THE FURTHER YOU GO, THE WORSE IT GETS…

After the signing of the Zurich protocols every country and international organization interested in a normalization of Turkey-Armenia relations began to talk about the positive effect of this process on the settlement of the Upper Garabagh conflict. Although the protocols make no direct reference to this issue, everyone asserted that the two processes would unfold in parallel. 

These statements drew the conclusion that the co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group and, overall, all interested players are ready to exert influence on Yerevan with a view to achieving progress in a settlement of the conflict before the protocols are ratified in the Turkish and Armenian parliaments. Ankara's unequivocal linking of ratification of the protocols to progress in the resolution of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict backs up this conclusion. In other words, without a constructive approach from Yerevan, there will be no interesting "show" featuring Turkey, either for Armenia or its backers or the West. 

This was indirectly confirmed by the European Union special representative in the South Caucasus, Peter Semneby. In an interview with Russia's Kommersant newspaper, Semneby said the process of ratifying the Zurich protocols would be complicated, but it met the interests of both Turkey and Armenia. 

"I am confident that in the long term, this also meets the interests of Azerbaijan, because it is also interested in the opening of borders in the region. The war in Georgia has shown that the South Caucasus states are vulnerable, and this vulnerability can be eliminated only by solving these issues. I am confident that the Armenian leaders are of the same opinion and that the status quo in Garabagh does not meet Armenia's interests, and it cannot remain undefined forever. To make this happen, more confidence is necessary in the Caucasus, which requires the involvement of third parties, such as the EU or Russia. I hope that together we will be able to secure dialogue."

It is common knowledge that restoring long-awaited stability in the South Caucasus region depends today primarily on a solution of the Garabagh problem. But is Armenia ready for a constructive dialogue, without hysteria, not only in the process of Garabagh settlement but also in normalizing its ties with Turkey? It doesn't look like it.

Yerevan has begun to insist on denying a link between Turkish-Armenian reconciliation and the process of resolving the Garabagh conflict. In addition, the Armenian authorities have begun to challenge separate clauses in the protocols. Although the documents envision recognition of the existing border between Turkey and Armenia according to the Kars Treaty, and the establishment of a commission of independent historians to research the "Armenian genocide", Yerevan is trying to question this content -- at times, explicitly, and at times, in a covert fashion. All this is happening under powerful pressure from "Armenianism" ideologists and the Armenian diaspora, who accuse the Sargsyan regime of betraying national interests. The Garabagh clan, which once usurped power in Armenia against a backdrop of clear national chauvinism and irreconcilability over the Nagornyy Karabakh conflict, today has to answer to its compatriots, who have been infected with the virus of the uniqueness of Armenianism and the idea of "Great Armenia." Now, at a time when Turkey and the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs are trying to step up the process of conflict settlement, Yerevan is trying, in many ways, to actually derail the process. 

If we study thoroughly some events and statements made on the eve of, and during, the Minsk Group co-chairs' latest visit to the region, we see a situation emerging that is not moving towards conflict settlement. In early November, President Serzh Sargsyan claimed at a meeting of the Armenian Apostolic Church's diocese that the process of Turkish-Armenian normalization does not, in any way, mean relinquishing efforts to achieve international recognition of the "Armenian genocide" and is not linked to settlement of the Garabagh conflict. The leader of Nagornyy Karabakh's separatist regime, Bako Saakyan, who attended the meeting, underlined that for many years running, the Armenian diaspora has been aiding the separatist regime largely due to the church's efforts. It cannot be any clearer. Considering the unmatched role and experience of Echmiadzin and the Armenian clergy in igniting inter-ethnic conflicts, such a high assessment of the Apostolic Church by the Armenian authorities comes as no surprise. Also, the submission of another "genocide" bill to US Congress after the signing of the Turkish-Armenian protocols and the Senate majority leader H. Reid's request to US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to arrange a meeting with the leaders of America's Armenian community to discuss the protocols, indicates that Armenians have no intention of shifting the issue from the political agenda to the historical.

