BLACK HOLE

Turkish-Israeli relations are stuck in a black hole. The tensions in the dialogue between Ankara and Tel Aviv, which arose after the Israeli military operation in the Gaza Strip in late 2008 - early 2009, have been affected by new developments since then. Meanwhile, the tightening of Turkey's attitude towards Israel gives us grounds to talk of some change in Ankara's foreign policy strategy, which is confirmed by Turkey's obvious rapprochement with countries of the Muslim world. 

The latest in a series of events pointing to a cooling in Turkish-Israeli relations (and it began with Ankara's sharp criticism of Tel Aviv's military operation "Cast Lead"), was the "ambassadorial'" scandal. This arose from a highly unusual meeting between Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon and Turkish ambassador Oguz Celikkol. The reason was the broadcasting on Turkish television of a serial in which Israeli secret service agents were represented as war criminals, as well as a statement by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan accusing the Jewish state of destabilizing the situation in the region, in particular, violating Lebanon's airspace and bombing Gaza. During a meeting with Ayalon, the Turkish ambassador was handed a protest note, while there was no Turkish flag on the table and the Israeli diplomat refused to shake hands with Celikkol, who was deliberately made to sit on a low sofa. Commenting on the incident in an interview with the local media, Ayalon said in Hebrew that "we just want it to be noticed that he was made to sit below us and that there was only one flag on the table".

Ankara took the actions of the Israeli representative to be a deliberate humiliation of the Turkish ambassador and disrespect for diplomatic tradition, and demanded an official apology. Turkish President Abdullah Gul even threatened to recall the ambassador from Israel. Meanwhile, dissatisfaction with Ayalon's behaviour was also expressed by senior Israeli leaders. President Shimon Peres and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu demanded that the Israeli Foreign Ministry apologize for insulting the Turkish ambassador.

Soon Ankara received an apology from the culprit in the scandal: Danny Ayalon officially apologized to the Turkish side, emphasizing that he had no intention of humiliating the ambassador and pledging "to make his position known by appropriate diplomatic means in the future."

The Turkish Foreign Ministry expressed satisfaction with the message from the Israeli side and, subsequently, Ankara was visited by Israeli Defence Minister Ehud Barak. Despite all the handshakes and kind words during the visit, the tension in Turkish-Israeli relations did not subside. This was proved by the refusal of the Turkish president and prime minister to meet Barak. And even new arrangements in the military-technical sphere, by which Ankara will buy 10 unmanned aircraft from Tel-Aviv and the Israeli Defence Industry concern will modernize Turkish tanks, are unlikely to support dialogue between the two states at strategic alliance level, as was established in the mid-1990s.

The point, of course, is not that Erdogan's government indirectly supports anti-Semitism, of which the Israeli Foreign Ministry accused Ankara in its report, especially as Erdogan himself has consistently stated at various international forums that anti-Semitism is a crime against humanity and mentioned the support that Turkey has always given to Jews. The issue is that Turkey and Israel are becoming increasingly estranged from each other by the reality of a great geopolitical game unfolding in the Middle East, in which Ankara seeks to play a key role. The ideological reason for the cooling of Turkish-Israeli relations is the change in Ankara's foreign policy since the Justice and Development Party (AKP), led by Erdogan, came to power in 2002. This party, which promotes itself as a moderate Islamist party, is increasingly pursuing a policy of active rapprochement with the rest of the Muslim world, which, in turn, pre-determines a change in Ankara's policy towards Israel (especially in the light of recent events in the Middle East when the Jewish state, in the opinion of most of the world community, used disproportionate force to stop rocket attacks on its territory by militants of the Palestinian movement Hamas). Erdogan's government, appealing to the historical and cultural values of its people, does not consider it expedient to ignore the consequences of Israel's policy towards Palestine. Trying to demonstrate its independence in the international arena and, in particular, expressing a particular attitude towards Israel, Ankara also prefers to ignore the opinion of its main ally - the United States, especially as that country is the patron of the Jewish state.

Highly significant in this sense are the increasingly different approaches taken by Ankara on the one hand, and Washington and Tel Aviv on the other, to the problem of Iran's nuclear programme. While the United States and Israel, confident of Tehran's intention to develop nuclear weapons, are willing to use every means, including force, to prevent this, Turkey believes that the Iranian nuclear programme is for peaceful purposes. Admitting that it has no interest in the Islamic Republic becoming a nuclear power, Ankara, however, calls upon the world community to attend to the fact that Israel is already a nuclear power and, therefore, deserves much more criticism than Iran.

