AIMING FOR THE FUTURE

The US decision not to deploy interceptor missiles in Poland and radar systems in the Czech Republic was the most important news in September. "My decision is based on two key factors. First, we have received an update on Iran's missile programme, which indicates the danger of small and medium-range missiles capable of hitting targets in Europe. Second, we have made significant progress in the development of the missile defence technology, especially in the development of onshore and offshore interceptor facilities, as well as their associated radars. Simply, the new architecture of the missile defence system in Europe will provide more reliable, thorough and timely defence for American troops and our allies," US President Barack Obama said while commenting on his decision. 

According to a statement by US Defence Secretary Robert Gates, published in The New York Times, the first phase of missile defence deployment under Obama's new plan will be completed by 2011. During this period, sea-based missile complexes SM-3 (Standard Missile-3) will be placed in areas of greatest danger to Europe. The second phase will be completed approximately in 2015, and it provides for the deployment of several dozen SM-3 interceptor missiles in Southern and Central Europe. Such a system, according to the Pentagon chief, will be more effective if Iran launches a large number of missiles at the same time. 

But not only. The effectiveness of GBI interceptor missiles, planned to be deployed in Poland under Bush's plan, is extremely low. Of the 12 tests, half ended in failure. Financial parameters that come to the fore at a time of crisis are not in favour of these systems either. "A missile for the Patriot anti-missile system costs $3.3 million and for THAAD - about $9 million. Manufacturing SM-3 costs about $9.5-10 million. For comparison, each GBI interceptor missile costs about $70 million," said the deputy chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General James Cartwright.

However, President Obama's adjustments to the plans of the previous Bush administration on the missile defence system caused a mixed reaction both in the US and in the leadership of Poland and the Czech Republic. The Republican Senator from Arizona Whip Jon Kyl called Obama's decision dangerous and shortsighted: "This will strengthen the Russians and frighten and weaken the Poles, Czechs, Ukrainians and Georgians. This is a huge mistake. Not only does this decision leave America vulnerable to the growing Iranian long-range missile threat, it also turns back the clock to the days of the Cold War, when Eastern Europe was considered the domain of Russia."

This view is echoed by Barack Obama's recent rival in the presidential election, Republican Senator John McCain: "The decision (on ABM) has been taken at a time when Eastern European nations are increasingly wary of renewed Russian adventurism..."

But it is wrong to think that the Obama administration, overawed by pressure from Moscow, has given up on missile defence in Europe. According to the official Pentagon commentary, the new plan envisages the deployment of missile defence elements in Poland, but, as stated above, based on SM-3 interceptor missiles. And they will appear even earlier than the missile silos planned previously. There will be more of them, and because of their mobility, they will be less vulnerable to Russia's Iskander tactical missiles.

As for the radar systems, it is possible that they will be deployed in the Caucasus region. The US military has not yet specified exactly where, but it can be either Georgia or Azerbaijan, and, in an extreme case, Turkey. For its tactical and technical characteristics, the Qabala radar station, which Moscow offered to share previously, is not suitable for the US missile defence system.

The Pentagon does not hide its interest in Russia's more modern radar station in Armavir, which can be used along with the Qabala radar station only when there is a relevant agreement on missile defence.

But it is too early to talk about it. According to the chief of the general staff of the Russian armed forces, Nikolay Makarov, Russia is not happy about any missile defence system other than a joint one. At the same time, the Russian general staff expressed a negative attitude to the US intention to deploy its radar systems in the Caucasus.

But whatever it is, the Obama administration, to a certain extent, took Moscow's concern into account, and Russia's leaders - President Dmitriy Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin - commended the move. At a press conference in Pittsburgh on the results of the G20 summit, Medvedev announced that in response to the decision of the Obama administration, Russia abandoned plans to deploy Iskander tactical systems in Kaliningrad. This was not difficult for Moscow if we take into account that physically these complexes do not exist yet and have yet to be produced.

Statements by leaders and experts and comments in the media suggest that Russia is in no hurry to back the West in persuading Tehran to close its nuclear programme. Nor is Moscow going to give up the contract on the delivery of S-300 anti-missile systems to Iran. President Medvedev said that Russia's military supplies to the Islamic Republic are only defensive systems and do run counter to international practice and norms. He also did not hide his negative attitude to the issue of tightening sanctions against Iran, noting that experience testifies to their low efficiency. At the meeting of the UN Security Council, attended by heads of state, to address measures to strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime and the moratorium on nuclear tests, any direct mention of Iran and North Korea was removed at the insistence of Russia and China.

The change in Washington's plans on missile defence in Europe will certainly have a positive effect on the matter of reaching a new Russo-American agreement to reduce strategic offensive arms (START). The old START treaty expires in early December this year. Unlike the Republican administration of George Bush, the government of President Obama demonstrates a desire not only to conclude a new treaty with Russia to reduce strategic arms, but also to approach the threshold where they can tackle the task of liberating the world from the deadly nuclear weapons.

It is clear that Russia needs such a treaty no less than the US, and not for idealistic considerations, but for very pragmatic reasons. Given its scarcity of financial resources and deep technological backwardness, Moscow is not able to engage in a new arms race with the United States. Moreover, the Russians do not have enough money even to service and maintain their current fast-crumbling nuclear arsenal. Therefore, even without an agreement with the US, Russia will have to scrap most of its obsolete ballistic missiles and warheads, because not only their planned but also extended period of use has expired. As a result, the number of Russia's nuclear weapons is falling to the parameters outlined in the new treaty (warheads from 1,500 to 1,675 and means of delivery from 500 to 1,100 pieces).

Thus, as we see, the "resetting" in US-Russian relations has not yet led to real change in their quality. Each of the parties, making adjustments to its policies, pursues its own goals. Moscow seeks to keep at least some attributes of its former superpower status, namely military-strategic parity with the United States and lucrative positions in the energy field. At the same time, Russia is not losing hope (apparently in vain) that the West will recognize the post-Soviet area as its special sphere of responsibility and influence.

The United States, in turn, is aware of the burden of individual leadership in the world and would not mind sharing it with its NATO partners, and on some regional issues, even with Russia, China and India. The mounting global economic and financial crisis, climate issues, international terrorism and drug addiction which has overwhelmed the world make such cooperation an imperative of time.

From Azerbaijan's standpoint, even a relative decline in the severity of US-Russia rivalry and the growing trend of cooperation provide additional chances for a consensus to resolve the long-standing and painful Karabakh problem. The negotiations within the Minsk Group are in the home stretch and a lot depends on the activity of Washington and Moscow.

A consolidated position on Iran's nuclear programme may finally cause the leadership of this country to give up its confrontation with the world and rule out the military scenario, which is also dangerous for our region. As for the use of the Qabala radar station or deployment of US radar systems, the best option for Baku is to ensure that this does not become necessary and we do not have to make a risky choice that will affect the multi-pronged and balanced foreign policy of Azerbaijan.