OUT OF ALLIES INTO AMICABLE ENEMIES

The first ten days of February will stick in our mind with open disagreements between the West and Russia over the system of modern security. Both parties chose the international security conference in Munich as a kind of landmark in this mild confrontation. Prior to the conference, Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev approved Russia's new military doctrine, under which a nuclear strike can be carried out if Russia is attacked using conventional weapons. During a meeting of the OSCE Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) in Athens in early December last year, a new draft treaty was presented on European security, which in principle was not supported.

The West believes that this plan is an attempt to weaken NATO. Representatives of some countries saw Russia's attempt as a desire to preserve the current status quo in conflict zones (especially in the former Soviet Union) through an intricate mechanism to address them. A scrupulous study of the document somewhat confirms the viability of such sceptical moods in the West. For this reason, the foreign minister of an Eastern European country said that in this way, Moscow is trying to secure its right of veto in European affairs. "But we have had enough of the fact that it has such a right in the UN Security Council," he said. It should be noted that Russia's Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov also tried to push this plan in Munich. He explained Russia's point of view as follows: "The OSCE, which already covers the area from Vancouver to Vladivostok, is not a suitable alternative to Russia's proposal. Since most of the member countries of the OSCE took part in the armed conflict in Kosovo in 1999, they violated the principle of the indivisibility of security." Lavrov's point of view did not cause optimism among participants in the conference. The situation was heated up by the speech made by the chairman of the Russian State Duma international affairs committee, Konstantin Kosachev: "NATO is still unable to take Russia seriously. Russia is only informed of how the strategic concept of the alliance is discussed, but is not allowed to take part in the discussion. Everything would be fine if NATO's actions were limited to its own territory. But since this organization is active throughout the world, Russia should be entitled to vote in discussions on NATO plans and objectives for the near future. The path taken by NATO arouses serious concern." Following this, Secretary of Russia's Security Council Nikolay Patrushev described NATO as an organization that directly threatens Russia's security. Some Western officials interpret such statements by Moscow in their own way: "Moscow, apparently, will never forgive NATO for surviving the Cold War, while the Warsaw Pact failed to do so. At present, however, this deep-seated suspicion has tangible consequences. On the one hand, for NATO: the new Eastern European members of this organization continue to feel the threat posed by Russia - since the Russo-Georgian war, these fears have become even stronger - and they insist that this should be clearly written in the new concept of the Alliance."

Prior to the Munich conference, US Undersecretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Philip Gordon said that Washington has doubts about the effectiveness of the new treaty on European security proposed by Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev. The senior US official said that the US shares the principles outlined in Russia's initiative, but favours the upgrading of existing security structures instead of creating new ones. In short, Washington makes it clear that Moscow should have no illusions about its proposal.

But the differences existing in relations between the US and major European powers can play a cruel trick on Washington, although allied relations between them are taken for granted. For example, although everyone opposed Russia's proposal in Athens, Italy's Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi said later that Rome was not against a thorough study of this document. This means that leading European countries, if they have common views with Moscow, could accept a deal with it despite protests from Washington.

And in general, there have been obvious differences in relations between the US and Europe on certain issues, particularly in relation to Russia. They were clearly seen in the reaction of some EU "old-timers" to Lavrov's speech in Munich: "Of course, we must discuss openly our security interests with the Russians. However, this may lead to certain results only if the Russians recognize that their primary interest is to maintain their influence over their former satellites such as Georgia or Ukraine." This statement suggests that the views of the United States and leading European powers differ greatly on some points. There are several reasons for that.

Washington, "having won the Cold War", does not intend to stop halfway and is doing everything possible to limit Moscow's geopolitical influence in the former Soviet Union. But, apparently, strong European countries are not particularly eager to pander to Washington's intentions in order to prevent the simultaneous absolute strengthening of US positions in Europe. Rather, Moscow's commitment not to interfere in European affairs and not to threaten the safety of the Old Continent is enough for them. In return, they are ready not only to recognize the leading role of Russia in the post-Soviet area, but also indirectly prevent the expansion of NATO and the EU. Therefore, the entire dispute between the old and new members of NATO, which escalates every time Russia has a dig at East Europeans or Georgia and Ukraine who seek to become members of the Alliance, gets a new impetus and thus, determines the course of discussions about a new strategic concept. Of course, Moscow is on the alert for such discrepancies in the positions of the US and European "old-timers" and tries to gain dividends from such situations in every way. It was strong resistance from Germany and France that did not allow Washington to push for the accession of Ukraine and Georgia into NATO.

