THE PACT IS NOT A FACT

The initiative to establish the Caucasus Pact on Stability and Cooper-ation (CPSC), which Ankara put forward after the five-day war between Georgia and Russia, is still the most important issue on the regional agenda. Due to the presence of an Armenian component in this initiative, it immediately took a special place in Azerbaijani-Turkish relations. Since Turkish diplomacy is currently making active efforts to promote this pact (sometimes it is called a platform) in its dialogue with Baku, Moscow, Tbilisi and Yerevan and it may have serious consequences for our country as well, it is important to return to this subject and dwell on its main goals.

The international and European factors

What goals did Turkish diplomacy pursue by putting forward this initiative? The Turkish leadership itself probably has a sober assessment of the prospects for the CPSC. Does Ankara not understand that it will be quite difficult to put Moscow and Tbilisi, and Baku and Yerevan "at one table" within the framework of this pact, especially in the current stage when the political-diplomatic phase of the Georgian-Russian conflict is no less important than its military stage?

In our view, Turkish politicians are still realistic and have pragmatic motivations. From the very beginning of the conflict, Ankara avoided falling out with Moscow and condemning its policy, but at the same time, it could not but support Tbilisi on fundamental issues of sovereignty and territorial integrity, especially as Tbilisi was strongly backed by the main NATO allies of Turkey. As a result, an idea was put forward to unite this double position into one regional initiative which would cover up the shortcomings of Turkish policy on this conflict and help it solve its tasks in this region. Turkish President Abdullah Gul said that his country "is not an enemy of any other country in the region" and that the conflict between Georgia and Russia showed the need to take "urgent measures to resolve frozen conflicts in the Caucasus".

For this reason, we believe that the most important task of this initiative, which was designed first of all for international, including European public opinion, was to demonstrate that Ankara is keeping abreast of the events and is still an important regional player and peacekeeper. 

At the same time, hoping to strengthen Turkey's positions in the EU accession talks, Ankara sent a message to Europe, saying that they can rely on Turkey in a critical period and that it can play a constructive role in the settlement of severe regional conflicts that pose a threat to European security. In other words, as a promising member of the EU, Turkey may become a reliable "pillar" of the security of the European Union.

Moreover, the initiative to establish the pact should be examined in the context of its current foreign policy doctrine which is based on a formula of "strategic depth", i.e. the establishment of strong relations with all the regional neighbours (Iran, Russia, the South Caucasus and Middle East countries) and with countries of Africa, Latin America and other "untraditional" regions.

The Armenian factor

In terms of Ankara's interests, the Armenian component is one of the most important components of the pact - the possibility of using the CPSC to boost the Turkish-Armenian dialogue on the normalization of bilateral relations. Turkish politicians unanimously say that Ankara must change its relations with Yerevan for the better. This policy is based not so much on pressure from the USA and the EU as Ankara's desire to strengthen its regional positions, to play a more noticeable role in the South Caucasus and to get additional dividends in its dialogue with Russia (it is of benefit to Russia to eliminate the isolation of Armenia, even at the expense of Turkey, after the closure of the Russian-Georgian border) and with the USA and the EU.

Thus, the rapprochement with Armenia within the framework of the pact may allow Turkey to solve several important foreign policy tasks at once. First, it may neutralize Russia's opposition to the strengthening of Turkey's positions and its more active role in the South Caucasus. We should repeat - eliminating the isolation of Armenia, which strengthened after the Georgian-Russian conflict, meets the interests of Moscow. Second, this factor plays a great role in Turkey's future negotiations with the EU. This is not a key factor, but its positive use, or to be more precise, the intensification of the dialogue within the framework of the same pact may create a favourable atmosphere in this process and give Ankara an extra vote of support in countries like France where the Armenian diaspora has strong positions. And finally, the victory in the US presidential elections of Barack Obama who is known for his strong and principled support for the recognition of the so-called "Armenian genocide" may result in US Congress adopting a bill on the recognition of the "Armenian genocide" for the first time in relations between the USA and Turkey. Obama is known for his principled position and has promised the Armenians twice to ensure that the House of Representatives adopts the so-called resolution. In order to prevent the initiative of the new US administration, Ankara decided to seriously demonstrate its intentions to improve relations with Armenia. And the idea of the pact is quite suitable here.

In this regard, we can suppose that the five-sided format of the pact was meant to be an "umbrella" that covers negotiations between Ankara and Yerevan and an idea that makes the negotiations between Ankara and Yerevan more legitimate and the Turkish-Armenian dialogue on the normalization of bilateral relations more comfortable and "protected" from Baku's dissatisfaction and criticism. Within the framework of this initiative, Ankara believes, the dialogue between the two countries will not cause harsh opposition from Azerbaijan. In this regard, Turkish Daily News quoted an anonymous Turkish diplomat as saying that "though we do not have any diplomatic relations, we recognize Armenia". He also said that Armenia's absence from the Ankara-sponsored mechanisms of Caucasus cooperation will be tangible because it is Armenia that sustained more losses from the recent war in the region. Meanwhile, Yerevan has already positively reacted to Ankara's initiative, saying that Armenia has always supported dialogue and negotiations, especially on issues of cooperation and security in the region.

