TO ARMENIA TO WORK?

The Turkish Grand National Assembly has embarked on its consideration of the Turkey-Armenia protocols. Submitting the documents, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu said Ankara was acquiring a great chance to raise discussion, meaning, to question the "Armenian genocide." He also noted that any reference to the Sevr treaty will become meaningless once the protocols are ratified in parliament, and no one will have the right to level territorial claims against Turkey. Davutoglu said further: "We are trying to establish an environment of mutual understanding and create a basis for political dialogue which will help to solve all the problems facing the region. The existing status quo in the Caucasus is not in line with our vision, as there are frozen conflicts in the region which can blow up at any time." He also pointed to the ongoing occupation of Azerbaijani territory, adding that Turkey is unable to act effectively within the current status quo. 

"We have three important goals in this process. The first is to establish good neighbourly relations with Armenia; the second is to forge a wholesome dialogue between the people of our countries and, lastly, to accelerate the process of settling the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict."

As was expected, lawmakers representing Turkey's opposition Nationalist Movement Party (NMP) and People's Republic Party staunchly opposed ratification of the protocols on the normalizing of ties with Armenia and left the parliamentary session. There were no apparent reasons for such a move as, not only the opposition, but also MPs from the ruling AK Party (Justice and Development Party) have stated resolutely that the Turkey-Armenia border will not open before a withdrawal of Armenian armed forces from the occupied Azerbaijani territories. However, although politicians, analysts and mass media are focusing on this point, there are, in fact, enough problems and differences in Turkey-Armenia relations to keep ratification of the signed protocols hanging in the air. Thus, Sukru Elekdag, an MP representing the People's Republic Party and a former Turkish ambassador to the United States, has pointed out that the documents make no direct reference to the Kars treaty. 

"Don't forget that the first thing Armenia did after it gained independence was to pass a decision not to recognize the Kars treaty," the MP recalled. 

The expectations of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's government that the signing of the Turkish-Armenian protocols will reduce the Armenian Diaspora's efforts to lobby for the recognition of the so-called 1915 "Armenian genocide" are not being justified either. Senators Robert Menendez and John Ensign have lately submitted another "genocide" resolution to the US Senate. A similar bill has been submitted to the House of Representatives on the initiative of Frank Pallone and Mark Kirk, co-chairs of the congressional group of support for Armenia, as well as Congressmen Adam Schiff and George Radanovich. 

In addition, the procedure to ratify the Turkish-Armenian protocols, in itself, is quite long and complicated. First, the issue has to be discussed in the Turkish parliamentary commission on foreign affairs and, further, if approved, the protocols will be put to the entire parliament for discussion. Nonetheless, given the numbers of MPs from the ruling AK Party and those of opposition lawmakers, approval of the protocols should not face major hurdles in the legislature. 

However, public disapproval in Turkey and a tough response from Azerbaijan are prompting the Gul-Erdogan government to exercise caution. It is therefore possible that Turkish MPs will ratify only the protocol which does not specify the timing of opening the border with Armenia.  

In Yerevan too, there is no hurry to discuss the protocols in parliament. First, the documents were sent to the Constitutional Court to ensure that they comply with the main law of the land. Armenian media are now speculating that it would be more expedient to tackle parliamentary debate on the protocols only after they are ratified by Turkey. Thus, the Sargsyan government is trying to insure itself against opposition criticism on one hand and, on the other, if a decision is passed by Turkish legislators, to supplement its own decision on the protocols with a statement that allows an ambiguous interpretation of the documents in the future. It is this kind of "battle of statements" that nearly derailed the signing of the protocols in Zurich, and it cannot be ruled out that the same will happen again during ratification.

The reason for the lack of haste and hesitation is not only doubt about the losses and gains to be made from the agreement. The ruling elite in both countries have to reckon with resistance from the opposition and public disapproval. Both in Turkey and Armenia, some approach the agreement positively, while others are opposed, and there are at least as many opponents of the deal. Online news portal Tert.am, quoting Gevorg Pogosyan, head of the Armenian Sociology Association, has cited the results of a public opinion poll commissioned among 1,000 residents of Yerevan. 52.4 percent of those polled opposed signing the protocols with Turkey, and 40 percent even opposed opening the border.

Attitudes on this issue are even more negative in Turkey. As early as this summer, about 70 percent of Turks were opposed to normalizing ties with Armenia. Although the number of opponents has decreased somewhat by now, it still amounts to more than half of the population. So, what is prompting the Turkish and Armenian authorities to move along this path of historic reconciliation, triggering unequivocal public reactions at home, besides insistent advice from Washington and Brussels?

