WAR OR PEACE?

On 22 Novem-ber, Munich hosted the sixth meeting this year between the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan - Serzh Sargsyan and Ilham Aliyev. The negotiations, which took place at the residence of the French consul, were attended by the two countries' foreign ministers, Elmar Mammadyarov and Edward Nalbandyan, as well as by the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs: Robert Bradtke (USA), Bernard Fassier (France) and Yuriy Merzlyakov (Russia) and the personal representative of the OSCE chairman-in-office, Andrzej Kasprzyk.

Following the meeting, the Minsk Group co-chairs issued a statement which read: "The talks, which lasted almost four hours, were constructive. Progress was made in some areas. At the same time, some issues remain open and 'complexities' were discovered."

They also noted that the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia instructed their foreign ministers to continue to work with the co-chairs on the issues under discussion. As the next step, it is planned to organize a working meeting of the two ministers ahead of the OSCE Council of Ministers' session, which will be held in Athens from 1-2 December.

This time, unlike the previous meeting in Chisinau, the tone and content of official comments from Baku and Yerevan were similar to the Minsk Group statement. A spokesman for the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry, Elxan Poluxov, noted that after thorough and detailed discussion of outstanding issues, a shift towards rapprochement on a number of points was noted in the positions of the parties. Armenian Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandyan also said that the talks in Munich saw some progress which made it possible to maintain the positive trend observed in the eight meetings between the presidents over the past year and a half.

Neither the statement by the Minsk Group, nor comments by the Foreign Ministries of Azerbaijan and Armenia disclosed details of the talks. However, influential European and Turkish media gave some details. Thus, according to Euronews, although the heads of state made significant progress, they have yet to come to a final conclusion. At the same time, according to the TV channel, the parties reached agreement on an Armenian withdrawal from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan. The Turkish newspaper Hurriyet, referring to informed diplomatic sources, said that at the talks in Munich, Serzh Sargsyan finally consented to withdraw from five of the occupied districts. Armenia is ready to withdraw its troops from Kalbacar and Lacin, but only after the status of the corridor linking Nagornyy Karabakh and Armenia has been determined. According to the newspaper, the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan also agreed to continue negotiations to conclude a framework agreement between the parties.

These reports indicate a positive outcome of the meeting, although the negotiating process has been in a kind of impasse recently, and expectations of a breakthrough have been replaced by mutual reproach and even threats. Literally on the eve of the Munich negotiations, Ilham Aliyev said that this meeting would be "decisive" because this year has seen "several meetings", but they had all failed. The president stressed that the negotiating process cannot last forever. The Azerbaijani leader did not rule out a military solution to the problem if all attempts at a peaceful settlement of the Karabakh conflict are exhausted.

This statement by the Azerbaijani president was not rhetoric, but specific, and it provoked an appropriate response. The Armenians' bravado and comments in the pro-Armenian Russian media, which alleged that a military solution would not bring success to Azerbaijan, could not hide the real concern of Armenia and its backers. The co-chairs of the Minsk Group, who, as usual, called upon the parties to refrain from military threats, could not but be aware that in the absence of progress in negotiations, their continuation would be called into question and the situation would develop in line with the worst-case scenario.

Of course, we are not talking about an immediate resumption of hostilities between Azerbaijan and Armenia, but it is obvious that the spiralling arms race would unfold with new vigour. Taking into account the fact that Yerevan does not have the financial or demographic resources to maintain an acceptable military balance, the burden would have to fall onto the shoulders of the powers that traditionally sponsor Armenia, primarily Russia. One might expect an upscaling of the propaganda war and diplomatic clashes at the UN and the OSCE. All this, combined with the frequent violations of the cease-fire, would sooner or later lead to a resumption of full-scale hostilities.

