DIVORCE HAS TAKEN PLACE

On 18 August, the Georgian Foreign Ministry circulated a report that the country's parliament had passed a resolution on Georgian secession from the CIS. Everything was done in accordance with the law: under the organization's charter, membership of the Commonwealth can only be terminated after one year's notice and upon written notification. The appropriate documents were issued by Tbilisi last year, in the wake of the shocking "five-day" war.

At the same time, according to the 1969 Vienna Convention, Georgia continues to be party to some 75 international agreements within the CIS which also apply to non-member countries. These include an agreement on visa-free travel for citizens between CIS countries, on the establishment of a free trade zone (free movement of goods between countries), a convention on legal assistance in civil, family and criminal law, on legal relations, agreements on cooperation on the protection of copyrights and allied rights, on notification and measures to prevent the issue of false trademarks and geographical names etc. Besides, Georgia has decided not to discontinue membership of the Railway Coope-ration Organization (RCO) and continues to be a party to the Agreement on international railway cargo communication and the Agreement on inter-state transportation of hazardous and explosive cargoes.

It was hard to expect any other decision from Tbilisi than secession, especially since, according to the Commonwealth charter, countries should help each other, including in the settlement of territorial disputes. Thus this turn of events did not come as a surprise. In essence, the secession actually took place a year ago. After last year's developments it would be strange to imagine Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili attending CIS summits. There are times when one throws stones and there are times to gather them. Now, a year after the bloody developments in the South Caucasus, the time has come for politicians and experts to start thinking about what is in store for Georgia proper and for the Commonwealth of Independent States.

In particular, it is said that Georgia's secession from the Commonwealth runs counter to its own interests, because most of its economic and humanitarian relations have been forged within the organization. And even though, as mentioned above, Tbilisi remains party to many CIS agreements, the Georgian government now faces the task of switching to bilateral relations in many respects. Georgia's neighbours, however, have reassured it that, regardless of future developments, their relations will be of an amicable nature.

Has Tbilisi thus got any closer to the West - the EU and NATO? Hardly. Of course the path to these organizations is still open to Tbilisi - during a recent visit to Georgia US Vice President Jo Biden said that Tbilisi can and must "choose its partnerships and alliances by itself". Actually reaching that goal, however, is not so easy - it will require a great deal of effort.

All this is happening against a backdrop of serious economic problems in the country. Different figures can be cited, but the most graphic symptom is the recent dismissal of economic minister Lasha Jvania, after the Georgian prime minister expressed discontent with his work, primarily in the sphere of attracting investment.

This, in fact, is not the first reshuffle of the Cabinet. Local media maintain that further drastic changes in the government are still to come. Georgia Online reports, with reference to the Mteli Kvira newspaper, that Saakashvili is allegedly planning to replace all ministers except for Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili and Justice Minister Zurab Adeishvili.

On the other hand, Russian officials are saying that Georgia's secession from the CIS will not affect the organization in any way, adding that Tbilisi had never been an active member. They stress that Tbilisi may always change its mind… Provided, of course, that there is still an organization for Tbilisi to join should it change its mind.

Since Georgia became officially divorced from Russia, the future of the CIS has been a popular topic of debate. Many were particularly alarmed by media reports that Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko may boycott the ninth CIS summit in Kishinev. Media reports recall many Ukrainian officials saying that Kiev is not a fully-fledged member of the CIS anyway, because it has yet to ratify its charter.

It is said that the possible refusal to attend the Kishinev meeting may be determined by Ukrainian desire to exact revenge on the Kremlin for a recent letter by Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev, in which the Russian leader lambasted his counterpart for his clear anti-Russian policy. However, this situation may be viewed from a different angle: it may have been Moscow itself which made it clear to Yushchenko that attending the Moldovan summit might not be a good idea.

We recall that a presidential election is due in Ukraine soon and, judging by survey results, Yushchenko is not favourite to win. In this light, many observers believe that the Ukrainian leader's decision can be explained quite simply: relations with Russia are of tremendous interest to most of the Ukrainian electorate. It also goes without saying that secession from the CIS will not be as easy for Ukraine as it is for Georgia. There is much greater inter-connection between the trade and the economies of Russia and Ukraine, a huge proportion of Ukraine's population is Russian-speaking, the Russian Navy is on Ukrainian territory, there is a very long common border etc. 

