SUCCESS OR FAILURE?

On 21-22 May, the Latvian capital will host a high-level summit of the member states of the EU Eastern Partnership programme. It will discuss the achievements, shortcomings, and most importantly, the future prospects of this programme, as well as the broader European Neighbourhood Policy. In this regard, EU officials are writing numerous reports, and politicians, analysts and the media share their own analysis and evaluation. It is clear that the situation is seen differently from Brussels and the capitals of the partner countries. But the programme belongs to everyone, and this means that through public dialogue and final debate at the summit in Riga it will be necessary to come to a common denominator.

The author of the article had the opportunity to participate in discussions as a civil society expert during the formation of the European Neighbourhood Policy and subsequently, the EU Eastern Partnership programme. Since 2010, as a member of the Azerbaijani delegation, I have been involved in the work of the EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly. Therefore, I can quite competently judge the achievements and objective limitations of the programme.

The European Neighbourhood Policy, which was subsequently extended and supplemented by the Union for the Mediterranean and Eastern Partnership projects, was met with enthusiasm, which was unanimously expressed by both the EU and member states. Now after 10 years we have to sadly admit that the expectations of the parties were overstated and largely failed to materialize. As it turned out, participants in the Eastern Partnership programme included in it goals that differed in essential aspects, and it is not surprising that the results achieved were at odds with the expectations to an even greater extent.

It is no secret that many participants from Eastern European countries considered the European Neighbourhood Policy and in particular the Eastern Partnership programme as a preparatory step towards full membership in the European Union. Brussels officials, although they did not deny such claims, called for focus on a long process of reform and development to achieve compliance with the so-called Copenhagen criteria. At the same time, they encouraged a realistic focus on the formula: "Everything but institutions." After all, Brussels did not initiate the Eastern Partnership programme for the further expansion of the EU, but pursued a pragmatic goal of creating along the borders of the European Union a belt of friendly states closely related politically, economically and culturally.

It would seem that in this case, they ought to focus on support for stability in the partner countries, help strengthen their public institutions, resolve existing conflicts, improve border control and migration processes, establish cooperation on combating cross-border crime and develop transport, economic and humanitarian ties. However, in practice the emphasis in the Eastern Partnership programme was often shifted to the political and ideological plane and the promotion of "European values", and as a result, the actions of Brussels began to look like the formation of a kind of sphere of influence of the European Union. This is exactly how Moscow perceived the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership programme, considering them an attempt by Brussels to establish control over the European part of the former Soviet Union, which Russia is used to seeing as its own exclusive sphere of influence, especially as it received a formal offer to join this programme with the same rights and status similar to the rest of the six participants, i.e. become equal to Moldova and Armenia. Moscow considered it beneath its dignity and chose a bilateral format of cooperation with Brussels.

Not being able to influence the course and content of the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership programme from inside, Russia put forward its own alternative integration initiative - the Customs Union and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), presenting the post-Soviet countries with a hard choice. This is particularly evident in the case of Armenia and Ukraine. The Armenian leadership initially unanimously stated the impossibility of joining the EAEU and declared its readiness to sign the Association Agreement with the European Union, but then, after 30-minute face-to-face talks between President Serzh Sargsyan and Russian leader Vladimir Putin, they unexpectedly announced that they were joining the Eurasian Economic Union. Hesitations between the EU and Russia cost President Yanukovych power, and Ukraine itself - the loss of the Crimea and the crisis in the south-east. Ultimately, Kiev and Brussels signed the Association Agreement, although they had to take into account certain objections from Russia about the timing of its implementation. In Georgia and Moldova, the process of signing the Association Agreement led to no apparent disasters, but there is no certainty that problems will not arise later. Certain symptoms of this are being observed, and perhaps Moscow only postponed active countermeasures because of its reluctance to spray its forces when the main question - Ukraine - is being resolved.

