HOPES AND REALITY

The talks between the presidents of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Russia in Moscow will remain the focus of international attention for a long time to come. A majority of analysts believe that the Moscow declaration on the regulation of the CIS's oldest regional conflict, together with the "Caucasus platform of stability and cooperation," proposed by Turkey, were manifestations of the "intensification of peacekeeping activities" in a region shaken recently by what is described in politically correct fashion as the "five-day" war between Russia and Georgia. Apart from anything else, the war left no doubt that "frozen" conflicts are still conflicts and cannot forever remain "frozen," especially as the "freeze" proved to be not as deep as everyone had hoped.

Obviously, for Moscow the talks about Karabakh were first and foremost an attempt to re-establish its image as the peacekeeper in the CIS area, an image which had been tarnished by the war with Georgia. Russia understands that regulation of the conflicts is the best way to widen its influence in the region.

Just before the talks, the notorious Aleksandr Dugin who, if we take the word of the Turkish justice system, was a link between the Russian special service and plotters from the Ergenekon group, voiced his opinions on the prospects and agenda of the Moscow meeting. The chief "Eurasianist" was clearly trying to give the impression that in abandoning its position of unqualified support for Armenia, Moscow is changing direction and seeking contact with Baku. Answering a question as to whether recognition of Karabakh could be on Moscow's agenda, Dugin said: "Currently, this is not urgent. It is much more important to establish strategic partnerships with Turkey and Azerbaijan. From the viewpoint of specific geopolitical interests, in order to counter the Atlantic strategy, at a regional level Russia needs at least Turkey's strategic neutrality and an alliance with Azerbaijan, more than anything else. We have "squeezed" out all we can from our strategic alliance with Armenia. Armenia's strategic position is such that it cannot give Russia more than it already has, whereas the positions of Azerbaijan and Turkey are very important now."

But what Mr Dugin and the people behind him are ready to give Azerbaijan in return for a strategic alliance remains an open question, because the very same "geopolitical specialist" said openly that the "very legitimacy of post-Soviet borders might come into question because within the limits of the Soviet Union, a single unitary state, borders had no national importance, they played an administrative and territorial role, like, for example, districts in the city of Moscow."

"It is important to realize that the borders we are talking about are a kind of convention, recognized rather hastily as fixtures in international law, without any historical justification or consideration of ethnicity. Naturally, this has given rise to endless problems, including the Karabakh conflict. I am certain that any form of annexation of this territory by Azerbaijan is unrealistic. Yes, administratively it was under Azerbaijan's control, but Armenians have lived there from time immemorial.  Armenians have some negotiating positions in the regulation of their status, but the main plan will be to eliminate the United States from the negotiating process as an absolutely destructive, mentally challenged and amoral power which complicates the situation wherever it goes and creates the conditions for new conflicts," Dugin maintains. Let us remind readers that Matthew Bryza is the only co-chairman of the OSCE Minsk Group to make direct statements on the need to resolve the conflict in Krabakh within the framework of the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan.

Nor was Yerevan particularly optimistic on the eve of the Moscow meeting. For example, Yuriy Simonyan, staff analyst for the South Caucasus at the Nezavisimaya Gazeta, headlined his article on the forthcoming presidential encounter, "Fruitless Activity."  "What are the Azerbaijani and Armenian presidents going to bring to Moscow?" - the journalist asks in a rhetorical question. "Alas, nothing really: their agreement to meet and discuss the Karabakh problem can be explained more by their respect for Dmitriy Medvedev's proposal than by their readiness to take practical steps toward the resolution of the problem itself. Shortly before the meeting, they engaged in polemic and demonstrated once again that Baku's and Yerevan's positions on issues relating to the self-declared 'Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh,' (our quotation marks here and below - editor's office) are diametrically opposed, and there are simply no levers to be seen which could bring their positions closer." In the journalist's opinion, "at present, there are no grounds or reasons to hope that Dmitriy Medvedev will manage in some way to unblock the situation and bring the sides to an agreement on the issue of Karabakh's status. Observers think that it would be very handy for Moscow: after the August war and the recognition of Abkhazian and South Ossetian independence and, to a lesser extent, because of the failed mediation in Transdnestria, Russia's reputation in the international arena has suffered. A breakthrough in Karabakh would bring Moscow serious dividends. In this light, Moscow's activity on the Armenia-Azerbaijan issue seems logical.  It is unlikely, however, to prove fruitful, at least in the near future."

