"NO PROBLEM" OR NEW PROBLEMS?

The visit by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan to the US has brought up a multitude of questions about how the negotiations will affect world developments, Turkey's stance in the region and US-Turkish relations. Many analysts agree that the visit will also influence the future of Armenian-Azerbaijani rapprochement. It is worth mentioning that the Turkish prime minister clearly defined Turkey's position on the issue in a meeting with US President Barack Obama: the future of Turkish-Armenian relations depends on whether or not Armenia vacate the occupied Azerbaijani territories. Political experts believe that, considering US interests in strengthening its ally in the region, it cannot be ruled out that the world will soon see Washington act more resolutely to resolve the Karabakh dispute. This view is shared by Sinan Ogan, head of the Turkish Centre of International Relations and Strategic Analysis (TURKSAM), who has revealed some of Ankara's foreign political objectives and the situation and balance of power in the region, giving a forecast on further developments.

Mr. Ogan, what steps do you think Turkey should take in the current situation in the region?

The situation in the region requires Turkey to be active. Turkey is a regional leader and cannot afford to stand aloof from any developments. However, while trying to resolve regional problems, Ankara also aspires to protect the interests of its strategic partners.

Another important goal for Turkey is to resolve conflicts the West has either failed to settle or made mistakes in handling. At the same time, it is necessary to maintain a balance between Russia and Western superpowers.

It is no wonder that US President Barack Obama paid his first trans-continental visit to Turkey. Very recently Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan met Obama at the White House. If we look at the agenda for those talks, we can see that the most important issues of foreign policy for the US overlap with those of Turkey. Only the sequence of these issues may differ. While Afghanistan is top priority for Washington, for Turkey the priority is Nagornyy Karabakh. In other words, regional processes require that Ankara deals with the problems in close contact with world leaders.

Speaking to the Azerbaijani parliament in May of this year, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said Ankara would not take any steps counter to Azerbaijan's interests. However, a little while later, protocols were signed envisaging the opening of the Armenian-Turkish border. The Armenian side claims that the Karabakh problem is not part of the dialogue with Ankara at all. Don't you think that this undermined Azerbaijan's confidence in Turkey?

Of course, Azerbaijan needs to continue to trust Turkey, just as Ankara should carry on trusting Baku. The statement by the great leader of the Turkic world, Heydar Aliyev, that "We are one nation in two states", should not be forgotten. And two states of one nation should trust each other.

Regardless of who is prime minister in Turkey, he must honour commitments made. Heads of government don't promise anything on their own behalf, they speak on behalf of the state they represent, on behalf of the Turkish nation. In this case the prime minister must honour the commitment made by the Turkish nation as a whole.

Azerbaijan should not doubt that. The Turkish nation, the Turkish state will never take steps which Azerbaijan opposes, including on the Karabakh issue.

However, it should also be remembered that international politics requires countries to be able to manoeuvre. Thus it is sometimes necessary just to wait. The most important point is the intention of a state and what it seeks to accomplish. Turkey's desire and the steps it is taking aim to contribute to the strengthening of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity, the return of IDPs to their homes and an end to Armenian occupation.

Do you think that by getting closer to Armenia, Turkey is pursuing an independent policy or is it acting under pressure? It is no secret that countries such as the US and France are quite active on this issue.

Turkey's desire to open the border with Armenia has several motives. First, Ankara is currently pursuing a policy of "No problems with neighbours", and this envisages the removal of all obstacles existing in relations with Yerevan. However, in response to Ankara's steps within this policy, Yerevan is toeing a line of "no concessions to Turkey and Azerbaijan".

Another reason is Armenia's international policy aiming at recognition of the conjured-up Armenian genocide. By improving relations and opening borders with Armenia, Ankara is trying to weaken this campaign.

The third reason is pressure from the West, which is interested in the opening of the Turkish-Armenian border. The pressure originates not only from the US, but also from the European Union.

Finally, Ankara believes that the opening of the border will be a trump card in urging Armenia to take a constructive stance in its talks with Azerbaijan. Turkey is trying to use a new method of conflict settlement. This method has been tried elsewhere in the world - to engage the opposing party in different economic projects and show it how much its interests lie in regional peace.

However, I don't think that the chances of success are very high. This method could work with any other state, but not with Armenia, which cherishes territorial claims against neighbouring states and makes a "hostile image of Turks and Azerbaijanis" part of its daily life. I think Turkey does not know Armenia well enough.

How will the opening of the Turkish-Armenian border impact on Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan?

Such impact will depend on how and under what circumstances the border checkpoints were once closed.

