MOSCOW GETS READY TO BARGAIN

The parliament (Jo-gorku Kenesh) of Kyrgyzstan has voted by an overwhelming majority (78 in favour, one against and two abstentions) to revoke the agreement with the USA on the air base at Manas international airport. The base was opened in Kyrgyzstan in December 2001 under a UN mandate to support the coalition forces' anti-terror operation in Afghanis-tan. Around 1,200 US servicemen are stationed at the base, along with military transport planes and refuelling planes.  After the bill has been signed by the president of Kyrgyzstan and the US side has been officially informed, the USA will have 180 days to withdraw its troops, hardware and equipment. Agreements are expected to be revoked on the stationing of troops at Manas from another 11 countries that are members of the anti-terror coalition. 

Back in 2005, Kyrgystan's newly elected president, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, demanded an increase in the rent for the base from $2 million to $200 million. The American side refused, suggesting instead an annual aid package worth $150 million overall, but with the direct payment for use of the air base limited to $17.5 million. Bishkek was very annoyed that the agreement included various projects, not terribly important ones at that, on which they would have to reach agreement with American experts and report back to them. The Kyrgyz authorities demanded a large, transparent rental payment for the use of the military site, but did not receive an acceptable proposal. Tired of waiting, the Kyrgyz government succumbed to a tempting Russian counter-offer to allocate the government $150 million (in addition to investments of $1.7 billion and the writing off of debt of $180 million) in return for expelling the American military from the country.   

Readying itself for dialogue and the establishment of relations with Barack Obama's new American administration, Moscow is reinforcing its bargaining position. It is obvious that it has set itself two goals. First, to get Washington to give up the roll-out of its global missile defence system (this refers to the anti-missile system in Poland and the radar in the Czech Republic) which could devalue Russia's nuclear missile potential. Second, Moscow wants recognition of its special role and responsibility in the post-Soviet area which would practically mean tacit acceptance that the CIS is Russia's sphere of influence, and that NATO or indeed political and economic projects that do not suit Russia should not be advanced in this direction. In response the Russian leadership is ready to collaborate constructively with Washington on Afghanistan, a Middle East settlement, the Iranian nuclear programme, North Korea and other issues. This is why, in order to raise the stakes in the eyes of the West, the Kremlin contrived the gas war with Ukraine at the start of the year, announced its intention to put military bases in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and, finally, achieved the closure of the American air base in Kyrgyzstan. At the same time, Russia invited the USA to talks on the transit of freight to Afghanistan across its territory. 

All this manoeuvring by Moscow has not gone unnoticed, although the reaction of the USA, the European Union and NATO will not necessarily be the one that the Russian authorities are expecting. US Defence Secretary Robert Gates said in Krakow, Poland, before the meeting of NATO defence ministers, that Russia is trying to derive benefit from all aspects of the closure of the American airbase at Manas in Kyrgyzstan. The Pentagon chief said the following, according to ITAR-TASS: "On one hand Russia is making positive noises about working with us in Afghanistan and on the other hand is working against us in terms of that airfield which is clearly important to us."

Nicu Popescu, a research fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations (London) thinks that the USA, Europe and NATO will look for alternatives to the Manas airbase. "The final exhaustion of the possibility of using Central Asia as a transit point will undermine US policy on stabilizing Afghanistan," the expert said. "We don't know what the consequences might be. They could be bad. The consequences of the closure of the base might be felt first by Russia itself and its allies in the region, for example Tajikistan. Russia will not manage to cope alone with all the problems in the post-Soviet area. This is partly because the majority of post-Soviet states do not want to remain alone with Russia. They are all actively looking for alternative centres in order to tack between Russia and other states. In Central Asia this is China, in the Caucasus the USA and to a lesser extent the European Union."

