"BIG-TIME POLITICS" VERSUS "BIG-TIME DIPLOMACY"

Analysts described as a "Prague spring" the diplomatic efforts within the EU summit on Eastern Partnership in Prague:  a breakthrough in the settlement of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict was expected to occur.  Had the talks proved successful, May 2009 would have gone down in history as the beginning of positive changes in geopolitical processes in the South Caucasus, because two long-standing conflicts would have been resolved simultaneously, those between Armenia and Azerbaijan and Armenia  and Turkey.

All the meetings due to take place in Prague:  between Aliyev and Sargsyan, Aliyev and Gul, and finally, Gul and Sargsyan, did take place.  However, the results of these meeting are given diametrically opposite assessments in different sources; this, however, is not surprising.

For example, commenting on the results of the talks between the Azerbaijani and Armenian presidents, US mediator Matthew Bryza, who represents the United States in the OSCE Minsk Group, said that the presidents agreed on the main ideas of the basic principles of regulation.  The phrase sounds promising, but the only detail which we have managed to learn was that dialogue would soon continue in St Petersburg.  French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner admitted that the talks had been difficult. A good example was the "leak" of information to the Azerbaijani media:  they reported that Armenia had dramatically hardened its stand by returning to demands voiced as far back as two years ago and which had been turned down then, even by the co-chairmen of the OSCE.  Be that as it may, the expected breakthrough did not happen, once again because of Yerevan's uncompromising position.  The results of the meeting between the Azerbaijani president and his Turkish opposite number, and of the Armenian-Turkish talks, were also not commented upon in public.  Abdulla Gul gave quite a reserved statement, calling the meetings with both Ilham Aliyev and Serzh Sargsyan "successful".  The Arme-nian president said for his part that during the Armenian-Turkish talks, the participants agreed to "respect earlier agreements and move forward without preconditions and to a reasonable time table".

In the meantime, Turkish analysts stress that the dialogue between Armenia and Turkey will move forward simultaneously with an Armenian-Azerbaijani settlement.  Let us remind our readers that, if we take the Azerbaijani media at their word, Armenia has noticeably hardened its position.  Many analysts linked this to the Armenian-Turkish talks.  However, the possibility cannot be ruled out that the Russian factor was decisive here.  Indeed, against the background of a series of talks in Meindorf, first in autumn 2008 in a "1+1+1" format, and then in Russian-Azerbaijani and Russian-Armenian formats, Moscow clearly demonstrated its desire to win exclusive peacekeeping status.

However, the meeting in Prague, which had been prepared during talks between Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov, his Armenian opposite number Edvard Nalbandyan and US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in Washington, has clearly undermined Moscow's "peacekeeping monopoly".  Moscow must also have been alerted by the Armenian-Turkish dialogue.  The media actively disseminated reports about Turkey's decision on "reconciliation" with Armenia being influenced by Russia's demonstration of military might in the Caucasus, but things are not so simple in reality.  Even when the ink was still to dry on the "road map" signed by Turkey and Armenia, which caused quite a fuss, Vremya Novostey warned:  "If the Armenian-Turkish border opens, Russia's main ally in the south Caucasus (Armenia) will inevitably move towards Turkey.  The economy will help to heal old wounds.  And crossing the fences of two neighbours (Georgia and Azerbaijan) is always less comfortable than using the open gates of your own courtyard."

