OPEN QUESTIONS AND CLOSED BORDERS

Our media and political circles have recently been busy discussing the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations, which is understandable given the direct link between the issue and the settlement of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. It is also natural that the issue should have taken centre stage in relations between Baku and Ankara. Great attention is also being paid in Armenia to the possible normalization of relations with Turkey, and the blame for the lack of normal relations and the so-called "blockade of Armenia" is laid squarely at Turkey's door.

Careful study of the true facts reveals that the thaw in relations between our two neighbours has not been equal on both sides. Moreover, these facts show that the claims of Yerevan and some Western media of a so-called Armenian blockade by Turkey are completely groundless.

Turkey was one of the first countries to recognize Armenia's independence on 16 December 1991 and since then it has unfailingly conducted a friendly policy towards its neighbour. Armenia, on the other hand, maintains its territorial claims on Turkey at the official level. Point 11 of the Armenian Declaration of Independence, adopted on 23 August 1990, says: "The Republic of Armenia supports the international recognition of the Armenian genocide in 1915 in Ottoman Turkey and Western Armenia." Thereby the declaration clearly shows that Armenia retains its claims on several eastern regions of Turkey, which it still calls "Western Armenia" and does not recognize as part of modern-day Turkey. 

Ankara's constructive approach towards relations with its neighbour is repeated in other interstate areas. In order to build confidence with Armenia, Turkey gave its consent to regular direct flights between Yerevan and Istanbul by Turkish company Fly Air and Armenia's Armavia Airlines, while charter flights are made between Yerevan and Trabzon and Yerevan and Antalya. Moreover, Turkey has opened unrestricted access to two air corridors, UM-111 and UB-374, in its air space for international flights to and from Armenia and every month gives permission for more than 100 flights across its territory.

On an official level the Turkish government has not forbidden and does not forbid its citizens and companies from trading with Armenia or from employing Armenian citizens. More than 50,000 Armenian citizens now live and work in Turkey. According to the Turkish-Armenian cooperation council, trade turnover between the two countries in 2007 topped $200 million which made Turkey one of Armenia's leading trading partners. This is quite a large figure in terms of the Armenian economy and in 2008 was even higher. These figures are, of course, lower than the trade between Azerbaijan and Turkey (around 1.5bn), but we have to agree that this is certainly no blockade.

Ankara does not object either to transit trade via Armenia and Turkey. Every year more than 4,000 Turkish lorries supply Turkish goods to Armenia via Georgia.

Turkey has also opened doors to Armenia in regional cooperation. It was Ankara that invited Armenia to become a founder member of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization, while Armenia now has its permanent representative to the organization in Istanbul.

At difficult times for Armenia, during a worsening of the energy crisis and natural disasters, Ankara has always offered help and support to Yerevan, which in turn has always turned it down.

As for humanitarian contacts, Armenian citizens can visit Turkey without restrictions on visas issued at entry points at airports on Turkish territory which are valid for 30 days. A similar rule applies to our country's citizens too. Armenia, however, has done nothing to help Turkish citizens visit Armenia.

There is, therefore, no foundation to talk about a Turkish blockade of Armenia or an embargo imposed by Ankara on relations with Armenia. The Turkish-Armenian land border is closed and that's all. And it's worth remembering that Turkey decided to close the border in 1993 for two very important reasons.

First, it was a response to Armenia's aggression against Azerbaijan. The closure of the border was a signal to Armenia that Ankara would not accept the occupation of its friend, Azerbaijan, and Armenia's disregard for four UN Security Council resolutions on settling the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. In other words, this was an act of support for, and solidarity with, the Azerbaijani people, who - and let's remember those difficult years - experienced real genocide and found themselves in a real information blockade. The only country to give real assistance - moral, political, diplomatic and economic - to Azerbaijan at that time was Turkey.

Second, this measure was a logical response to the hostile policy towards Turkey of all Armenian governments. In this regard, I will mention some instances which Ankara saw as evidence of hostility and territorial claims on Turkey. As has been mentioned above, point 11 of the Declaration of Armenian Independence refers to Turkey's eastern Anatolian region as Western Armenia, while Article 13 Point 2 of the Armenian Constitution refers to Mount Agri (Ararat), which is on Turkish territory, as a national symbol of the Armenian Republic. This is clear evidence that Armenia retains claims on some eastern regions of Turkey. Moreover, Armenia's National Security Concept, confirmed in January 2007, specifies Turkey as "an external threat to Armenia's national security".

In the light of the above, the Turkish side for a long time thought that Armenia should radically change its policy both towards Ankara and towards Azerbaijan and conduct a policy of respect for independence and sovereignty and other commonly accepted norms of international law. Only then would it consider the normalization of relations with Armenia and the opening of its borders possible. However, the Turks set the normalization process in motion without waiting for these changes. What has changed over the past years? What has happened to prompt Ankara's radical change in direction?

It can be said that everything has changed apart from Armenia's policy. Or in other words, everything has changed except what was the basis for the closure of the border. Turkey's combative attitude towards normalizing relations with its neighbour, which has not taken a single step towards formulating a more tolerant, respectful policy towards Azerbaijan or Turkey itself, is surprising.

It is understandable that Turkey's change of direction towards Armenia is dictated by several strategic foreign policy objectives. These are the neutralization of the Armenian lobby in the US Congress on the passing of a resolution on the so-called "Armenian genocide", the creation of a favourable background for talks on EU accession and the interests of Turkish business that is seeking to expand to what it sees as the attractive Armenian market. The ambitions of the ruling AK Party come into play here, which has got so carried away with the ideas of the Islamicization of Turkish society and Turkey's regional leadership that it has closed its eyes to the problems of its Muslim neighbour, Azerbaijan.

Foreign influence on Ankara should not be dismissed either - the USA and EU are clearly trying to use Turkey to achieve their strategic objective of breaking Armenia away from Russia. The reasonable question arises here - has Ankara weighed everything up in developing its "Armenian combination"? Has it thought through the possible consequences of its policy for relations with Azerbaijan and Russia? Taking into account the contradictory statements by the Turkish leadership, who have recently become frequent visitors to our capital, only now are they beginning to understand that "marriage to Armenia" will not come cheap in all respects. Moscow should also be considering the consequences. In the late 1980s the Armenian factor in Nagornyy Karabakh became the mechanism with which the USA and West managed to weaken Russia's position in the region. History could be repeated this time too.

Azerbaijan's position is of great significance in this situation. Fortunately, it is not emotional and has a distinctive healthy pragmatism. At its heart is the thesis that the formation of relations with neighbouring states is the sovereign right of Turkey. No-one is encroaching upon this right, nor are they entitled to do so. But while supporting this right, we think that Turkey, as a friendly neighbour and our strategic partner, should take the following into account: opening the border without any progress in the talks on settling the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict could have a negative influence both on the peace process and on security and stability in the South Caucasus, especially when the Armenian president, in practically all his official speeches both at home and abroad, makes categorical statements on the unacceptability of Baku retaining sovereignty over Nagornyy Karabakh.

So sending positive messages to Yerevan in the current conditions could be interpreted by them as encouragement to continue the occupation of Azerbaijani territory. This is unacceptable for Baku while other countries in the region have nothing to gain from this either. Turkey's new foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, in Baku compared unresolved conflicts with bombs that could go off at any moment. Presumably this was the impression conveyed to the minister, who paid an official visit to Baku on 26 May and had lengthy talks with the Azerbaijani leadership. Baku expects from friendly Turkey a real contribution to supporting the peace process and ensuring regional security and stability in the South Caucasus.