UNREST SUBSIDES, BUT PROTEST REMAINS

To all appearances, the Iranian authorities managed to suppress protests by the part of the population who expressed their protest at what they thought was the fraudulent re-election of Mahmud Ahmadinezhad. However, it would be wrong to say that the post-election battles are now over. The next few years of Iran's history will take place under the banner of the failed "green revolution" which, despite its failure, disclosed the painful aspects of three-decade-long ayatollah rule.

Out of depression into repression

The next day after the 12 June elections, from the moment the incumbent president Ahmadi-nezhad was announced the winner, supporters of the reformist candidate Mir-Hoseyn Musavi took to the streets.

However, the leader of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Ali Khamene'i, urged citizens of the country to close ranks around Ahmadinezhad and said that all forces of the state will be directed against those who try to dispute the outcome of the elections.

Soon, the state really showed the protesters the long arm of the law. According to unofficial information, as a result of clashes with the police and Basij pro-government armed brigades, dozens of people were killed. The authorities arrested hundreds of Musavi's supporters. The repressive apparatus was used to the fullest. Things reached such a point that four leading footballers of Iran's national team were disqualified for the rest of their lives for supporting opposition protests.

Meanwhile, the Guardian Council examined complaints about the results of the elections and acknowledged that irregularities occurred during vote-counting in 50 population centres, mainly in distant cities and villages, and these irregularities might have resulted in a mistake of 3 million votes during recounting. However, the Council stressed, these votes did not have a significant impact on the general outcome of the elections which ended in Ahmadinezhad's victory.

After that, the Iranian parliament named the approximate date for Ahmadinezhad's inauguration - from 26 July to 19 August. Iran's Interior Ministry and National Security Council demanded that Musavi stop calling for street protests. The Islamic Revolution Guards Corps and Basij brigades expressed their resolve to prevent any new attempts to stage street protests. Despite all threats, Musavi continues to urge his supporters to fight on for the annulment of the election result. But the general decline in the protests causes no doubts.

Meanwhile, the split in Iranian society has also affected the ruling elite of the country. It is possible that the Assembly of Experts of the Islamic clergy, which is authorized to remove the country's spiritual leader and is headed by Musavi's supporter and former president Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, will try to remove Khamene'i.

Having realized this possibility, the authorities arrested five members of Rafsanjani's family, including his elder daughter. They were all released later, but the leadership of the clerical regime clearly showed the former president what can await him if he continues supporting the opposition. Nevertheless, Rafsanjani seems to be trying to enlist support from hierarchs of the Islamic clergy. They might decide that Khamene'i should be removed, not because they love the opposition which is demanding reforms, but because they realize that it is impossible to maintain the previous power of the ruling regime when supreme power remains in the hands of a person who has dissatisfied most of the population.

Khamene'i and President Ahmadinezhad whom he supports do not like talking about the domestic causes of the events. They prefer accusing Western countries, first of all the USA and Britain, of organizing the protests.

Interests of geopolitics

In response, the West expressed its perplexity. Jan Kohout, the foreign minister of the Czech Republic which holds the presidency of the EU, said that European politicians limit themselves only to expressing their concern about the way the Iranian authorities are treating the opposition. The accusation of supporting the Iranian opposition was also rejected by David Miliband, the foreign secretary of Britain, a country which Khamene'i called "the most mendacious state in the world".

The West's reaction to the events in Iran was indeed much more restrained than it could have been. It was mainly US President Barack Obama who set the pace, noting the inexpediency of interference in Iran's internal affairs. The US administration seems to have decided not to give the Tehran regime the trump card of foreign threat which would be able to unite Iranian society.

Israel's reaction to the events in the Islamic Republic was also quite notable. On the one hand, Israel drew the world community's attention to the real face of the "mullah regime", and on the other, it seized the opportunity to say that the Jewish state wants to be a friend of Iran if it is run by a government that is ready to stop supporting terrorism and give up its aspiration to wipe Israel off the face of the earth. "There is no conflict between the Iranian and Israeli peoples, and within the framework of another regime, the peaceful relations that existed in the past could be restored," Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said. The Israeli premier also described the actions of Mir-Hoseyn Musavi's supporters as "acts of incredible bravery and courage".

