PROSPECTS IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

The last month has seen several major events which could significantly affect the resolution of conflicts in the South Caucasus and radically alter the geopolitical configuration in the region. A landmark event here was the resolution by the European Parliament which demands the withdrawal of Armenian forces from all Azerbaijan's occupied territories. Although Armenia's foreign and defence ministers hastened to declare that the resolution was not legally binding and had a recommendatory nature, it is capable of influencing the position of the EU as a whole. Further, this document is an important addition to the four UN resolutions on unconditional withdrawal from the occupied Azerbaijani territories, which are legally binding under international law.

Another unpleasant surprise for Yerevan in the European Parliament resolution was the provision for an active role for Turkey in the Nagornyy Karabakh conflict. Armenia declared this document to be contrary to the Madrid principles and to be disrespectful to the leaders of the countries co-chairing the OSCE Minsk Group, i.e. shifting the blame onto others. As if Armenia displays particular respect for the leaders of these countries, dealing with the co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group for many years without voicing its position on the updated Madrid principles.

However, the most severe blow to Armenia's position, I think, is the emergence of clear outlines to the Russian-Turkish alliance. It is not without reason that the dramatic rapprochement between Ankara and Moscow arouses controversy in Armenia. Some Armenian experts and MPs are sceptical about the possibility of such an alliance taking shape. They are confident that Russia will never sacrifice the interests of its "strategic ally" for the sake of rapprochement with Turkey. Of course, by this they mean possible pressure on Armenia from Moscow in the Nagornyy Karabakh conflict, because one of the important factors in Russian-Turkish cooperation is precisely this question. This is proved by the cautiously optimistic statement on the issue made by Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev in Ankara. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that Russia would agree to sacrifice the interests of its "strategic ally". But the difference is in how Moscow and Yerevan interpret the notion of "the interests of Armenia". 

It is absolutely clear that by the "interests of Armenia", Yerevan implies, first of all, its territorial claims on all neighbouring countries. For some reason, Armenia is convinced that Moscow should be held hostage to these "interests", while the Kremlin is unlikely to consider the demand for withdrawal at the initial stage from at least some Azerbaijani regions surrounding Nagornyy Karabakh to be a betrayal of Armenia's interests. On the other hand, why should Russia be a tool in the hands of the Armenians to be used for their expansionist designs? Apparently, a moment of truth and sobriety is setting in for Russian-Armenian relations. It is possible that Moscow will ratchet up pressure on Yerevan over the Nagornyy Karabakh conflict. Some Armenian media reported that during Serzh Sargsyan's recent visit to Moscow, the Kremlin presented him with a plan (2+3+2) to withdraw from the Azerbaijani territories surrounding Nagornyy Karabakh. It is hard to say how true this is. But Moscow does have many levers to force Armenia into taking a constructive position. Some events suggest that the Kremlin has already launched a mechanism to exert soft pressure on Yerevan. At the end of May, the Armenian prime minister returned empty-handed from Moscow, where he had gone for another tranche of the Russian stabilization loan. Before then, the Russian Foreign Ministry had issued another statement on the recognition of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity, which may be interpreted as another signal to Yerevan. However, it would be naive to believe that the Kremlin will rapidly and dramatically change its position on all issues and conflicts that exist in the South Caucasus. But being totally fed up with Yerevan's double-dealing policy, Moscow, with the active participation of Ankara, may gradually begin a process of normalizing the situation in the region, which would meet Russia's own geopolitical interests. First and foremost, Russia's shaken influence in the region will become stronger. As a result, the influence of external factors in the region will be minimized or even eliminated. Moscow will have an excellent chance to become the principal moderator in the process of normalizing Turkish-Armenian relations, wresting the initiative from the West. And finally, by strengthening the already close Russian-Azerbaijani relations, Moscow will have Baku as a more reliable ally in the region. This will neutralize the danger of Western players getting a foothold in the Caspian basin and the Central Asia region. And in future, there will be a possibility of building a Russia-Azerbaijan-Turkey-Iran-Georgia-Armenia-Central Asia axis, which could become a focus for the "Eurasian concept", which has long been promoted by the Kremlin political scientist Aleksandr Dugin. According to Dugin, it is this reality that is a powerful deterrent to the expansionist ambitions of the West seeking to weaken Russia and Turkey. This is why he has long promoted the idea of an alliance between Russia and Turkey. It seems that there is a good opportunity for this now, and Moscow does not want to miss the boat, especially when, according to information that has been leaked, the Kremlin does not exclude discussions with Tbilisi on problems related to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. According to some sources, the well-known politician Yevgeniy Primakov is already engaged in this issue. Of course, such realities are of serious concern to the Armenian political establishment and community of experts. Outspoken statements are already being made about the betrayal of Armenia's "interests" by the "strategic ally". They are convinced that, historically, Russian-Turkish rapprochement has had a negative effect on Armenia, as evidenced by the events of the last century. Significant rapprochement between Azerbaijan and Russia, as well as major contracts for the supply of Azerbaijani gas to Russia, has had a significant influence on the geopolitical situation in the region, with no benefit to Armenia. It this respect, a variety of options are being suggested to change the situation in favour of Armenia.

