DIVORCE HAS TAKEN PLACE

Georgia's attempt to re-establish its territorial integrity and to put an end to the separatist regime in South Ossetia resulted in Russian military operations against Georgia itself.  Moscow justified its actions by citing the need to defend "fellow citizens in South Ossetia" and its own peacekeeping forces deployed in the breakaway autonomous district.  Russian troops came close to Tbilisi, and combat operations ended thanks only to diplomatic interventions by the United States and the European Union, and especially by French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who played a pivotal role in the achievement of a cease-fire.  The main political consequences of the war were the recognition by Russia of South Ossetian and Abkhazian independence and the severance of diplomatic ties between Moscow and Tbilisi.  But it is already clear that both sides lost much more than they gained from the war.

Despite the success of the military operation against the Georgian Army, which was driven out of South Ossetia and, most importantly, despite Russia's acquisition of a geostrategic foothold in the former Georgian autonomous republics, it lost all hope of regaining influence in Georgia.  After the first ever war between two Eastern Orthodox peoples, Georgia, which was once considered one of the privileged territories of "Russian Eurasia," has now turned irreversibly towards the Euro-Atlantic world.

The West, it seems, had waited for this moment and took a number of measures during the post-war period to tie Tbilisi fast to its orbit of influence.  It suffices to mention the signing of the US-Georgian agreement on strategic cooperation and the provision by the West of all kinds of political and financial assistance to Georgia, which testify to the fact that the United States and the West are monitoring the situation closely and are ready to react instantly in case the Georgians again face a threat like that of the Russian operation in August.  The West has made it clear that it will actively resist all attempts to gain international recognition for Sokhumi and Tskhinvali and has urged Russia to withdraw its troops to the positions they occupied before the August conflict, that is to say, from the breakaway Georgian regions.

In the mean time, Russia has failed to persuade even its closes CIS allies to recognise Abkhazia and South Ossetia, including Belarus, whose position is now one of firm support for Georgian territorial integrity; this is against the backdrop of the recent "milk war" between Moscow and Minsk.  As for the strengthening of the Russian Federation Armed Forces in the breakaway republics, in the form of the deployment of military bases, Moscow views this step not only as a preventive measure against a revanchist operation by Georgia, but also as some compensation for the weakening of Russian influence in the South Caucasus, after the strengthening of the West's position in the region.  Russia's veto on an extension of the UN and OSCE missions' mandates in the Georgia-Abkhazia conflict zone should also be seen in this context.

Yet another aspect of Russia's failure is that Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, with whom the Russian authorities categorically refused to talk, has managed to remain in power.  Georgia's loss of Abkhazia and South Ossetia did not lead to the fall of the Georgian leader, as Moscow had hoped.  The only pleasing factor for the Kremlin is that Georgia (and Ukraine) are no longer considered by the West to be candidates for early membership of NATO.  However, this consequence of the August war can only be viewed as a tactical, rather than a strategic, achievement for Russia, because Georgia remains one of the closest allies of the North Atlantic Alliance.  In principle, Tbilisi has a green light to join the military-political organization.

Georgia's post-war situation has naturally proved to be much more dramatic.  In the light of the possible loss of its former autonomous regions once and for all, the intensification of Tbilisi's integration into Western structures can hardly be viewed as proper consolation.  And US and EU promises to do their best to prevent broad international recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia does not mean that the separatist regions will easily be brought back under the control of the central Georgian Government.

So neither Moscow nor Tbilisi feel satisfied (still less victorious) about what happened in August 2008.  Could this be the reason why both sides continue to threaten each other, despite their obvious lack of interest in a resumption of military operations?  Moscow suspects that Georgia intends to launch a new military operation to regain control of South Ossetia.  Tbilisi, for its part, is worried that Russia, in pursuing its objective to see Saakashvili removed and also to prevent further rapprochement between Tbilisi and the West, will again invade Georgia.  All these fears are stoked by both Russia and Georgia, and both sides continue to step up their combat readiness.

This new round of aggravation in relations between Russia and Georgia has been unfolding since April 2009.  Russia increased the frequency of reconnaissance flights by its airplanes over Georgian territory, it began to deploy additional military units in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and to assemble Black Sea Fleet warships near the Georgian coast.  The sharpest demonstration of Russia's military might came when it held large-scale military exercises in the North Caucasus, which have now become an annual event, and which this time around were accompanied by an escalation of tensions between federal troops and local Wahhabi groups.  The large Russian military contingent moved to occupy positions near the border with Georgia to take part in the Kavkaz-2009 exercises.  Tbilisi and Western capitals remembered that it was precisely these exercises which heralded the August war last year.  This factor stirred passions further on the eve of the anniversary of the Russian-Georgian armed conflict.  Talks between the Russian and US leaders, Dmitriy Medvedev and Barack Obama, which were held in an outwardly quite warm atmosphere, did not alleviate these tensions.  At any rate, the position of the United States, voiced not only by President Obama, but also - a little later - by Vice President Joseph Biden and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, left no doubt:  Washington objects to any form of pressure on Tbilisi from Moscow.

However, Russia gave it to understand that it did not need any instructions from the superpower from across the ocean on this issue.  A few days after his meeting with Obama, Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev paid a visit to South Ossetia, where he said that the stationing of Russian troops there was a "clear signal to those people whose heads sometimes generate idiotic plans."  And the Russian media began to report that the Saakashvili regime "is preparing new acts of provocation" in Tskhinvali and is possibly even planning to attempt once again to resolve the South Ossetia problem by armed force.  On the very eve of the anniversary of the August war, the Tskhinvali authorities reported several mortar barrages of their "state" by Georgia.  Tbilisi, for its part, accused Russia of movement on the South Ossetian border, which is guarded by Russian border guards, deep into Georgian territory.

In the mean time, only the resumption of Russian-Georgian dialogue can guarantee that the events of August 2008 will not be repeated.  But it is clear that this will be difficult to achieve in a situation in which both sides operate within the strict and uncompromising limits of their own geopolitical ambitions, which in Russia's case means the preservation of its influence in the South Caucasus and in the broader post-Soviet area and, in the case of Georgia, in asserting its position as a mouthpiece for an unstoppable movement towards the West, often without any consideration for either regional realities or the readiness of the country itself to join the Euro-Atlantic system as a fully-fledged member.  Not to mention the ambitions of the breakaway regions themselves, which push the Caucasus towards a redrawing of national borders, which would be fatal for the region.  However, Abkhazia categorically rejects the possibility of remaining a self-governing autonomous area inside Georgia and wants independence for itself a la Kosovo (the only difference being that Pristina is backed by the West and Sokhumi by Moscow) and South Ossetia simply wants to become part of the Russian Federation.  This sad collection of facts unfortunately leaves little room for the stabilization of the situation surrounding the breakaway Georgian territories and a speedy resumption of dialogue between Moscow and Tbilisi.  Azerbaijan, which maintains friendly relations and strategic partnerships with both countries and which acts as undisputed leader in the South Caucasus region, urges both countries to do precisely that - engage in dialogue.