An even more obvious indication of the change in Turkish policy is the significant intensification of dialogue with Arab countries. Erdogan's visits to Syria, Libya, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, as well as the Ankara talks with Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri, were marked by the proclamation of a "unified strategy", which Turkey intends to develop in its relations with the Arab world.

Huge repercussions followed the statements Erdogan made during his visit to Saudi Arabia. According to the Turkish prime minister, for his country, relations with a state which "is the custodian of the Two Holy Mosques" are no less important than relations with the EU. Erdogan noted that Turkey's intention to join the EU does not mean that the country will abandon the Muslim world, because it considers the EU to be a political and economic union, not an alliance based on religion. Speaking in the Chamber of Commerce in Riyadh, Erdogan said: "Our history, faith, common culture, customs, fate and ideals have made us brothers. For the sake of Allah, tell me, is the fate of Istanbul or Ankara different from the fate of Riyadh? Can the fate of Mecca, Medina, Jeddah, Ta'if and Tabuk be different from the fate of Konya, Adana or Diyarbakir?"

But the reason for Turkey's fraternization with Arab co-religionists is not only motivated by religion. Its desire to raise its standing in the international arena will, of course, make a country like Turkey, which has played the role of the first Muslim state for centuries, return to an imperial world outlook. This outlook is now called "neo-Ottomanism", and has been officially proclaimed to be the new foreign policy doctrine of Turkey. Speaking to members of the JDP at the end of November last year, Turkey's Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu admitted: "There is a legacy left by the Ottoman Empire. We are called 'neo-Ottomans'. Yes, we are 'new Ottomans'. We have to deal with neighbouring countries. And we even go to Africa. Great powers are watching these developments with dismay."

Davutoglu also spoke about his meeting with former US President Bill Clinton, during which the American politician wondered about the reasons for the increasing foreign policy activity from Ankara. The Turkish minister replied: "Draw a circle with a diameter of 1,000 kilometres on the map around Turkey - it includes 20 countries; draw a circle with a diameter of 3,000 kilometres - it will include 70 countries. How many countries will be included in a similar circle around the US? So, Turkey will be interested in its environment."

All the recent steps taken by Ankara are within the scope of its new strategy, which does not allow Turkey to be used as a tool in the policies of great powers, even of such a close ally as the United States. By this, Ankara explains why Turkey did not support the military operation of the Washington-led coalition in Iraq and now demonstrates its own approach in dealing with Iran, Syria and even Russia (in particular, ignoring in its dialogue with Russia the latter's actions in the August war over South Ossetia, which were condemned by the West). In the context of neo-Ottomanism, it is clear that for Erdogan's Turkey, which adheres to conservative values, it is much more important to position itself as an ally of Islamic countries than to support Israel, which is perceived negatively by most of the Islamic world. Not to mention that in its policies towards Israel, the JDP government takes into account the mood of its electorate, which is sensitive to the woes of the Palestinian people, who still do not have their own state; especially as the attempts at rapprochement with Armenia and the implementation of the scandalous "Democratic Initiative" within the country adversely affected the ruling party's ratings. According to various Turkish sources, the rating of Erdogan's party dropped to 30 per cent, whereas in the parliamentary elections of 2007, the Justice and Development Party gained 47 per cent of the vote.

Speaking about the changes observed in Ankara's policies, it is also necessary to note that, by strengthening collaboration with the Arab world, even to the detriment of Western-backed Israel, Turkey also increases its ability to fulfil the mission which, apparently, the same Western strategists have happily assigned to it and which is very flattering to the self-esteem of Turkey itself. This concerns its potential contribution to the dialogue between civilizations, which is so pertinent to the increasingly fierce war against international terrorism. The US and Europe clearly see Turkey as an important element in the process of rapprochement between the West and the Islamic world. In this context, Turkey's bid to become, once again, the first country of the "crescent" is very welcome for Euro-Atlantists who do not wish to see prominence go to not just the odious regimes in Tehran or Damascus, but even the oil monarchies of the Persian Gulf, which have not had the proper "weight" of civilization historically.

Returning to the continuing tension between Ankara and Tel Aviv and considering the possibility of its reduction, it is worth noting the Azerbaijan factor. Baku has an interest in Turkey and Israel maintaining normal partnership relations, as both states are allies of Azerbaijan. Thus we cannot rule out Azerbaijani mediation in establishing intensive dialogue between Ankara and Tel Aviv. Such a prospect is likely to be discussed during Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman's first visit to Baku in the first ten days of February.