THE SITUATION IS ALMOST QUIET IN TEHRAN

Mahmud Ahmadi-nezhad won the presidential election in Iran for a second time. According to official reports, about 40 million voters from Iran's population of almost 70 million turned out to vote in the 12 June elections.

Election campaign innovations did not help the reformists

This election was a historic event for Iran not so much in terms of its outcome, which is of no reformist or revolutionary importance since it helped the previous administration to concentrate power in its hands, as in terms of new election technologies. The Internet was widely used for the first time during the election campaign in Iran. The turnout at various campaign rallies was unprecedented and most importantly, the Iranian voter witnessed direct TV debates between presidential candidates, including the current political leader of the country, Mahmud Ahmadinezhad.

The president's rivals were three retired statesmen - former Prime Minister Mir-Hoseyn Musavi, former parliament speaker Mehdi Karrubi, and the former commander of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, Mohsen Reza'i. It is notable that they are all representatives of national minorities. Musavi, who was Ahmadinezhad's main rival in the presidential race, is of Azerbaijani descent, while Karrubi and Reza'i are of Lor origin. In any case, this did not break the political tradition of the Islamic Republic of Iran: in their ethnic aspirations, the presidential candidates did not go beyond the framework of what is allowed, speaking only about the cultural rights of ethnic minorities.

However, the ethnic issue was quite obvious during the election campaign. On the third anniversary of the suppression of demonstrations in Azerbaijani provinces, a large protest was staged on a central square in Tabriz. Its participants carried posters demanding their national rights, specifically the right to teach the Azerbaijani language. However, the Iranian police opened fire at the demonstrators again, killing and wounding dozens of people.

The election campaign demonstrated again that the Azerbaijani population is the most progressive and democratic part of Iranian society. Apparently, it is no accident that the main mouthpiece of reformist views among the candidates was Mir-Hoseyn Musavi who sharply criticized Ahmadinezhad's policy.

Talking about the economic situation in Iran, Ahmadinezhad pointed to the growing annual GDP indicator compared to the one that existed before his presidency. He also noted a considerable growth in employment, inflation falling to 15 per cent and a 256-per-cent growth in pensions. However, Musavi who had a debate with the president accused him of lying. He quoted accurate information showing that the level of inflation has grown to 25 per cent and unemployment has reached 12.5 per cent.

Moreover, Musavi openly called Ahmadinezhad a dictator and revealed the negative sides of his foreign policy which the incumbent himself described as his most successful sphere of activity. According to the reformist candidate, the president's foreign policy suffers from "adventurism, imbalance, self-admiration and extremism". Musavi stressed that Ahmadinezhad's insistent denial of the Holocaust has significantly reduced international support for Iran. He called for reconsideration of Iran's policy in the Middle East, especially in Lebanon, and for new approaches to the nuclear problem and even said that official contacts might be established with the USA. It does not mean that Tehran and Washington will become good friends. Musavi simply said that Iran may establish diplomatic relations with the United States if they lift the sanctions against Iran and establish bilateral economic cooperation.

Thanks to his position and calls for reforms, Musavi was supported, first of all, by the youth and women. The participation of his wife Zahra Rahnavard in his campaign rallies became a remarkable event in Iran's political practice.

However, all this was not enough for the supporters of reforms to gain a victory. The elections ended in Ahmadinezhad's victory though Musavi's headquarters point to numerous violations during the voting. According to official preliminary information, the incumbent head of state gained 65 per cent of the vote after 80 per cent of ballot papers were counted, whereas Musavi gained only 32 per cent.

Such an outcome was predetermined mainly by the support of the Iranian clergy, including the supreme leader of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Khamene'i, for Ahmadi-nezhad. Meanwhile, it must be admitted that even if the reformist candidate had won, it is unlikely that the reforms he promised would be implemented, since the political system of the clerical Iranian state is totally under the control of ruling "mullacracy" which leads the influential conservative forces of the country. In this sense, hopes for reforms following Musavi's possible victory were extreme though he had a clear chance of becoming an "Iranian Gorbachev", i.e. "a perestroika man" of Iran's political system.

Whatever it is, for the international community, especially for the West, it was much more important to get a clear idea of public sentiments in the Islamic Republic rather than the outcome of the presidential race in Iran. They probably now have a clear idea about them. Despite all the factors that speak against Ahmadinezhad and his policy, most of the Iranian electorate which represents the "titular nation" - Persians - wants to continue the policy which they think is aimed at turning the Islamic Republic of Iran into a powerful state in the East, and not only, if we believe in the promises of the winner Mahmud Ahmadinezhad.

Inappropriate ambitions

Ahmadinezhad's victory clearly indicates that the Iranians have an imperial way of thinking. The incumbent president who in fact threw down the gauntlet to the USA and the West seems to be a bearer of the imperial idea in the eyes of his countrymen and deserves all kinds of approval and support in this regard, even if the other side of his strategy which helps isolate the country are clear problems in the economy and social sphere in Iran. On the other hand, Ahmadinezhad's hold on power as an uncompromising fighter against foreign enemies seems to reduce the fears of Iranian society about a possible military strike from the USA. Ahmadi-nezhad's promises to continue to the very end the development of the country's nuclear programme, which is keeping the whole world community in suspense, played into his hands.

Ahmadinezhad's re-election shows that the international crisis around Iran's nuclear programme will hardly subside in the near future. Moreover, it may continue and have unpredictable consequences. In view of Ahmadinezhad's victory, it is unlikely that Tehran will positively react to the call of US President Barack Obama to start a direct dialogue to discuss the possibility of Iran halting its uranium enrichment. The White House will have to take a final decision on the Iranian issue. Obama himself has repeatedly said in the recent period that his administration will make up its mind on this issue after the presidential election in Iran. Washington hoped that the reformist candidate would win the election. Now Iran will see even tougher international sanctions, not to mention the military scenario favoured not only by "hawks" in the United States, but also by most of the political elite in Israel, the main US ally in the Middle East. Appealing to Israeli public opinion, Barack Obama expressed confidence that it is necessary to clarify Tehran's position by the end of this year when the image of the new presidency would take shape. With Ahmadinezhad's re-election, this "image" will hardly need to be clarified because it has clearly proved its worth over the last four years.

Meanwhile, the future of the expectations of the Iranian public from their country asserting itself as a great regional power is quite vague. In the Middle East, the ambitions of Tehran, which stakes on alliance with the radical movements Hamas and Hezbollah, clash with the interests of many Arab countries, not to mention the growing positions of Turkey in the region. However, Iran's imperial prospects in the South Caucasus where Tehran has been trying, during the post-Soviet period, to present itself as a player who has enough resources to force its own rules of the game look even more unconvincing. However, these resources are not that great, which is proved by the course of the negotiations on the issue of determining the legal status of the Caspian in which Tehran is opposed by the joint approach of the other littoral states to the issue of the sectoral division of the sea, and by the real positions of the Islamic Republic in Caucasian geopolitics.

The only country that Tehran can more or less rely upon in its ambitions in the South Caucasus is aggressive Armenia. Despite the occupation of 20 per cent of Azerbaijan's territory, Tehran considers it an honour to fraternize with Yerevan, which is counter to its claims as a promoter of Muslims' interests around the world.

Nevertheless, Azerbaijani-Iranian relations will remain neighbourly and mutually beneficial. The main guarantee for this is the independent and balanced foreign policy of Baku which does not allow one centre of power to attempt on the rights of another in its policy. Of course, Tehran officials understand this as well, though separate politicians of the Islamic Republic regularly dare to make statements against our state, which has nothing to do with the task of successfully developing the bilateral dialogue.