At the same time, Russia expressed certain sympathy with Ahmadinezhad. Most of the Russian media think that the West is overstating the scale of protests by the Iranian opposition which it thinks is acting on an instruction from the USA and Europe. The latter were accused of intending to stage a "colour" revolution in Iran. The most realistic explanation of Russia's approach should be the unpredictability of Iran's policy if the reformist Musavi comes to power. While assessing such a prospect, political experts in Moscow say that a liberal government in Iran may strike a deal with the West, which will deal a blow to Russia's interests not only in the sphere of geopolitics, but also energy.

It is not only political leaders and the public of leading powers that express their attitude to the developments in the Islamic Republic of Iran. For example, Armenia is following the events with great attention and concern. Armenia seems concerned as possible political changes in Iran may aggravate its situation. Ahead of the elections, one of the Armenia's leading Iran experts, the head of the Iran department at Yerevan State University, Garnik Asatryan, said: "Whoever is elected Iran's president, the policy of this country with regard to Armenia will not change. The only exception is the candidate Mir-Hoseyn Musavi." The Armenian expert expressed his distrust in Musavi who stated during the election campaign: "If the Iranian authorities had been strong, they would have had dignity and the Armenians would not have occupied Karabakh."

Determining their sympathy with this or that presidential candidate in Iran, the Armenians remembered that while being governor of Ardabil Province, Ahmadinezhad "had a very negative attitude towards Azerbaijani nationalism". Political expert Sergey Shakaryants ecstatically said how Ahmadinezhad "mercilessly suppressed any attempt of Azerbaijanis to confront the Iranian state" and personally participated in the hanging of almost 1,500 Azerbaijanis.

The Armenians' desire to deal with the incumbent Iranian president is based on the fact that they realize that if an opposition leader comes to power in Iran, this country may raise the issue of preventing the occupation of Azerbaijani lands more actively. The Armenians are not happy with the widespread idea in the world media that if Musavi had ascended the presidency, he would not have given up Iran's traditional policy in the Caucasus. It seems much more convincing to "the long-suffering people" that it is exactly Ahmadinezhad's government that guarantees the preservation of the southern road of life for Armenia. The most recent confirmation of this is the desire of the Iranian authorities to build the Tabriz-Yeraskh oil pipeline in the near future.

Betrayed hopes

Returning to the Iranian situation, we should point out that its main meaning is defined neither by the split in the higher echelons of power nor by the omnipresent hand of the West. A large part of Iran's population is clearly unhappy with the tough realities of clerical authoritarianism. Even opposition leaders cannot always control the expression of protests because many Iranians, mainly youngsters, are demanding changes, as it were, hear and now, rejecting any calls to end the protests or hold them in a more restrained form. Incidentally, Musavi himself also urged them to be more restrained. However, the situation has acquired a nature when any call for an end to the struggle may be perceived by the protesters as a betrayal. Maybe in the end, the wave of the opposition movement will put Musavi himself in a position he did not even dream of before 12 June.

The domestic Iranian confrontation initially ensued from the inability of the clerical regime to respond to present-day challenges appropriately. Now the most amazing thing is that the Iranian authorities lost the support of many of those who sincerely believed in the ideals of the Islamic Revolution. Most of the protesters took to the streets not because they are against the Islamist state as such, but because they regard themselves as betrayed by the unfair outcome of the election.

Iran's ruling elite will now clearly tighten the screw, manipulating the worn-out subject of national pride and greatness. It is appropriate to remember that about a year ago, Ayatollah Khamene'i said that Ahmadi-nezhad's government is advantageously different from its predecessors by its offensive foreign policy. According to Khamene'i, the previous President Mohammad Khatami, who tried to smooth out tense relations with the West, included Iran in the "axis of evil", while the hard line of Ahmadinezhad, who came to power in 2005, resulted in Washington offering negotiations with Tehran. In this regard, it is worth expecting that Ahmadi-nezhad's line will become even harder in the talks on Iran's nuclear programme, especially if we take account of the extent of the arrogant inspiration that the "mullah regime" has experienced from the latest almost reconciliatory gestures of the new American leader. At the same time, the people of the Islamic Republic will again get convincing proof that Khamene'i and Ahmadinezhad are protecting national interests.

However, for Tehran the problem is whether "the enemies of Iran" will agree to continue playing the "game of reconciliation". Moreover, the Iranian leadership, which is clearing the streets from demonstrators, is not capable of clearing the country from the protest energy that has overwhelmed it, because this energy will definitely be waiting for another opportunity to come out. The future of this ancient and always unpredictable country will depend on how this issue is solved in Iran.