The Russian factor

The fact that Ankara does not strongly support the territorial integrity of Georgia like other NATO countries also proves that the pact is aimed at securing a rapprochement with Russia. Turkish journalists stress that today Turkey supports this principle with regard to Georgia in quite a reserved manner and refrains from any criticism of Moscow. Moreover, Turkey realistically assesses the situation and does not rule out the secession of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. That's to say for Ankara it is more important to maintain good relations with Moscow due to the strategic nature of these relations, Russia's importance as a partner in the energy sector and the possibility of using Moscow as a counterbalance in Ankara's complicated relations with Washington on the Iraq and Kurdistan issues.

It is important to note here that Moscow also has an interest in good relations with Ankara. The thing is that both countries have a single attitude to the issue that is becoming quite important today - a foreign military presence in the Black Sea. Both Turkey and Russia believe (in contrast to Ukraine, Georgia and Romania) that the Black Sea is a zone of influence only for littoral states and are against the strengthening of the presence of NATO and the EU here. Turkey's position is that any strengthening of the foreign military presence (of non-Black Sea countries) in the Black Sea will lead to the "erosion" of the 1936 Montreux Convention under which Turkey controls the passage of military vessels from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea through the Bosporus and the Dardanelles. Incidentally, the fact that Ankara closed the Bosporus and the Dardanelles to the US navy for several days shows that it has no interest in the strengthening of US positions in the Black Sea.

Russia is an ally of Turkey on this issue. It has no interest in the strengthening of US and NATO positions in this region. Moscow clearly opposes the presence, including military, of NATO, the EU and the USA in the Black Sea, as it might neutralize its influence in this region. From this point of view, Russia could not but welcome one of the features of Turkey's initiative - its purely regional nature and the fact that it is closed to the USA and NATO, at least in the current stage.

All this allows us to say that one of the aims of the Caucasus pact is to demonstrate readiness for more mutual understanding with Russia not just on the South Caucasus, but also on the Black Sea issue. Amid US and NATO attempts to increase their presence in the Black Sea under the pretext of aiding Georgia, both sides have an interest in supporting each other. The format of the pact may be quite convenient for the Turkish-Russian dialogue and interaction on this issue.

Thus, the pact revealed at least three directions in which Moscow and Ankara have common interests - eliminating the regional isolation of Armenia, a strategic ally of Russia; countering the increasing strengthening of US positions in the Black Sea region, including through Georgia; and the possibility of coordinating their actions on the Kurdish and Iraq issues as Ankara needs Moscow's support to solve them. Since their interest converge, Moscow is quite likely to support this project. In this case, the pact may well become a tool for the strengthening of Turkey's positions in the region.

The American factor

Washington is an unnecessary element in Ankara's project - at least in the current stage. This is no accident. We think that by putting forward its initiative, Ankara tried to send the USA and NATO a signal that it will be conducting its own policy in this region, ignoring the position of Washington and Brussels. The more the USA insists on the establishment of a de facto independent Kurdish state in Northern Iraq, which has become a bridgehead for Kurdish separatists, the more persistently Ankara will pursue this policy.

And finally, the Azerbaijani factor

Baku may be the only side that will suffer from the implementation of the Turkish initiative. Indeed, we have no reason to oppose this project. The initiative must be welcomed because the project is purely peaceful and is aimed at stabilizing the situation in the region. At the same time, the intensification of the dialogue between Turkey and Armenia under the aegis of this project and the stage-by-stage normalization of relations between the two countries may have a negative impact on Azerbaijan's interest, i.e. strengthen Armenia's position in the Nagornyy Karabakh settlement and weaken that of Azerbaijan. The best way out of the situation could be an appeal to our Turkish partners that the rapprochement between Ankara and Yerevan should not outrun the Nagornyy Karabakh settlement process and should be totally linked to Yerevan's readiness to take serious and constructive steps towards a fair solution to this conflict on the basis of the principles confirmed by the well-known UN Security Council resolutions which envisage respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our country. Turkey itself admits that only this version of the pact can be given "the green light" in Baku.

In parallel, Azerbaijan should be more active in the Russian and Greek directions and in its approaches to the problem of the Cyprus settlement. It is quite possible that this activity will be correctly assessed by the USA and the West which are behind Ankara, and by Ankara itself.