BEHIND THE SCENES

On 25 January, Sochi hosted a trilateral meeting between the presidents of Azerbaijan, Russia and Armenia - Ilham Aliyev, Dmitriy Medvedev and Serzh Sargsyan. The talks were also attended by the foreign ministers Elmar Mammadyarov, Sergey Lavrov and Edward Nalbandyan. This is the fifth trilateral meeting in the last two years and the second meeting which was organized specially, not for any international event. The first such meeting in Moscow in November 2008 adopted the Mayendorf Declaration, which registered some convergence of positions between the parties regarding the settlement of the Nagornyy Karabakh conflict. For the first time in 15 years after the ceasefire, it was possible to adopt a document signed by the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia.

The meeting between Aliyev, Sargsyan and Medvedev lasted about two hours. The official part was supplemented by an informal meeting between the presidents at a joint dinner and skiing on a mountain road. On the same evening, the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia held another meeting before their flight at the VIP hall of Sochi International Airport, and this time it was attended by the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs Robert Bradtke (USA), Bernard Fassier (France) and Yuriy Merzlyakov (Russia). It was also attended by the personal representative of the OSCE chairman-in-office, Andrzej Kasprzyk.

Judging by the thoroughness with which the Russians had prepared the Sochi meeting, Moscow anticipated specific progress in resolving the conflict. On 13 January, Yerevan was visited by Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov who discussed the Karabakh issue with the Armenian leadership. Then, Moscow was visited by Armenian Defence Minister Seyran Ohanyan and the head of the separatist "NKR" Bako Sahakyan, while on 18 January Dmitriy Medvedev received Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan. Baku was also visited by a large delegation led by the chief of the Russian presidential administration, Naryshkin. However, apparently, at first glance, the sceptics were right - the expected breakthrough in the Karabakh conflict failed again.

No document was signed during the meeting. Neither was any problem issue agreed upon. Neither the presidents nor the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan, and not even the co-chairmen of the Minsk Group spoke to the media. Only Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov told reporters that there is a general understanding of the preamble of the document prepared by the Minsk Group co-chairs.

"Everyone admitted that the existence of such a document is useful because it provides an opportunity to talk not abstractly, but in relation to specific wording," Lavrov said. The Russian minister pointed out that although there are contentious issues, the parties will prepare their specific ideas and formulations on them which will be included in the text. The Russian Foreign Ministry declined to specify the details of the document or at least its preamble: "This is a subject of negotiations between the parties."

During two weeks, Yerevan and Baku should submit their proposals to the provisions of the Madrid document on which the parties have yet to reach understanding," Russia's representative in the Minsk Group, Yuriy Merzlyakov, said after the talks in Sochi. Then, the co-chairs will visit the region again.

We can add that the semi-official news agencies RIA Novosti and ITAR-TASS, referring to Kremlin sources, expressed the view that the post-conflict period should not change the historically established balance of forces in the South Caucasus region. At the same time, REGNUM news agency, which is known for its openly pro-Armenian position, said that the preamble of the document, agreed upon during the tripartite meeting of the presidents, supposedly notes Nagornyy Karabakh's involvement in further negotiations and specifies the right of self-determination in resolving the conflict.

This information was denied by Foreign Ministry spokesman Elxan Poluxov. However, Azerbaijani officials have not yet announced any additional information and assessments on the basis of the Sochi meeting.

The Armenian side is laconic as well. The press office of President Serzh Sargsyan made a brief statement on this issue, noting that "Armenia highly appreciates Russia's consistent mediatory efforts in the settlement of the Karabakh conflict."

Representatives of the member states of the Minsk Group and international organizations are also restrained in their assessments. Only the special representative of the OSCE on the conflicts in Georgia and Nagornyy Karabakh, Goran Lennmarker, said while commenting on the meeting between the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan: "I hope that the parties are at the end of the negotiations. More meetings will be needed for the signing of an agreement, and it will not happen today. But currently, we can observe that the parties have become closer, and the signing of an agreement on the conflict may be possible this spring." However, Mr Lennmarker is known for his optimism and has repeatedly made such unverified forecasts and expectations.