An expert from the Washington Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Hovhannes Nikoghosyan, argues that Russian-Turkish rapprochement is absolutely contrary to the interests of Armenia and, therefore, Russia is no longer able to ensure the security of Armenia alone. Here, the national interests of Armenia require deeper US involvement in the region as a third force. It should be noted that this is an age-old Armenian trick - to get maximum political dividends by contrasting the interests of major world powers in the region. Nikoghosyan even offers a "recipe" to rectify the situation: "This undeclared, but actual break in American regional (meaning South Caucasus) policy should be used by Armenia to 'work' with the United States. As a first step, it is very important to create in Washington an Armenian (not American) centre to fill the American political agenda with 'Armenia'." Hit the bull's-eye. Armenia is no longer content with Washington's pro-Armenian position, now it needs the whole of the US to serve Armenian "interests". This "expert" is also convinced that every historical stage in rapprochement between Russia and Turkey results in a loss of territory for Armenia (?!). It is strange how he "forgot" that Russia nurtured and nourished Armenia, expanding it to its current size.

Meanwhile, the nationalist forces in Armenia, inventing mythical sources of "threat" to the Armenians, are trying to re-awaken a sense of pity for this "longest-suffering nation" in foreign patrons. Recently, the leader of the Dashnak faction in the Armenian parliament, Hovhannisyan, stated that the reopening of the Council of Europe subcommittee on Nagornyy Karabakh was unacceptable, because it would have catastrophic consequences for the Armenian side. He criticized the leadership of Armenia harshly for accepting the initiative of PACE President Cavusoglu and urged the Armenian delegation in PACE to make every effort to thwart the initiative. His colleague, MP Nranyan, went even further: "Turkey's initiative to build a railroad and establish an air link to Naxcivan threatens (?) Armenia's national security. Turkey is also taking steps to deploy military bases in Naxcivan (?!), and it is unacceptable that the Armenian side does not respond to this properly because, in the geopolitical context, the deployment of Turkish military bases on this territory constitutes a threat to the national security of our country."

How do Washington and US experts react to these Armenian tricks? Observations show that even at this fateful moment for its interests in the South Caucasus, Washington cannot boast a balanced, far-sighted policy. For example, during a recent visit to Armenia, the US State Department adviser on Europe and Eurasia, Tina Kaidanov, declared Armenia (the aggressor country) to be an important ally of the United States in nuclear security and peacekeeping actions in the Caucasus, Afghanistan and Iraq. Although some Armenian media reported that Kaidanov set out stringent requirements to Yerevan for a withdrawal from the Azerbaijani territories outside Karabakh.

Some US experts are concerned about Turkey's close relationship with Russia. They are confident that this process could threaten the interests of the United States. In particular, Islamists have come to power in Ankara, they are undermining the foundations of the secular republic and re-orienting the country's foreign policy towards Syria, Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah. In turn, Russia is playing quite a clever game with the US, concluding beneficial treaties (e.g., START-3) with Washington and, at the same time, irritating it by collecting "affordable Arab money". Now Moscow and Ankara have entered into a strategic alliance, and this should worry America: it is an unprecedented alliance between Russia and a NATO member country which conducts joint exercises with Syria. The Russian government assesses the situation and the possible benefits to be derived quite sensibly, while we cannot say the same about the American administration.

As we see, there is not even a hint that this rapprochement was the result of short-sighted US policy in relation to Turkey or its touching concern for the aggressor country. Even at this turning point, the double standards apparent in US policy do not cease to amaze us. A group of 16 pro-Armenian congressmen wrote a letter to Secretary of State Clinton, asking for political and material support for the resettlement to Armenia of Iraqi Armenians who fled to Syria and Jordan because of the devastating war in Iraq. It notes that this is in the interests of the United States. The "interest" is explained by the fact that otherwise, they might want to emigrate to America itself.

Perhaps there is another "interest". Since the rapprochement between Ankara and Moscow, positive things have been observed in the settlement of the Nagornyy Karabakh conflict; this is not to the liking of Armenia or its patrons. Is the concern of the US congressmen about the Iraqi Armenians due to their desire to settle them directly in Nagornyy Karabakh? After that, the West could use them as a "fifth column" when necessary. Where is the guarantee that under this pretext, they are not trying to move hardened Armenian terrorists to the conflict area who have received training at terrorist bases in some Middle Eastern countries? After all, this tactic is not a new one for Armenia and its patrons.

Meanwhile, judging by developments, there is a growing understanding in Turkey and Russia of the need to resolve the Nagornyy Karabakh conflict for the further development of mutually beneficial cooperation and a strengthening of their positions in the region. Some Russian experts' assertions that the positions of Russia and Turkey are quite close today are not accidental. In this light, in the absence of destructive external factors, prospects for the South Caucasus look rosy.