According to R. Martirosyan, President of Armenia's National Academy of Sciences, Armenians should reject the establishment of a Turkish-Armenian commission of historians to study the "genocide" issue. As for territorial claims against Turkey, Armenia's ambassador to Switzerland (an odd coincidence, isn't it?) well-known ballad singer C. Aznavour has made the most explicit statement. He claimed: "In 1924, when I was born, Armenians were promised their land back, but this has not happened yet. I am now 85 years old, and I can't wait for another 85 years. Stalin pledged in 1924 that Armenians would regain Erzerum, Erznkan, Agri, Sivas, Elazig, Diarbekir, Bitlis, Siirt, Mush, Van and Khakkari. And under the Sevres treaty, Wilson's Armenia would also include the Trabzon, Erzrum, Van and Bitlis provinces."

So, this is the way Armenians intend to normalize their relations with Turkey. But Aznavour apparently forgot about the Azerbaijani, Turkish and Georgian territories which, as a result of the world's superpowers' geo-political games, in particular, the Stalin-Mikoyan-Orjenikidze manoeuvres, were given away to Armenia during Soviet rule.

Even more vigorous was the effort by Armenia's Heritage parliamentary faction. It has again circulated a draft law "On recognizing the independence of Nagornyy Karabakh" and a bill to amend the law "On holidays and memorable days of the Republic of Armenia", which, along with commemorating the victims of "genocide", proposes a marking of the "Day of great deprivation of Armenians' homeland" on April 24. 

The latter bill aims to directly defy the provision of the Zurich protocols to establish a commission of independent historians to research the "Armenian genocide." If the Armenian parliament, at a certain time, adopts this law, the essence of this provision will be altered. Having replaced the term "Armenian genocide" with the notion of a "Day of great deprivation of Armenians' homeland", which would be tantamount to levelling territorial claims against Turkey, Armenia would deprive the commission of a subject of study. On the other hand, Armenia's current Constitution strongly reflects the "genocide" topic and territorial claims against Turkey, as well as Turkey's image as an enemy. So, even without the passage of the Heritage faction's initiatives in parliament, Armenians will act accordingly.   

But it turns out that S. Safaryan, the Heritage leader, has a valid reason for concern. He says that more and more European politicians are connecting Turkish-Armenian relations to a Garabagh settlement, although they do not openly state this. Safaryan arrived at this conclusion after holding a number of meetings with officials of European organizations in Brussels and Strasbourg. According to him, in denying the link between these two processes, the Armenian authorities are taking advantage of their position to make statements slanted for domestic use. Turkey is currently considered by Europe to be a rising star in the region, for which the door for OSCE MG co-chairmanship is open. At the same time, Europe does not have an unequivocal approach to Turkish-Armenian relations, which hinders the removal of this imbalance. Based on these considerations, Heritage is opposing ratification of the Zurich protocols. 

The Heritage faction has also interpreted in its own way the tactics chosen by Ankara and Yerevan in the process of parliamentary approval of the protocols: "At this stage, each of the parties is pursuing its own goals. Armenia deems it necessary to achieve Turkish ratification of the protocols by April 24, 2010, without including the factor of the Garabagh conflict, as well as to achieve an Armenian lobby-brokered recognition by the U.S. of the "Armenian genocide" in the event Turkey refuses to ratify these documents. Turkey's goal is to find the speediest solution to, or real advances in, the Garabagh conflict in order to rule out the possibility of congressional ratification of Armenian genocide. Ankara's second minimal objective is to assert Turkey as a regional leader. Turkey will therefore be delaying ratification of the Turkish-Armenian protocols. Ankara will attempt to take steps toward a settlement of the Garabagh conflict, meeting Azerbaijan's interests, while leveraging its diplomatic resources and other opportunities at hand."

It is interesting to consider whether or not such a revelation from Safaryan is a coincidence. It cannot be ruled out that Yerevan is revealing its tactics through a leader of an "opposition" parliamentary faction in a bid to pressure Turkey and the parties involved in the process of Turkish-Armenian normalization. Having vested in Turkey the responsibility for taking the first step towards approving the protocols, Yerevan has left Ankara in a difficult position. Thus, in the event of a rejection, the entire brunt of responsibility will rest with Ankara and advantage will immediately be taken by Armenia and the Armenian diaspora, not to mention forces that are uninterested both in Turkish-Armenian normalization or a Garabagh settlement. And reopening the Turkish-Armenian border without advances towards a Garabagh settlement will deal a major blow to Turkey's image on the world stage (especially in the Islamic world) and complicate its relations with Azerbaijan.