"The possibility of opening the border is an incentive which Turkey might offer Armenia in the big-picture bargaining over Karabakh, thereby sidelining Russia from its position as main 'patron' of Karabakh settlement," the newspaper wrote.  "Moscow has no such incentive, although it might have had one, had it not been for the August war (with Georgia) after which, incidentally, Russia is feared in Baku, Yerevan and Ankara alike, despite the large number of for-the-record statements about unchanging mutual respect."  The Russian mediator in Prague, Merzlyakov, managed to only partially alleviate Azerbaijan's caution, by stating that Russia does not plan to recognize the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh.  Russia has reliable methods of influencing its trusted satellite, Armenia, including domestic political levers.  Remem-bering the collapse of the ruling coalition in Armenia, and the withdrawal of the Dashnaktsutyun party soon after the publication of the road map, should suffice.  And experts say that the spring is only now beginning to recoil.  Of course, Armenians stress that dialogue with Turkey is taking place without preconditions, but this is impossible, even theoretically:  after all, even if the Nagornyy Karabakh conflict is set aside for the time being, the need for Armenian recognition of the Kars Treaty, that is to say, of its present-day border with Turkey, will remain.  For now, only political analysts and commentators - and perhaps opposition members of parliament - raise objections in this respect, but analysts advise us not to forget about quite a serious armed body of opposition to progress in the talks - the Karabakh separatists.  At any rate, while politicians in both Baku and Yerevan awaited news from the Prague meeting between the Azerbaijani and Armenian presidents, the Armenian Armed Forces began large-scale military exercises in the occupied territories of the Agdam District. This "syncing" was hardly accidental, especially as, on the other side of the frontline, no one tries to hide the fact that the talks cause no particular delight among Karabakh separatists.

The Golos Armenii newspaper - which, incidentally, is quite an official publication - wrote, when commenting on the then forthcoming meeting in Prague:  "Let us note that a number of pessimistically inclined analysts predict that, for now, events are unfolding according to the 'Turkish' scenario of 'synchronous regulation,' which is why, in the run-up to the Prague summit, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 'synchronously' invited the Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers to make it clear that Clinton intends to accelerate the regulation process both in Armenian-Turkish and Armenian-Azerbaijani relations, which is why Yerevan is under pressure aimed at persuading the Armenian side to withdraw its troops from five buffer districts which are under the control of Nagornyy Karabakh.  Presumably, this step might bring about some progress, not only on Nagornyy Karabakh, but also in Armenian-Turkish relations."  In the newspaper's opinion, "it is difficult for now to judge how realistic this scenario is, and to what extent it is imbued with the latest dose of Azerbaijani-Turkish bluff."  "At any rate, recent statements by the leadership of the Republic of Nagornyy Karabakh testify that Stepanakert does not like this scenario at all", the newspaper writes.

The same issue of Golos Armenii carried a significant interview with Major-General Arkadiy Ter-Tadevosyan, one of the Armenian field commanders during the war of aggression, by the Arminfo news agency.  "I came back from Kara-bakh just recently and am going there again for a few days.  I want to note that dramatic changes are taking place there.  In its state development, the Republic of Nagornyy Karabakh has reached a point at which it is quite capable of protecting itself from foreign threats independently," Ter-Tadevosyan said.  Another of his statements is even more notable:  "Karabakh residents live on their land, as they have for many centuries, and know full well how to defend it.  The only negative characteristic of the Karabakh resident is that he does not particularly strive to work peacefully.  On the contrary, it seems to me that the Karabakh resident waits only for a call for war to demonstrate everything he is capable of."

Of course, one could raise objections to what the general said:  while the monument erected to commemorate the 150th anniversary of the resettlement of ethnic Armenians from Iran was blown up near the village of Maraqa, this does not mean that Azerbaijani Karabakh khanate lands have indeed become "historically Armenian."  Not to mention the fact that both back then and later the resettlement of ethnic Armenians to Karabakh was accompanied by seizures of land and other property belonging to the local Azerbaijani population.  The point is that General Ter-Tadevosyan's complaints that the Karabakh residents are not particularly keen to "work peacefully" is eloquent proof that Nagornyy Karabakh today has become a huge military camp, in which the widely advertised "peaceful work on our own land" is ruled out of the question.

This heavy military fist is "assigned" to the names of Yerevan's puppets in Karabakh, who do not take part in the talks but who periodically say that if they do not like some document signed by Baku and Yerevan, they will take up arms.

In short, the ideal instrument for thwarting any agreement by armed provocation has been created in Nagornyy Karabakh.