OXYGEN MASK EFFECT

The Protocols on Establishing Diplomatic Relations and on the Development of Bilateral Relations, signed by Turkey and Armenia in Zurich on Oct. 10, represent not only a major milestone in the development of Turkish-Armenian relations; they will also, undoubtedly, have a considerable impact on the situation across the whole South Caucasus region. 

No matter how encouraging are the statements made by the interested parties (Turkey, the United States, the European Union, Switzerland and other countries) that the process of Turkish-Armenian rapprochement will promote peace in the region and even facilitate a settlement of the Upper Garabagh conflict, the reality does not appear so inspiring or optimistic. President Ilham Aliyev, in a recent interview with an Azerbaijani television channel, noted reasonably enough that if Turkish-Armenian relations are normalized prior to a solution of the Garabagh problem, then Yerevan's position in the negotiating process will inevitably become tougher and unacceptable. And the president knows what he is talking about, as he it is who encounters the uncompromising and unconstructive positions at meetings and talks with the Armenian leader at each stage of the negotiating process. And the Chisinau summit confirmed once again this undisputed truth. In other words, the documents signed in Zurich will, in fact, bolster Yerevan's position in its "negotiating stand-off with Baku", and this will be the most important outcome (a negative outcome for us) of Turkish-Armenian normalization. 

Ankara is trying to convince us that the opening of the Turkish-Armenian border is not envisioned at this point, saying that only diplomatic ties will be established for now. But, in our opinion, it is currently unclear which course of developments is the lesser of two evils for Azerbaijan. 

In the past two years, Turkish diplomats have adjusted their stance on the Garabagh conflict significantly on the international stage. The problem of Garabagh and support for Azerbaijan are rapidly being downgraded in the list of priorities for Ankara's foreign policy. Once Turkish-Armenian diplomatic relations have been forged, this trend will at least persist, if not accelerate. Of note, the introduction to the Protocol on the Development of Bilateral Relations says that the two countries will back "the development of cooperation within international and regional organizations, in particular, within the frames of the U.N., the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership and the Black Sea Economic Council."

Considering that Ankara was one of the few partners to Azerbaijan's adherence to a position of principle on settlement of the Garabagh conflict, its new course, following the establishment of diplomatic ties with Armenia, may considerably weaken Azerbaijan's international position. And the cost of such a weakening may be higher than the potential economic and other losses to Azerbaijan as a result of the opening of the Turkish-Armenian border. 

So, who will eventually gain from this new development in Turkish-Armenian relations? In the short term, it will certainly be Armenia. It can revitalize its economy by developing trade with the neighbouring Turkey and receiving Turkish investment. However, as noted by President Ilham Aliyev, the effect of this "oxygen mask" is unlikely to foster economic turnaround in Armenia, whose economy is in decline, having been sidelined from major regional projects and almost completely "privatized" by Moscow. 

Ankara will also reap its share of dividends - political and economic. Turkey will strengthen its relations with the U.S., in particular in countering the U.S. Armenian lobby, as well as with the EU. The Zurich protocols will be a major personal success for Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, who is "the intellectual architect" of the Justice and Development Party's foreign policy and the chief ideologist behind rapprochement with Armenia. 

Despite frequent allegations that Russia will lose Armenia due to this rapprochement with Turkey (and, through Turkey, with the U.S. and the West), Moscow will undoubtedly also benefit. Russia has already stated its readiness to back the Turkish-Armenian reconciliation process with further cooperation on projects with both countries. The opening of borders and channels of cooperation between Turkey and Armenia will minimize Yerevan and Moscow's dependence on Tbilisi's stance and the Georgian transit corridor, which cannot function normally during the current Georgia-Russia stand-off. It is worth mentioning in this context that the elimination of Armenian reliance on transit through Georgia will inevitably result in a toughening of Armenia's rhetoric and policy on the status of the Armenian community in Georgia and an increase in separatist sentiments among Javakhetia Armenians. 

Turkish-Armenian normalization will also open up new prospects for the EU and create the pre-conditions for a strengthening of Brussels' clout in the South Caucasus region. 

However, the greatest benefits are in store for Azerbaijan, no matter how surprising this may sound. A rapprochement between Ankara and Yerevan should prompt Baku to reconsider the ideological basis of its foreign policy and adjust the priorities for its foreign political course, some of which were formulated short-sightedly, with one eye on Ankara. This should make everything clear to that part of the political elite clinging to vain hopes in Ankara, in the belief that it would always adhere to a pro-Azerbaijan stance on the Garabagh issue. 

Our foreign policy should be freed of its ethnic-political component and excessive linkage to Turkish interests on certain issues and, as the Azerbaijani president has repeatedly emphasized in his statements, it should dwell fully upon national interests, the interests of Azerbaijan and the Azerbaijani people.