Again, there is another reason for this disagreement between Washington on the one hand, and the centre of power in Europe on the other. It is becoming more and more evident that in its game against Russia, the United States has begun to rely mainly on Eastern European countries and post-Soviet states, which are trying to get under the wing of the West in order to ensure their own security. But the tacit struggle between the two wings of the West (the US and major European countries) causes some intrigue in this process, of which Moscow can take advantage. Berlin, Paris and Rome are not delighted with strengthening relations between the US and the new EU members, which allows Washington to further strengthen its influence in Europe. They themselves are trying to strengthen their influence in Europe and oppose US influence. With respect to the post-Soviet area, there is a similar approach. If the United States are "pushing their way through" in this matter, the leading European countries are acting on the principle of "a long flirtation" with Russia in the hope that they may be able to get something out of it. The EU-sponsored programme "Eastern Partnership" is part of this game. I venture to suggest that the failure of such tactics will not really upset the "pillars" of Europe. Since in the worst case scenario, Moscow will be busy strengthening its influence in the CIS, which will distract its attention from European affairs. The most striking example of this policy was the events of August 2008 in the South Caucasus. On seeing that Washington's position on the five-day Russo-Georgian war has not changed to this day, Europe, or to be more precise, the leading European countries have changed their rhetoric by exactly 180 degrees in an attempt to avoid harsh statements about Russia. Thus, Europe chose to stay aloof, leaving it to Washington to deal tete-a-tete with Moscow. The failed diplomacy of French President Nicolas Sarkozy resulted in the OSCE blaming these events equally on Moscow and Tbilisi. Quite recently, it became known how Sarkozy shamelessly pressed Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili to sign a document which was a product of the French president's "diplomatic mission". It also became publicly known that the United States seriously considered intervening in the military clash between Russia and Georgia. But after some discussions, they considered it inappropriate. I think the main reason for Washington's decision was the reluctance of leading European countries to support this idea and provide possible assistance to the United States. Incidentally, this is not the only example of such behaviour by European centres of power in extreme situations. These tactics were employed during the Balkan events, of which Lavrov accused the majority of European countries. No-one knows how these events in the heart of Europe would have ended, had Washington not secured NATO's intervention in the war in the Balkans. But even this did not save the Bosnian Muslims from ethnic cleansing by the Serbs. It was with the criminal connivance of the Dutch peacekeeping battalion that heavily armed Serb military forces exterminated Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica, killing within days 8,000 people of the village's population of 30,000. That's the price that one of European "old-timers" paid in order to protect the lives of its 30 soldiers held captive by the Serbs. And what was the reaction of the leading European countries? Absolutely nothing! This criminal inaction was reported by a Polish politician (note - a citizen of an Eastern European country - Author), the first post-communist Polish Prime Minister Mazowiecki who was appointed special representative of the UN Commission on Human Rights in former Yugoslavia in 1992. After this revelation, he resigned in 1995 in protest against the policies of European countries and the United States in the Balkan region, as they failed to prevent massacres. Even then, major powers of Europe had no courage to admit their own mistakes (only mistakes? - Author) in such developments.

The contradictions between the United States and leading European countries are also evident in relation to alternative energy projects, which Washington actively lobbies in the interests of Eastern and Central European countries. Such European countries as Germany, France and Italy are engaged in backroom bargaining with Moscow, lobbying Russian projects and contributing to the failure of alternative ones. Even if they support alternative projects in words from time to time, they often suggest involving countries which the US considers as its antagonists.

The United States and Europe also have different views on the issue of deploying US missile defence systems in the Czech Republic and Poland. Moscow's harsh opposition to this plan acquired a special meaning against the background of an inert reaction from leading European countries, which were not enthusiastic about the US idea either. Interestingly, after the refusal of the US administration to deploy the third GMD area in Europe, France, which has a powerful military-industrial complex, expressed a desire to close the European "gaps" in the missile defence system with its our own forces. However, France's desire to provide its military enterprises with orders to build a European missile defence system was met with stiff opposition from the United States which wished to build the missile defence system in Europe with its own guarantees to ensure security for all NATO member countries. And, apparently, they succeeded. Closing the issue of the Czech Republic and Poland, Washington offered to deploy a similar system in Romania. Thus, it can be argued that often the action strategy of countries that challenge US decisions on certain issues within the organization has an indirect nature, acquiring the features of a latent confrontation. This, in turn, testifies to latent threats to the unity of NATO. 

