SWISS KEY DOES NOT FIT THE ARMENIAN LOCK

Euphoria in big-time politics is a thankless and very dangerous feeling.  The consequences of such a mindset can be very sad.  But is this simple truth always remembered by the political leaders of the international powers who have undertaken to shape the new world order?

Perhaps precisely because they are trying to coerce one country or another to dance to their tune and promote their interests, they often find themselves in awkward situations.  And the problem here is not so much the fact that it is their own fault that these things happen to them, but the fact that, trying to somehow address the problem, they put pressure on the country in question and sometimes even resort to military intervention.  This deplorable outcome is often the result of none-too-careful tactics in the great geopolitical game.  The desire to achieve the goal at all costs often leads to the loss of gains already achieved.  I think that the latest developments, which unfolded in connection with the Zurich protocols and were intended to assist in the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations and opening the borders between the two countries, prove this point very well.  But initially, things started off very well for the supporters of these protocols.  After a year and a half of intrigue behind the scenes, and pressure (especially on the Turkish side), the interested players cajoled Ankara and Yerevan into signing the protocols without preconditions.  All attempts by the signatories to add provisos to the documents brought major protests from the main players, who have their own geopolitical interests in the South Caucasus (SC) and Central Asia (CA).  The greatest objections were raised by the West.  Moscow, which did not openly protest against the protocols, although they could potentially weaken its influence on Yerevan, was forced to grin and bear it and verbally support the initiative.  So, Armenia's intention to add clauses which would include its territorial claims against Turkey and its desire to achieve international recognition of the "Armenian genocide" ended in fiasco.  These two issues are discussed in the protocols clearly and unequivocally.  First:  the parties, confirming their bilateral and multilateral obligations, will honour the principles of equality, sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviolability of borders and non-interference in the domestic affairs of other nations.  They also reaffirmed mutual recognition of the border between the two countries, which is demarcated under appropriate agreements in international law.  This means that the parties automatically recognize the legally binding nature of the Kars Treaty, under which the present-day borders between the states were demarcated.  Second:  The sides undertake to carry out a dialogue between the two nations in the historical dimension to rebuild mutual trust, including by studying in an unbiased manner the historical documents and archives to formulated more accurately the current problems and make proposals.  For this purpose, a bilateral intergovernmental commission was to be created, which would have individual sub-commissions.  In other words, an international commission of independent historians is to be created, which will include researchers from both countries to study the archive documents about so-called "Armenian genocide."  Ankara, on its part, had to abandon the idea of including in the protocols of the Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) problem, which would directly describe the aggressive policy of Armenia and Armenian ideology in the document.  Although at first sight, Yerevan agreed to sign the Zurich protocols without preconditions, the fact that Armenian President S. Sargsyan took steps before signing the documents, which would presumably win support for the signing among the Armenian diaspora abroad, was a major signal.  The hint was more than clear.  The Armenian would not ratify the protocols if the diaspora would be displeased, not to mention domestic pressure on the incumbent authorities in the country.  The second unofficial precondition was that Yerevan demanded that Ankara ratifies the protocols in the Turkish Parliament first.  In the game of "who winks first," the Turkish authorities made their own unwritten precondition:  "The process of ratification and the positive change in resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh problem must be simultaneous."  In other words, without Yerevan's demonstrating a constructive policy on the latter issue, the ratification of the protocols was out of the question.  Nonetheless, the protocols were sent for discussion to the Foreign Policy Committee of the Turkish Parliament.  Yerevan, as it said in advance, decided to receive a ruling of the Armenian Constitutional Court (CC) on conformity of the documents with the country's laws.  And on the day of S. Sargsyan's visit to Moscow, the Armenian CC published its decision in which it recognized the conformity of the protocols with the country's main legal document.  But this was done in a very odd manner.  To be precise, the country's CC discussed these documents in the Armenian Parliament in the preliminary unilateral manner, making its own amendments in the process, which it had no right to do.  The Armenian CC maintains that the protocols cannot be interpreted or applied in a manner which would make it possible to discuss violations of the Armenian Constitution and Clause 11 of the Declaration of Independence of Armenia.  Here is what the clause says:  "The Republic of Armenia supports the process of international recognition of genocide of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire and Western Armenia in 1915.  This is why creation of the commission on "Armenian genocide" is considered inexpedient.  This interpretation and use of the term of "Western Armenia" mean that the Armenians will never remove the issues of "Armenian genocide" and territorial claims against Turkey from the agenda.  In principle, this ruling by the Armenian CC was expected.  It was no accident that Armenian Foreign Minister E. Nalbandyan staunchly opposed signing of the protocols in their current wording, which was why the ceremony in Zurich was delayed by the whole hour.  Any authorities of Armenia which would dare to make that step would place a delayed-action mine under its own office.  Yerevan is trying to persuade everyone that the CC decision is an internal circulation document has a recommendation nature in the process of ratification of the protocols in the country's parliament.  This statement could be found acceptable on only one condition:  If the Armenian CC handed down an unambiguous decision about the conformity of the protocols with the country's Constitution ("yes" or "no"), without making written amendments to the documents -- which it had no right to do.  Or if it demanded that the Armenian authorities re-sign the agreement with consideration for its objections.  In addition the Armenian CC had more than enough time to hold consultations on this issue with the Armenian authorities before agreeing to endorse these documents.  The fact that Yerevan overplays its part by stressing the recommendation nature of the CC ruling becomes very clear when you read the opinion of Armenian Democratic Party Leader A. Sarkisyan:  "The Armenian Constitutional Court ruling on the Armenian-Turkish protocols corrected all the shortcomings and mistakes which were made by the country's foreign political department."  The main objective of the Armenian side and, in particular, of the Armenian diplomacy, is protection of the national interests.  And in the talks on normalization of the Armenian-Turkish relations, representatives of the Armenian side, possibly because of their incompetence or lack of will, were unable to properly defend state interests.  By decision of the CC, many negative aspects and omissions were minimized.  The CC made the subject of the talks more specific and said that independent Armenia did not have and does not have bilateral obligations to Turkey.  Furthermore, the CC mentioned the "de facto borders," not the "interstate borders."  In other words, we were informed that at a time which Armenian finds right, it will cite the absence of bilateral obligations between Turkey and Armenia and admit only the borders which exist in the imagination of the Armenians.  Ankara must not count on anything else.  And while the Zurich protocols are still not brought into line with the desires of the Armenians, the obligations which Yerevan assumed within the framework of these documents are not worth the paper they are written on.  Ankara reacted soon enough.  The Turkish authorities accused Armenia of defaulting on agreement and attempting to thwart the process of ratification of the protocols.  Did Ankara seriously count on seriousness of Armenia's intentions?