However, Kiev's problems do not affect stability in the CIS in any way. It is obvious that the organization, established to achieve a civilized "divorce" of FSU countries, has now become a relic of the Soviet past and functions by momentum, not by necessity. Many CIS agreements have never become effective. Nevertheless, the CIS executive secretary, Sergey Lebedev, stated recently that over 70 per cent of decisions passed by heads of state and government last year have been implemented, while others are long-term and will take more time to fulfil. 

Countries of the Common-wealth do not agree on foreign policy - as a matter of fact, not all the states have signed the organization's charter yet. Of course, there is no denying that the CIS is an excellent arena for meetings of heads of state (ministers, experts etc). They are able to discuss issues of common interest within the organization. Sceptics, however, believe that the organization has long since turned into a "Presidents' Club" where they simply talk to each other but rarely come to a common understanding. The main stumbling block is that many interests in the CIS no longer overlap. Due to the lack of a "centre", every independent FSU state has its own national interests and priorities. 

This is clear, not least, because many CIS members also participate in other international and regional organizations - GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova), OCST (Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan), SCO (Tajikistan, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and China) etc. Russia itself is an active member of OCST, trying to benefit from the organization as much as it can. It has even initiated the establishment of CRRF (collective rapid reaction forces), which is portrayed as being analogous to the North Atlantic Alliance.

It is worthy of note that, after dropping out of the CIS, Georgia severed relations not so much with its Commonwealth neighbours as with Russia. For Moscow, the CIS is yet another opportunity to reinforce its influence in the post-Soviet area. The Kremlin is also hopeful that re-integration will start sooner or later in CIS countries and Russia will again be its focal point. Since all CIS members view participation in the commonwealth through the prism of relations with Moscow, the alliance is also seen as a measure of Kremlin success. Moscow's bilateral battles with its neighbours appear quite effective against this background.

For example, as far as Ukraine is concerned, the wrangling is often over Russian gas. It passes through Ukrainian territory to Europe and Kiev needs it. Moscow and Kiev are again on the threshold of a "gas war". Kiev continues to express its discontent over the hanging on of the Russian Black Sea fleet in the Crimea. There are also other negative aspects. 

Even Russian-Belorussian relations cannot be described as strong. They have been seriously marred by a number of incidents, including one over the "beef and dairy war". Minsk has never supported Russia's call to recognize the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In fact, the "reluctance of CIS members to dance to Russia's tune" and to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia is seen by Georgia as yet another indication of the Commonwealth's imminent collapse…

The democratic and liberal forces which have established a ruling coalition in Moldova are also threatening the Kremlin with problems. There is already talk that Kishinev should change its neutral status and consider joining NATO.

With this in the background, Russia has decided to focus on the Central Asian countries, but appears to have lost its way in their interests and relations with each other. Uzbekistan, for example, is currently unhappy about the future establishment of a Russian military base in Kyrgyzstan within the OCST, but this is only one of many contradictions in the region.

Some Russian experts have begun saying that the CIS may, in the future, be joined by countries which were not part of the Soviet Union, such as Mongolia, Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua and Honduras. Then it would be a completely different organization and the "demise" of the previous form of the CIS would thus be confirmed. There are very few people who believe that the CIS can develop into an organization similar to the European Union. Abkhazia and South Ossetia can become members of the CIS only if recognized by countries of the Commonwealth, which is highly unlikely.

However, the need for the Commonwealth will remain - as long as there is a common linguistic and cultural area it is not worth abandoning - Georgia, of course, is an exception.

Azerbaijan has always dealt with the issue pragmatically. Baku has never placed too high a stake on the organization, but does not underestimate its political and economic contributions either.

In fact, if anyone has been affected by Georgia's secession, it is Armenia, which has now lost its common border with the Commonwealth (the border with Azerbaijan is closed through Armenia's own fault), which will significantly complicate Russia's communication with its outpost in the South Caucasus.