It is no surprise that for all its efforts Moscow is not managing to maintain the necessary obedience not only in the post-Soviet area but even within the ranks of the Collective Security Treaty (CST), a military-political organization under its patronage. Tajikistan, which is a signatory to the CST, has already agreed to the use of its railways and roads for the transit of non-military cargo to Afghanistan, American Rear Admiral Mark Harnitchek has said, according to Reuters news agency. "Washington plans to send 50 to 200 containers weekly from Uzbekistan into Tajikistan and then by land into neighbouring Afghanistan," the rear admiral said, adding that the USA has also received agreement from Uzbekistan to the transit. Moreover, Tashkent is behaving quite independently in relations with Moscow and it is possible that it might again allow NATO forces to be based on its territory, as was the case before the Andijan events. 

The USA is also considering basing the air forces it withdraws from Kyrgyzstan in one of the Caucasian countries or Turkey, to be more exact in Trabzon. This was reported by Turkish newspaper Hurriyet, quoting a source in the Pentagon. Another newspaper, Yeni Safak, also claims that if the Tajikistan and Uzbekistan options do not work out, Trabzon will be next and this is why the commander of the USA's Central Command, David Petraeus, intends to visit Turkey. 

However, the possible air base in Trabzon and the existing base at Incirlik are not that close to Afghanistan and in this respect cannot fully replace the closing Manas air base. Georgia would have been more suitable and Azerbaijan or Turkmenistan even better. Official Tbilisi has already expressed its readiness to support the USA and NATO. This was stated by Georgian Defence Minister David Sikha-rulidze, who was referring to the provision of air space for flights to Afghanistan, rather than the location of NATO military bases in Georgia. As for Azerbaijan and Turk-menistan, officials and the top brass of these countries are keeping quiet about this for now. There is not even any information on whether or not they have been approached by Washington or Brussels to provide the air force infrastructure to support the operations of the anti-terror coalition in Afghanistan. 

Clearly, the situation is more complex for Baku and Ashgabat than for the other countries. Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan will have to take account of the negative reaction from Iran as well as Russia to any agreement to put bases at the disposal of the US command and NATO. The rental payments and free "lessons in democracy" are not all that attractive to Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan which have significant financial reserves from the export of energy resources. It would be another matter if the USA and NATO were to come out decisively on Azerbaijan's side in stopping Armenia's occupation of its territory and would guarantee the country's territorial integrity and security. But it does not look as though Washington and Brussels are inclined to do that at present. In these conditions the USA and NATO should not hope for anything more than the provision of an air corridor and a symbolic increase in the Azerbaijani peacekeeping contingent in Afghanistan.

Moreover, Russia and Iran are not giving up their attempts if not to win over Azerbaijan to their anti-American and anti-NATO policy, at least to extract a promise from Baku to keep to a neutral line, similar to Turkmenistan's. Evidence of this is Russian Federation President Dmitriy Medvedev's lengthy phone conversation with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev on the eve of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's visit to Baku. The Russian leader briefed his Azerbaijani counterpart on the outcome of the CST summit and its decision to roll out "collective rapid reaction forces", official press services reported.

This was probably not just a briefing but a specific explanation on the part of the Russian leader. Some politicians, army officers and analysts,  Russian as well as Armenian, immediately began to speculate on the possible use of the CST mobile armed forces to support Armenia against Azerbaijan if circumstances should force Baku to resort to liberating its occupied territories by force. Clearly, the scandal over reports of the free transfer by Russia of some 800 million roubles' worth of weapons to its bridgehead in the South Caucasus, Armenia, could push Azerbaijan into closer cooperation with the USA and NATO. It is understandable that Moscow is trying in any way it can to neutralize any of Azerbaijan's fears and not let it move decisively into the Western military political orbit.

Today it is difficult to draw definite conclusions about the results of the new stage of the Great Game in the South Caucasus and Central Asia between the West, led by the USA, on the one side and Russia on the other. Especially since China is cautiously entering the game too. It is important for small countries like Azerbaijan to weigh up their actions accurately so that they don't fall under the grinder of the competing great powers and do make good use of the available opportunities to solve their own problems.