Balancing between transatlantic cooperation and promotion of national interests in the continent at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries, the EU wants to build its own collective security system called the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The purpose of this policy is the possibility of autonomous EU defence activities, underpinned by a pan-European military force. France, which plays a pivotal role in the implementation of the ESDP with the active support of Germany, has high hopes for the future of this structure. It turns out that the ESDP is an attempt by leading European powers to create an autonomous security system, shifting the balance of forces in Europe from NATO to European states and, hence, questioning the integrity of NATO and American leadership in the alliance. It is possible that they can also offer Russia a place in this system. Perhaps, this explains Italy's recent proposal to establish unified armed forces of the EU, which was immediately supported by German Chancellor Angela Merkel. The USA abandoned the Monroe Doctrine after the Second World War, which led to its intervention in European affairs and strengthened its influence in almost all regions of the planet. Centres of power in Europe are not very happy with this situation and do not mind penetrating into the American continent. Therefore, for some time now, Europe has been playing the "Latin American card". This is proved by Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez's visits to Russia, France and Portugal last September. The main purpose of the visit was to strengthen military and energy cooperation with Russia, deepen the "unusual strategic alliance" with France, as well as to strengthen cooperation with Portugal in the field of energy. The dynamic relations and rapprochement between Russia and the EU, and Venezuela and other Latin American countries is taking place against the background of the United States' gradual alienation from Latin America. Russia and the EU are using the situation to boost cooperation with Latin American countries, which has already received positive responses from some leaders of Latin American countries.

Serious disagreements between the US and leading European countries are also observed in the issue of Turkey's accession to the EU. When Washington begins to actively lobby for this issue, Paris and Berlin rudely advise the White House not to interfere in European affairs.

An important point is also the differentiated attitude of the US and Europe to the Islamic world. In his inaugural speech, US President Barack Obama noted that in addressing all serious problems, Washington will consider the views and interests of the 1.5-billion-strong Islamic world. Unfortunately, Europe has still not made a statement about a similar approach. As relations between the US and any Islamic country worsen, European centres of power are ready to render any possible assistance to Washington.

Despite these major differences, Europe still counts on US protection from existing threats, while trying to escape from American influence: "At difficult moments, we expect help from you, but be so kind and do not dare to interfere in European affairs in return for this support." Even the overly active participation of Americans in rescue operations in Haiti after the devastating earthquake caused serious anger in France. Paris accused Washington of occupying Haiti under the guise of humanitarian aid.

In a private conversation with the author of the article, President of the European Institute for International Relations (Belgium) Irnerio Seminatore admitted that Europe wants to get rid of strong US influence. But at the same time, the European "pillars" are trying to get the United States to do all the "dirty" work. Their hasty decision to assign the Nobel Peace Prize for 2009 to the new US President Barack Obama should be seen through this prism. Moreover, in this game, leading European states are ready to sell the most up-to-date military equipment to Russia. For example, France's plans to sell Russia the powerful Mistral military ship (the second largest ship in the French navy - a 200 metre long helicopter carrier weighing 21 tonnes, which is capable of carrying heavy military helicopters, paratroopers' vessels, tanks and up to 900 soldiers) have already caused sharp criticism from the US Congress where some congressmen oppose the sale of NATO weaponry to Russia. Last month, Germany said that it was ready to sell Russia a licence for submarines. Although some experts claim that this product is third-rate and expired, Washington is unlikely to approve Berlin's decision.

All the above points prove that the existing serious disagreements (although we cannot say that they have a strategic nature) between the USA and Europe give Russia a carte blanche in the issue of ensuring its geopolitical supremacy over the West. And Moscow is unlikely to miss this chance. It is likely that for this reason, the Kremlin insists on its own concept of a new treaty for European security. But will Russia succeed? The West itself should answer this question.