Based on the above, many Azerbaijani analysts say that the Sochi meeting was futile and some even say that it was a failure. It would seem that it is hard to disagree with such a conclusion. But a reasonable question arises: would Russia be making serious diplomatic efforts to organize a special meeting between the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan with the participation of the Russian president himself, entirely without relying on the result? Would it not be convenient hold such a meeting on the sidelines of some international event in Moscow to imitate activity in the Karabakh settlement and to avoid undermining the authority of Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev? Therefore, I would venture to suggest that serious negotiations took place behind the scenes of the Sochi meeting and the Russians made important suggestions. In the course of the meeting, the parties apparently were not ready to say "yes" or "no" and asked for time to take stock. To avoid whipping political tensions ahead of time, the content of the Russian proposals was not made public. But using the bits of information and indirect points, we could try and build a possible picture of the situation.

Let's begin with the sudden appearance of a preamble to a certain document the agreement on which was announced by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov after the Sochi meeting. What do we need this preamble for? All these years saw the discussion of specific principles, and upon completion of the agreement on them, it was planned to prepare and sign a framework peace agreement on their basis. Therefore, it was enough to make a brief joint statement that the parties have basically accepted the proposed basic principles and instruct their foreign ministers to begin working on a peace treaty together the co-chairs of the Minsk Group. This could be done even verbally.

However, the appearance of the preamble indicates that they are trying to confirm the Madrid principles in the form of a separate international document. Something similar was proposed at the OSCE Ministerial Council in Athens, which French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner mentioned in passing, but something went wrong at the last moment there. Now Russia is in this business, but they also failed to achieve results at once. However, the issue is still open and the parties have been given two weeks to make final adjustments to the proposed document.

 What can it give the parties? Armenia wishes to secure Azerbaijan's obligations not to use force in resolving the conflict, as well as its consent to involve the Armenians of Nagornyy Karabakh in the negotiating process recognizing their right to self-determination by means of free expression. Baku is attracted by the Armenians' obligation to withdraw from the occupied districts.

The risk for Azerbaijan probably lies in the fact that refusal to use force to liberate the occupied territories will legally binding after the adoption of the document, while the timing and procedure for the withdrawal of the Armenian forces have yet to be determined in the peace treaty work on which may last indefinitely. However, Baku is insured by the fact that before the direct liberation of the occupied districts surrounding Nagornyy Karabakh, Azerbaijan will not unlock communications and begin economic cooperation with Armenia.

At the same time, the adoption of this document will make it possible to announce progress in the Karabakh settlement, which will allow Ankara to ratify the Zurich protocols and open the border with Armenia. For world powers, the benefit from the signing of a preliminary document by Azerbaijan and Armenia is that it will minimize the likelihood of unwanted military escalation in the region and provide an opportunity to promote the stalled normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations.

Judging by the information pause, Baku has not yet formulated its attitude to the proposals that emerged in the course of the Sochi meeting between the presidents. But the statements made by the Azerbaijani leader at the World Economic Forum in Davos gave some food for thought. Economic pressure is the primary means to persuade Armenia to sit at the negotiating table, Ilham Aliyev said told The Wall Street Journal in an interview. "We see that Turkey is understanding about the issue and does not intend to ratify the protocol until Armenia withdraws from the occupied territories. If these two issues are separated from each other, Armenia is likely to freeze the talks on the Nagornyy Karabakh conflict. Moreover, there is a common opinion in the region that Armenia should take the first step and withdraw from the occupied territories," the president said.

As for Armenia, Serzh Sargsyan can wait until April in the hope that Ankara will back down under pressure from Washington and Brussels, ratify the Zurich protocols and open the border without progress in the Karabakh settlement. Yerevan cherishes the idea that in the event of Ankara's intransigence, the US Congress may recognize the "genocide of 1915" because the House of Representatives will be re-elected this autumn. The congressmen who need votes and money donations become more amenable to Armenian lobbyists.

Thus, Yerevan is vainly waiting for Armenia's position to get stronger and for Azerbaijan to weaken, which would allow them either to turn the settlement of the Karabakh conflict to their own advantage or freeze indefinitely the status quo which suits the Armenians.

These hopes are illusory in nature, but the Armenians are used to clinging to illusions and persisting until the last possible moment. Well, they can hold out for a month or two, but no more. Obviously, the economic and international positions of Azerbaijan and Turkey greatly exceed everything that nimble and assertive Armenian politicians can mobilize for their support. For this reason, Baku's confidence and the fact that it appeals to international law and connects its own policy to the real interests of the states involved in the settlement of the Karabakh conflict have to produce results sooner or later.