Azerbaijan, in contrast to the abovementioned members of Eastern Partnership, did not speed up the conclusion of the Association Agreement and emphasized issues of practical importance. Baku signed with Brussels an agreement on visa facilitation and on cooperation mainly in the field of energy security, as well as education and tourism. In addition to the already implemented project of the strategic Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, work has been launched on the Southern Gas Corridor, which includes the South Caucasus Pipeline, TANAP and TAP. The scale of partnership between Azerbaijan and the EU can be characterized by the fact that this project, the driving force of which is Baku, entails financial costs in the amount of 45bn euros, while Brussels has set the overall budget of Eastern Partnership until 2020 at 16bn euros.

The reason for Azerbaijan's restraint stems from the sober consideration of possible benefits and losses from the Association Agreement with the European Union. Whether we like it or not, the fact is that these agreements cause a negative reaction from Russia. Despite all our independent foreign policy, we, Azerbaijan, should not ignore the negative attitude of Russia to EU integration projects and the strong anti-Western phobias of Iran, with which Azerbaijan has a nearly 1,000-kilometre border.

As for the benefits of the Association Agreement with the European Union, it does not yet look convincing. Have Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, which have advanced further than Azerbaijan in European integration and have signed the Association Agreement, made progress in resolving the conflicts with separatist entities in their territories? Let's assume that in the case of the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagornyy Karabakh conflict Brussels is hiding behind the OSCE Minsk Group. But in the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict in Moldova, the South Ossetian and Abkhazian conflicts in Georgia, and now the conflict in Ukraine, the European Union is one of the main moderators. Unfortunately, not only the positive results of the mediation efforts, but even these efforts themselves are not visible. The confrontation with Moscow has only exacerbated the situation in these countries.

We cannot say that as a result of the rapprochement with Brussels and distancing themselves from Moscow, Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine made visible progress in the economic development and welfare of the population. These countries are among the poorest in Europe. Industry and agriculture continue to decline in them, there is very little direct European investment, and EU grants, though important for these countries, are not able to drastically change the economic situation.

Azerbaijan is in a different position. Energy comprises 97 per cent of the country's exports to Europe and does not need restrictive barriers to be removed. At this stage, Baku does not consider it appropriate to hastily open its domestic market. Foreign investment is coming on a significant scale anyway, and not only for financing oil and gas projects. Azerbaijan's own financial reserves are impressive (about 50bn dollars) and we do not particularly need European Union grants that are small by our standards.

Taking into account these considerations, as well as the fact that, unlike Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia and Belarus, Azerbaijan has no direct communications with the EU and maintains them through Georgia and Turkey, Baku prudently did not show haste in the matter of signing the Association Agreement with the European Union. The Azerbaijani leadership offered Brussels to conclude a separate bilateral agreement on strategic partnership, which would reflect the mutual interests and wishes of the parties. The question is being studied and worked out. I should note that exercising certain restraint in the rapprochement with the European Union, Baku shows no interest in the Moscow-sponsored EAEU and prefers to build partnerships with member countries of the union on a bilateral basis.

Judging by the results, the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership programme did not achieve its stated goals. Instead of stable and prosperous neighbours around the perimeter of the European Union from Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Syria to the South Caucasus, Moldova and Ukraine, there is a belt of countries with internal instability, terrorist threats and active centres of separatism and armed conflicts. Most of the partner countries of the European Union cannot get out of the depressive situation, while in some there is clear regression and decline. Against this background, the problem of uncontrolled migration has worsened, and there are dangerous cases of penetration by terrorists and armed gangs into the territory of the EU.

Obviously, the European Neighbourhood Policy requires deep rethinking and pragmatic correction. The most important thing is to free it from confrontation and prevent it from being perceived as a fight between the European Union and Russia for an exclusive sphere of influence. Of course, Russian claims to define instead of partner countries how they build relations with Brussels are unacceptable. But ignoring the legitimate interests of Moscow is erroneous, and as experience has shown, is unproductive. Russia should have its voice in this programme, but not dictate. It is simply impossible to solve many problems without its constructive engagement. It is expedient to shift the emphasis in the European Neighbour-hood Policy to the promotion of conflict resolution, achievement of civil peace and public safety, strengthening of local government and legal institutions, business development and economic growth. The regulation of migration flows, freedom of movement and foiling of terrorist threats and cross-border crime remain important.