia and Central Europe, leave no doubt that the mediators in the regulation of the Nagornyy-Karabakh conflict are again all trying to seize the initiative.  And this time around, the West is in the position of runner-up, trying to neutralize the advances made by Moscow in late August and early September.  This is precisely why the main comments on the results of the visit were made by French co-chairman of the OSCE MG, Bernard Fassier.  And his statement that the co-chairmen had achieved a long-standing dream by arriving in Nagornyy-Karabakh (NK) from Azerbaijan by crossing, not a border, but the ceasefire line separating the parties to the conflict, did arouse some intrigue.  The more the merrier, as the saying goes.

From the end of September until mid-October, the mediators will visit the region again to assess the humanitarian situation in the occupied territories adjacent to Nagornyy-Karabakh.  The co-chairmen will be accompanied by high-level advisers and experts, including specialists from the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.  It will be the first step of this type since the completion of a fact-finding mission in 2005.  Upon completion of the visit, details will be sent to Vienna, to diplomats from all the MG member states.  It was noted in Baku that this programme of meetings by the co-chairmen was to last until December, when the annual report on its activity will be sent to the members of the OSCE Permanent Council and the co-chairman will start working closely in the run-up to the OSCE summit in Astana.  During a meeting in Baku with the ethnic Azerbaijani community of Nagorno-Karabakh, the co-chairmen were given the facts about illegal construction by the Armenian side in the occupied territories of Zangilan, Qubadli and Susa, and the co-chairmen promised to focus on these during their visit to those areas.  Furthermore, Kasprzyk promised to take steps in the future to include representatives of the Azerbaijani community in the humanitarian fact-finding group for the occupied territories adjacent to Nagornyy-Karabakh.  And the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus, Peter Semneby, noted in the meeting with representatives of the Azerbaijani community of Nagornyy-Karabakh that both the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and the return of internally displaced persons to their homes must be addressed in the process of regulating the conflict.  He also stressed the need for a strict observance of the cease-fire, noting as one option the deployment of a large number of international observers in the conflict zone.

The above-mentioned facts demonstrate that the major players in the region are increasingly leaning towards a just settlement of the conflict.  It cannot be ruled out that this may have been why Baku proposed to postpone discussion of the draft Resolution on the Protection of Human Rights and International Law in the Occupied Territories of Azerbaijan, which was placed on the agenda of the plenary meeting of the UN General Assembly's 64th Session, and to postpone discussion of Article 18 of the "Situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan" to the 65th session of the UN General Assembly.  Thereby Azerbaijan has again given the mediators an opportunity to demonstrate common sense in the regulation of the conflict.  Unfortunately, Armenia's negative approach remains the main obstacle for now.  As was envisaged, the Armenian side began to criticize the mediators harshly when it encountered this position.  Fassier was the target for particularly scathing criticism, although France has traditionally been considered pro-Armenian.

It seems that when analyzing the increasing activity of the non-regional players, two landmark events, or to be more correct, moves made by Moscow in the South Caucasus during the last month, cannot be ignored.  These include, first, the early prolongation of the agreement on the Russian military base in Armenia until 2044.  Second, the official visit by Russian President Medvedev to Baku, during which several important bilateral agreements were signed.  Agreements on the state border between the two neighbours and a fourfold increase in Azerbaijani gas supplies to Russia merit special mention.

Against this background, the opinion of Michael Emerson, researcher at the Centre for European Policy Studies, who maintains that the new agreement on the Russian military base in Armenia was the result of Baku's military rhetoric forcing Yerevan to clutch hold of Russian military guarantees, sounds strange.  Does Moscow sign a military treaty with one country against another country with which it is promoting strategic cooperation?