If the border is opened without any preconditions, i.e. without any progress in the Karabakh issue, neither Turkey nor Azerbaijan will benefit. In fact, there will be a deterioration in relations between Ankara and Baku. There is no doubt about that. In other words, this will only play into the hands of Armenia. 

However, if borders open in parallel with progress towards a Karabakh settlement, all regional countries will benefit. In both cases Armenia will end up benefiting. Therefore, Armenia is the state not interested in the borders remaining closed, which is why it is Armenia which has to make concessions.

Yes, but the Armenian side claims that normalization of relations with Turkey does not envisage an abandonment of its policy towards international recognition of the "genocide".

Indeed. A normalization of relations between Turkey and Armenia does not mean that Yerevan will give up its claims of genocide. In the best-case scenario, Armenia and its lobby will play the role of "good and bad policeman". In other words, even if Yerevan does soften its stance to make an impression, it will actually continue supporting its lobby, which will under no circumstances stop claiming genocide.

Ankara has to calculate all this very carefully. In my opinion, one of Ankara's biggest mistakes lies in the fact that it believes a normalization of relations will remove the artificial issue of genocide from the agenda. This, however, is a card held not only by the Armenian lobby, but also by the West, which constantly uses it against Ankara. 

Even in the event of detente with Armenia, accusations of the trumped-up genocide will continue. They may not be as frequent as before, but they will not disappear completely.

The talks on the transit of natural gas between Turkey and Azerbaijan are not yielding fruit. Meanwhile, Richard Morningstar, special envoy of the US president on energy issues in Eurasia, has acknowledged that the Nabucco and Southern Stream projects are of vital importance to European energy security. This means that the West should be interested in Azerbaijan and Turkey reaching agreement on this issue.

The West does not want Turkish-Azerbaijani relations to go sour. Neither does it want these relations to be at a level of "one nation - two states". Today the main culprit in all problems obstructing the Nabucco project is Europe itself. On the one hand, EU states are saying it is necessary to implement Nabucco, but on the other they are strengthening energy ties with Russia. Also, the EU is reluctant to give Ankara 15 per cent of the total volume of gas to be pumped to Europe via Turkey. In other words, the Washington representative's statement should not be taken too seriously. At the same time, we must remember that the essence of Nabucco is also changing. Initially Azerbaijan was planned to be a central player in the project, while now we are witnessing a new design focusing on Iranian, Turkmen and Iraqi gas being transported through Iran. 

How do you foresee relations between Ankara and Moscow, if Turkey becomes a strong player in the transit of gas from the South Caucasus and Central Asia to Europe?

As was the case in the 90s, Turkey and Russia are still competing on the pipeline issue. The rivalry on the question of oil pipelines has developed into cooperation, but the competition on gas supplies issue continues. 

The permission Ankara has granted for Moscow to build the Southern Stream gas pipeline in Turkey's economic zone does not mean that the project is not a competitor for Nabucco.

It is already clear that not all of the gas from the Caucasus and the Caspian region will pass through Turkish territory. Gas resources in the Caucasus and Central Asia will most likely be distributed between Ankara and Moscow.

Azerbaijan often accuses the West of double standards towards Baku. What is the reason for such an approach by the West? Don't western interests hinge on Azerbaijan to a large extent?

The stance of the West is preconditioned not only by interests, but also by other important factors. If only economic and political benefits were under consideration, the West and Russia would be supporting Azerbaijan. The reality is different. On the one hand, the West is trying to safeguard its interests, while on the other it wants to protect "non-Muslim and non-Turkic Armenia".

Azerbaijan is absolutely right to accuse the West of double standards. Although Armenia is "an aggressor and occupier", the West is putting pressure on Azerbaijan and Turkey to normalize relations with Yerevan.

The West understands only too well that if Baku and Ankara act together, it will be difficult to pressure them. But if differences appear between them, this will make it much easier to apply pressure. We must understand this and proceed from the "one nation - two states" principle.

And finally, what do you see in the future of Karabakh?

That is a very difficult question. I would love to answer it in this way: the Karabakh problem will soon be resolved in favour of Azerbaijan.

It cannot be ruled out that six of the seven districts surrounding Nagornyy Karabakh will be returned to Azerbaijan. The "corridor" issue will remain open, while the status problem will remain unresolved for many years to come.

We must remember that the Cyprus issue has lain unresolved for over 40 years. Karabakh will never be an independent state, but it is highly unlikely to be returned to Azerbaijan through peace talks. There is a reassuring factor here - Azerbaijan is becoming stronger and its army is capable of resolving many regional problems, including that of Karabakh.