It is worth mentioning again that all these statements came shortly before another visit by the OSCE MG co-chairs to the region, during which they discussed with the Azerbaijani and Armenian presidents ways of settling the conflict and arranging their next meeting. Thus, the stage was being set in advance to cast doubt on the fruits of the co-chairs' visit. 

All in all, an odd situation has emerged in the process of settling the Garabagh and, more precisely, in the co-chairs' actions. In the meantime, Yerevan is trying to reap maximum benefit from this situation. Back in October, Yuri Merzlyakov, the Russian MG co-chairman, pointing out that the Madrid principles are amended after each meeting, left open the issue of scheduling a date when an updated version of the document will be submitted to the parties to the conflict. 

Inspired by this statement, A. Arutyunian, the self-proclaimed prime minister of the Nagornyy Karabakh separatist regime, questioned even the updated version of the Madrid principles. "The Madrid principles cannot be considered as a document for Stepanakert (Khankandi - R+). Any document will be adopted by the authorities of Armenia and Nagornyy Karabakh only after its approval by the people," he claimed. 

This logical sequence is supplemented by the aspiration to get the separatist regime involved in negotiations now and at all costs, presenting it as a party to the conflict. These efforts were clearly evident during a roundtable attended by specialists from Azerbaijan and Armenia held in Moscow in early November. Only the Azerbaijani side's protests prompted a removal from the discussions of R. Zargaryan, who was introduced as an adviser to the "Nagornyy Karabakh Republic's Foreign Ministry." Zargaryan is known for having written "a book" about the Turkish threat to Eastern-Mediterranean civilization. It is interesting to wonder what went through the minds of those who state an interest in Turkish-Armenian normalization and a Garabagh settlement when they tried to have such a repugnant figure sit down at the roundtable meeting.  

During the co-chairs' visit to the region, another statement was made by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigori Karasin. "Russia is ready to back a solution to the Garabagh problem that would suit all sides involved and act as a guarantor of a settlement if a compromise is reached. Only a solution that will allow a restoration of stability and tranquillity in the trans-Caucasia region will be viable. Such a solution should help to maintain the historically-shaped geo-political balance of forces in the region in the post-conflict period, without, at the same time, turning this region into a stage for international political and military rivalry. We see our role in facilitating the process of settling the Nagornyy Karabakh conflict, the sides' seeking mutually acceptable outcomes on key issues, but without imposing any external recipes on the parties to the conflict. The main responsibility for making a final choice should rest with Azerbaijanis and Armenians proper."

In essence, this "revelation" is no different from numerous similar declarations by the co-chairs that they lack leverage to influence a party to the conflict, especially the aggressor. No comment here, so to speak. But a natural question arises: are the co-chairing countries indeed unable to influence the aggressor? Odd as it may seem, an answer to this question came from the camp of Russia's "strategic ally", from Richard Giragosyan, the director of Armenia's Centre for Strategic and National Research. Giragosyan said: "A change in Moscow's policy towards Yerevan would lead to a real shift in the peace process on settlement of the Garabagh conflict. This change could be reflected in Moscow's pro-Armenian policy becoming neutral, which could bring about an improvement in Russian-Azerbaijani relations. Russia would show to the EU and the U.S. that it is ready for more constructive cooperation. Such a change in the course of developments is the only factor that Armenia is not prepared for. If Russia indeed alters its policy on the Garabagh issue, Yerevan is unlikely to come up with a response or to counterbalance this." However, such a change in Russia's policy remains under question now. 

Most likely, it was for this reason that Azerbaijani Deputy Foreign Minister Araz Azimov, addressing a forum at the Columbia University in New York, called on the U.S. to play a greater role in seeking solutions to the Garabagh conflict. And, no matter how often the co-chairs point to the absence of a lever of pressure on the aggressor state, such opportunities are actually abundant, although they are being blocked by the Russia-Armenia military-political alliance, Western financial assistance to Armenia and the separatist regime in Nagornyy Karabakh, France's traditionally pro-Armenian stance and the powerful Armenian community abroad. And all this is happening amid a UN debate on the situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan, outright Armenian territorial claims against Turkey and the destabilizing situation on the Georgia-Armenia border and in Javakhetia. 

A profound analysis of the above-mentioned indicates that Armenia, aided by its benefactors and amid the negligence of the OSCE MG co-chairs, has stirred so much trouble (and continues to do so) that it will be hard to expect the Zurich protocols to facilitate not only a Garabagh settlement but also proper Turkish-Armenian normalization.