VICIOUS CIRCLE

The key to the Karabakh conflict is in the hands of Russia, says the well-known Russian journalist and analyst, Leonid Radzikhovskiy. There is a vicious circle around the conflict, and by breaking it, Moscow may obtain additional geopolitical dividends. In an interview with our magazine, Radzikhovskiy told how this circle can be broken and shared his vision of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict settlement.

- Hello, Leonid. I guess you know that the meeting of the foreign ministers of Azerbaijan and Armenia in Almaty was unproductive. To what extent does it increase the probability of a crisis in the negotiations and of hostilities resuming?

- I think that the resumption of the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan is not in the interests of both sides to the conflict. This can be explained by several factors. In particular, Armenia will hardly dare to attack Azerbaijan. That would be mad on the part of Yerevan. Armenia has seized territories that belong to Azerbaijan under international law. Another attack by Armenia would be open aggression.

Another option is if Azerbaijan resumes hostilities. Since the occupied territories belong to Azerbaijan, it would be a less aggressive action in terms of international law. But in fact, for Azerbaijan there is no point in starting a war that entails high costs and puts a strain on society.

- Is it possible that the OSCE Minsk Group mediators will simply wash their hands of it and step aside?

- The mediators and diplomats will never step aside. It is their job to travel and negotiate all the time. The longer the talks last, the better for them. The mediators travel all the time and get their travel allowance. If you ask them, they will negotiate for a thousand years.

- In Azerbaijan and Armenia, there is a perception that the "key" to the Karabakh conflict is in Moscow. But some believe that Moscow is not interested in resolving the problem, as in this case, it will lose leverage to put pressure on Baku and Yerevan...

- It's true and untrue at the same time. It is true in the sense that "as long as the wound is open, you need a doctor". He will come and do something, but as soon as the wound heals, he will no longer be invited. In this sense, Russia does not want the Karabakh wound to heal. As long as the conflict has not been resolved, Russia is needed. At the same time, it is not so. What's in it for Russia apart from diplomats' pleasure to engage in endless negotiations and pose as VIPs? Russian diplomats enjoy this, but Russia cannot convert it into some real gain. For example, Russia may want to get some preferences from Armenia, although it is not clear what Russia can get from Armenia. Imagine that Armenia says: "All right! We accept Moscow's proposal, but you need to guarantee that no lands will be returned to Azerbaijan. Russia will never accept this. Another option is when Russia decides to get preferences from Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan has something Russia may be interested in, for example, access to energy. Although Azerbaijan will never do that, but let's assume that Azerbaijan offers Russia control over its energy resources in exchange for the return of the lands occupied during the Karabakh war. Russia will never accept this either, because this will end Moscow's influence in the region. If Russia wants to keep the situation in the Karabakh conflict in limbo, it will not be able to derive any benefit whatsoever.

Deriving benefits implies an end to uncertainty, which deprives Russia of the opportunity to influence these countries. It turns out to be a vicious circle. If you want to have leverage through uncertainty, you must be ready to convert this situation into a favourable solution. By definition, it is not possible. Such a situation is beneficial to Russian diplomats and their corporate interests. They visit and hand out promises. In terms of Russia's national interests, it is an absolutely pointless game which leads to nothing.

Russia has only one way to convert the situation into a real political advantage, and it is connected not with Azerbaijan and Armenia, but with the United States. Since the situation surrounding Iran's nuclear programme has worsened, the value of Azerbaijan and Armenia and the political and geopolitical capitalization of these countries in the eyes of the United States has increased sharply. The US has several military bases in Iraq, but they do not mind having another military base in Azerbaijan, i.e. the north of Iran. For the Americans, it is important, but they cannot just enter the region, as they have no particularly high leverage in the South Caucasus. Therefore, there is an option in which Russia could persuade Armenia to withdraw from the Azerbaijani territories, and instead Azerbaijan would allow the Americans to set up military bases on its territory. That's a kind of a multi-way combination. Russia would thus do a very great favour to the United States and enhance its relations with Washington. In recent months, the government often says that it seeks to expand relations with the United States. President Dmitriy Medvedev said while speaking in the Russian Foreign Ministry that the priority is not the CIS, but the EU and US. If the main strategic focus is modernization, modernization with the help of the CIS is not possible. This can be done only with the help of advanced countries. We get the following picture: Russia needs the US, America wants to have a base in Azerbaijan, Baku needs to get its territory back and Russia has influence on Armenia. It's a long political chain. Unfortunately, long chains do not work. But this is the only way Russia may get an extra political card.

- How can the Russian-Turkish rapprochement help to resolve the Karabakh conflict?

- I do not think that Russian-Turkish relations can affect the resolution of the Karabakh conflict. What is the settlement of the Karabakh conflict? This is the return of the territories occupied by Armenia, and nothing else. Let's say Russia has excellent relations with Turkey, but this will not lead to the return of the territories. Armenia might withdraw from the territories in two cases: if Azerbaijan gets them back by force or if Armenia is forced to do so diplomatically. This option is possible only if a policy of "carrot and stick" is used.

Armenia is incredibly interested in Russia. This is gas and electricity, and in general, Armenia cannot exist without Russia. In that sense, the key to the Karabakh conflict is not in Tehran or Ankara, but in Moscow. Armenia is Russia's closest ally. Armenia has well-established relations with Iran, but to become an ally of this country means to oppose the world. Iran cannot serve as a guarantor of Armenia's security. Only Russia can influence it.