In addition, now Yerevan is trying to derive benefits from Ankara's protests against changes in the protocols by the Armenian CC, accusing it of attempts to thwart the process of their ratification.  And again, this was done with open support from the West.  It would suffice to read the statements by US Assistant Secretary of State Philip Gordon:  "One does not get the impression that the decision of the Armenian CC limits or qualifies the Armenian-Turkish protocols in any manner.  The United States' assessment of the Armenian CC ruling that the Armenian-Turkish protocols are in conformity with the provisions of the country's constitution was positive.  The US State Department views the Armenian CC ruling as a positive step toward the ratification of the protocols by the legislative bodies of the two countries.  The court ruling makes it possible to send the protocols to Parliament in the edition in which they were signed.  We are certain that Turkey and Armenia are responsible about their obligations.  This is why I call on the sides to ratify the protocols in the reasonably soon.  Our position remains the same.  We promote the process of normalization of relations which, in our view, will help establish peace and stability in the Caucasus.  One gets the impression that the US official either did not get the grasp of the ulterior motives behind the sophistic behavior of Armenia or he did not get the meaning of Ankara's complaints, or did not want to offend Armenia.  Otherwise he would realize that the Armenian Parliament received for ratification not the protocols which were signed in Zurich, but the amended versions of the Armenian CC.  And these are two different things.  On the other hand, the Western politicians, and Mr Ph. Gordon himself, had to familiarize themselves with the Armenian Constitution for even greater reliability of the agreements which that country signs before putting pressure on Ankara to coerce it into rapprochement with Armenia.

So I cannot resist temptation of asking Ph. Gordon a question:  "How would you react if amendments were made to the Azerbaijani Constitution about the just territorial claims against Armenia?"

The possibility cannot be ruled out that this ruling by the Armenian CC is an instrument of political pressure against Ankara in the Nagorno-Karabakh issue.  Because in its decision, the Armenian CC mentions that issue too, although the protocols do not have a word about it:  "Because the protocols are signed by two countries, Turkey's statement about the ratification of the Turkish-Armenian protocols after the regulation of the Karabakh problem does not comply with the protocols on account of inclusion of the third party in this process."  Turkey, for its part, considers addition of the clause to the CC ruling wrong because it signed the protocols with Armenia without preconditions, which is logically a right type of reaction on the part of Ankara.  The Armenian CC must consider the legal document to hand down its ruling, not the verbal statements by the Turkish officials.  But now it might happen that in return for agreement to drop the Armenian CC's complaints (although this is very hard to believe), Yerevan will demand that Ankara stop nagging it with the Karabakh issue.  Thereby, Armenia will try to secure a sure-fire option for itself.  In case of Ankara's refusal, Armenia will thwart the process of ratification of the protocols and shifts the blame where it does not belong.  And in case of concession (under the powerful pressure from the West) by Turkey, Armenia will occupy even more destructive position on the Karabakh issue.  And most importantly, in that case, the Azerbaijani-Turkish relations might come under serious blow.  But would this be in the interests of the West which so fiercely strived to sign these protocols without a second though and by putting pressure on Turkey?  Was it worth so much effort if the possible outcomes and destructive moves on the part of Yerevan were not precalculated?  This scenario only proves once again that the Karabakh issue must be the only precondition.  Then, encountering the united front of resistance to its aggressive policy, Armenia today would not set as its goal transforming the Zurich protocols into a soap bubble, which stands to first and foremost damage the image of the same West.