One way or another, the tough stance of the Azerbaijani leadership, as well as exhortations on Armenian leaders, which seem to have been sounded by Moscow and Washington recently, have had an impact on Armenia. The Armenians have been convinced that reliance on a profound alienation of Turkey from Azerbaijan, and on the hope that Ankara would soften its principled stance on a Karabakh settlement to secure swift ratification of Armenian-Turkish protocols, is not viable. The tactic of delaying negotiations artificially, which Yerevan has practised recently, did not work either. They also failed to squeeze the coveted concessions out of Azerbaijan. At a time when Armenia has plunged into deep economic and financial crisis and has lost its direct route to Russia, the risks involved in a failure of negotiations and involvement in military confrontation with Azerbaijan may seem excessive.

It is also clear that progress towards a Karabakh settlement is decided not only in Yerevan and Baku, but also in Moscow and Washington. Great importance is thus attached to President Aliyev's working visit to Russia, when he and Russia's President Dmitriy Medvedev took part in the 24 November opening of a square and monument to Heydar Aliyev in Ulyanovsk. After this meeting, the Azerbaijani leadership will be clearer as to whether Moscow is ready to facilitate a settlement of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Nagornyy Karabakh and what levers Russia has at its disposal.

It notable that immediately after the meeting between Ilham Aliyev and Serzh Sargsyan in Chisinau, the Armenian president was invited to Moscow for talks. Upon his return to Yerevan, he went to Nagornyy Karabakh, held private meetings with the separatist leaders and military officials, and then returned to Moscow, taking with him the "president" and "speaker" of the so-called "NKR". Apparently, this was done to make the stubborn Karabakh separatists understand the will of their Moscow boss and not throw a spanner into the workings of Sargsyan's policy to compromise on the withdrawal of Armenian troops from the occupied territories around Nagornyy Karabakh.

And finally, on 7 December, Washington will host a meeting between the US president and the prime minister of Turkey. The Anadolu news agency quoted Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu as saying that "during Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's visit to the United States, the sides will also discuss the Nagornyy Karabakh conflict." It is obvious that Ankara intends to link the normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations to progress on a settlement of the Karabakh conflict. In this connection, representatives of the Armenian lobby in the United States have intensified their "efforts" to create obstacles for the Turkish leader. This is not only proved by the latest attempt to initiate a congressional resolution to recognize the so-called "Armenian genocide of 1915" in the Ottoman Empire. Erdogan is also coming under attack from another direction. The influential Washington Post criticized him for the fact that Turkey, led by the AKP government, is moving closer to authoritarian Islamic regimes, while anti-democratic trends and pressure on the independent media, in particular the Doьan Media, have intensified there.

However, recalling that President Obama's administration needs Turkish support more than ever for a withdrawal of US troops from Iraq in 2010, as well as for operations against the Taleban and for stabilisation in Afghanistan, we can assume that these moves by the opposition to Ankara are unlikely to yield results. Otherwise, Armenian lobbyists would not be creating hysteria in Congress demanding that the Obama administration not put pressure on Serzh Sargsyan and not force him to make undesirable compromises in a Karabakh settlement.

Thus we can say that the negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict are in the home straight. There are opportunities for a breakthrough, and they are not so small; losing them would be an unforgivable mistake by the parties to the conflict and the mediating powers involved in it.

Much will depend on the outcome of negotiations between the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan, with the participation of the Minsk Group co-chairs, in early December in Athens. If they have a positive outcome, the preparation of a framework agreement based on the Madrid principles should not take too long, and 2010 could be the year of a peaceful breakthrough. An additional positive factor is that the presidency of the OSCE, under whose auspices the Minsk Group carries out its mediatory mission, will be handed over to Kazakhstan. It must be noted that the first, unfortunately unsuccessful, attempt at international mediation towards a peaceful settlement of the Karabakh conflict began with a Yeltsin-Nazarbayev initiative in 1991. It would be highly symbolic if agreements leading to long-awaited peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan were signed on Kazakh soil, a country friendly to both sides in the conflict.