Yerevan's motives and expectations are quite obvious. Talks on the Garabagh conflict settlement are now at the finishing line. Armenia, which is economically and demographically weak and which has driven itself into geo-political impasse by pursuing a policy of territorial claims, is unable to withstand a struggle with Azerbaijan and is leveraging its last resources to strengthen its negotiating position. Turkey's estrangement from Azerbaijan is seen by Yerevan as a significant development, and this very "gain" is the one most coveted by Armenia in the short term. Yerevan hopes that, having been disillusioned over backing from Ankara, Azerbaijan will lose hope of Turkish assistance in a possible scenario involving the use of force to settle the conflict and will make the concessions sought by  Armenia. The tensions lately observed between Baku and Ankara, in particular, after the so-called "misunderstanding over flags", seem to indicate that the plans of Armenian political strategists were well thought-out. However, Armenia has no leverage with which to influence significantly relations between Baku and Ankara. If they proceed thoroughly and cautiously, Baku and Ankara will maintain the current level of strategic partnership and deprive Yerevan of the opportunity to capitalize on Turkish-Azerbaijani differences. 

Armenia has certain economic expectations from the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations. First, it is looking to end the transport blockade by opening the border with Turkey. Operations have already been initiated to set up a logistics centre at the Akhuryan station bordering Turkey near the town of Gumri. Marat Khakov, deputy general director of the South Caucasus Railways closed joint-stock company, which has been charged with managing Armenia's railways, said that, initially, the volume of cargo transported might reach 2 million tons a year, which "will lead to a reduction by 25-30 percent of cargo transported from Armenia to Georgia and vice-versa." As a result, Armenia's dependence on Georgia for transport will be reduced. Armenia's trade and economic relations with Russia can be arranged via Turkish ports and overland communications. This is particularly important in light of plans to build a new nuclear power block in place of the Metsamor facility, which has outlived its usefulness. Besides, the possibility of accessing the Turkish market and, further, European and Middle Eastern markets, especially those of Syria and Lebanon, which have large Armenian communities, opens up prospects for investors to build enterprises in Armenia. But all this is only possible in the mid-term and long-term perspectives.

The actual opening of the Turkish-Armenian border will not lead to a "jumpstart" of the Armenian economy. Either way, Armenians have been visiting Turkey for work and recreation. Also, Turkish industrial goods and food to the tune of about $200 million a year have been delivered to Armenia through intermediaries. International experts estimate that the opening of the border will, in the best case scenario, lead to economic growth in Armenia of no more than 1%, which is obviously not much, considering the 18% decline expected in 2009. However, the above-mentioned advantages are enough for the Armenian economy to experience "the effect of an oxygen mask" mentioned by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev. 

However, Yerevan has no prospect of gaining transit advantages before a settlement is reached of the Upper Garabagh conflict and an opening of the Armenia-Azerbaijan border, and Armenia is unlikely to be even counting on routing Nabucco or other pipelines through its territory. In exchange for "behaving", in terms of normalizing Armenian-Turkish relations, the Sargsyan administration is looking, in the short term, to acquire new loans from the IMF and World Bank as well as relying on assistance from the United States and the European Union. Without these, inevitable financial default and economic collapse are in store for Armenia in 2010. 

As for Turkey, it has few expectations from a normalization of relations with Armenia and the gains are not obvious. By means of forging diplomatic ties and opening the border with Armenia, Turkey is seeking to boost its clout in the South Caucasus. At the same time, Ankara is looking to take off the agenda recognition of the so-called "Armenian genocide", which has been spoiling its relationship with the U.S. and the EU. The Turkish leadership is not even expecting the Armenian lobby to cease its efforts. It does consider, though, that once the issue is tackled by a bilateral commission, parliament and government, international groups will stop reacting to Armenian lobbyists.

Settling relations with Armenia and reopening the border will, possibly, remove another obstacle posed by opponents of Turkey's integration into the European Union. As for economic dividends from a normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations, given the incomparable volumes of the two countries' economies, the presumed benefits for Turkey are insignificant and may affect only borderline provinces. Developing Turkish business in Armenia will be complicated, even after the border has opened, because all the strategic hubs in the country's economy (railways, gas pipelines, electrical power infrastructure, communications, the banking sector etc.) are controlled by Russia. The Armenian government will not allow domestic producers to be squeezed out of the light and food industries. 

Thus, we may conclude that the sensational uproar has been deliberately created by the mass media over Turkish-Armenian normalization, although its actual significance is limited to a local scale and is minute in economic terms. The geo-political shape of the South Caucasus will be stipulated not by Turkish-Armenian rapprochement or by lingering hostility between the two countries, but by the settlement of the Garabagh conflict and the position that Azerbaijan takes towards regional states and the superpowers competing in the region, which are advancing their own economic, communications and military-political projects. Not only ethnic sympathies, but also prudent considerations, will prevent Ankara from ignoring this reality.