To all appearances, some Western analysts have never realized that the main reason for the early prolongation of the agreement on the Russian military base in Armenia is not Baku's military rhetoric, but the West's desire to extract Yerevan from Moscow's geopolitical influence.  Incidentally, most Russian experts are of this opinion.  As early as in 2007, speaking at a conference on the problems and prospects of the South Caucasus in the 21st century, Robert Simmons, the NATO Secretary General's special representative in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, said plainly:  "If the Armenian Government no longer wants Russian military bases on its territory, the alliance will assist Yerevan in addressing this issue."  Western diplomats in Yerevan constantly stress Armenia's participation in NATO operations in Kosovo and Iraq and promote NATO programmes within the framework of the IPAP.  And this means that the possibility of joining NATO in the future remains open to Armenia.  It would be naive for Russia to react calmly to these types of statement and not to take an opportunity to make Armenia more dependent on Moscow.  In principle, the prolongation of the agreement on the Russian base in Armenia was expected.  The Kremlin simply decided to strike while the iron was hot.  Why not take advantage of a favourable moment?  It is strange that these statements were not made when a considerable amount of Russian armaments, withdrawn from Georgia, were stored at the Russian base in Armenia.  The West's desire to unblock the Turkish-Armenian border at all costs also played its role in the early prolongation of the agreement on the Russian base in Gyumri.  Did Moscow not understand the strategic goals of the West that lay behind this desire?  And tactically, by extending the agreement by another 25 years, the Kremlin gave the green light to Serzh Sargsyan to run for a second term, thereby almost eliminating the possibility of a pro-Western politician coming to power.  And let us even put Armenia aside.  What is the explanation for an early long-term prolongation of the agreement on stationing the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol, signed this year by Ukraine and Russia?  I presume that the explanation is very simple.  Russia and the West are struggling in earnest for geopolitical influence in the post-Soviet area.  It was for a reason that, recently, both the Russian president and prime minister accused the West of not keeping its promise:  "We thought that after the fall of the Berlin wall, Russia's place in Europe would be somewhat different.  What has Russia gained?  Nothing of what we were promised, namely, that NATO would not expand eastwards ad infinitum and that our interests would be taken into account."  This is why today Moscow is prolonging its agreements with its next-door neighbours on whose territories Russian military bases are stationed.  And the West has no choice other than the statement made by US State Department spokesman Mark Toner:  "The extension of the presence of the Russian military base in Armenia is a matter of bilateral relations between Moscow and Yerevan," or to lay responsibility for its mistakes at others' doors, like Mr. Emerson.

At the same time, the West's mistakes in the South Caucasus, and in particular in Azerbaijan, do not go unnoticed in the USA.  Guy Billauer, American Jewish Committee director for international affairs, expressed his concern in the following manner:  "Tensions between Azerbaijan and neighbouring Armenia on the fate of the Nagornyy-Karabakh region are reaching dangerous levels.  In the past year, the Azerbaijani enclave in the South Caucasus, which Armenia has occupied since 1992, has been the focus of increased violence.  The prospects of another war in the Caspian Sea region are real.  But as the rhetoric heats up, little is heard from Washington.  Azerbaijan, America's closest ally in the region, deserves more direct and concrete support from the Obama administration.  Pinned between Iran and Russia on the ancient Silk Road bridging Europe and Asia, this former Soviet republic is an indispensable strategic partner.  But neither Mr. Obama nor his senior aides have come up with a serious plan to jump-start negotiations with Armenia on Nagornyy-Karabakh.  It took more than a year for the administration to pick an ambassador to Azerbaijan, and Mr. Obama has yet to meet with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev. Worse, unlike in the Middle East, no special envoy has been appointed to help - and ultimately replace - the idling Minsk Group.  A cautious and passive America in the Caucasus will only embolden an increasingly aggressive Russia. Mr. Obama must help defuse a potentially disastrous international conflict - before it is too late."

And while the West drags its feet, Moscow spares no effort to become the main moderator of processes in the region.  It also hints that, if third parties do not interfere, it can become the just judge.  But what will other players of the great geopolitical games offer in exchange?