Nonetheless, at first sight the success of the Moscow meeting seemed assured. The first document on the regulation of Karabakh for 14 years was signed by the three presidents. In the French newspaper Le Monde's assessment, it is not a roadmap in the strict sense of the word, but serves the purpose of reaffirming the need for a "political solution" backed by "international guarantees" and discussed within the framework of the OSCE Minsk Group of which Russia, the United States and France are co-chairs.  Furthermore, it is clear that Russia did not strive to justify its "mediation mission" out of spite for the OSCE and even issued statements in appreciation of the Minsk Group and its co-chairs.

In the mean time, it is hard to disagree with those who believe that the Moscow declaration contains no real commitments. The document says nothing about the recognition of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity by Armenia, neither does it mention the parties' obligation to refrain from the use of force. And, most importantly, the declaration does not answer the question of when Armenian troops will be withdrawn from Azerbaijan. However, the declaration also has many positive aspects. Most importantly, it brought what is written on paper closer to what is going on, or at least should be going on, in reality. First and foremost, the declaration is written in a way which states a clear and simple premise: the conflict should be regulated first, before the sides can begin discussing economic cooperation. In addition, the declaration was signed by the Azerbaijani and Armenian presidents without the participation of the separatists from Nagorno-Karabakh. Former Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan has already made a statement on this, having stressed in his interview with A1+ that the declaration signed in Moscow will "once and for all bury the decision by the OSCE Budapest summit of 1994, in which the 'Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh' was recognized as the third and fully-fledged party to the conflict.  And this means that Karabakh will play no role in the further talks that will determine its future."

Let us ignore Levon Akopovich's claims that the "Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh" - note the "republic," not the "ethnic Armenian community of Karabakh" - was legitimized in Budapest as a party to the conflict.  Especially as only recently, Armenia used as this type of "recognition document" the Bishkek protocol which, strictly speaking, was not a legal document.

The main point is that the declaration signed in Moscow without the participation or presence of the Karabakh "authorities" might indeed become the object of noisy speculation both in Yerevan and in Xankandi.  At the same time, we all know that every journey begins with the first step. Naturally, the first step does not mean that the journey will be completed, especially as, thus far, Moscow has failed to achieve the main goal of Karabakh regulation, the withdrawal of Armenian troops; this renders meaningless any talk of progress. Of course, theoretically, and taking into account Russia's influence on Armenia, we may imagine that Moscow could put pressure on Yerevan and force it to withdraw its troops. However, although Le Monde says that Serzh Sargsyan denied, during his trip to Paris, that such pressure takes place, this is widely discussed in the region. At the same time, Armenia makes it quite clear that the once-loyal Russian "outpost" might take offence. For example, on the eve of the meeting, Armenian Foreign Minister Edvard Nalbandyan said, when commenting on the possibility of deploying peacekeeping forces on the territories adjacent to Nagorno-Karabakh, that it was too early to talk about that, but, if needed, the peacekeeping contingent must be multinational: "It would be desirable to deploy a contingent from more than one country, to ensure an international presence in Nagorno-Karabakh." The hint is quite transparent. Armenia does not want to be "Russia's outpost" any longer, without an appropriate return for its love in the form of others' lands. Already, after the meeting in Moscow, one of the initiators of the separatist movement in Karabakh, Igor Muradyan, who now introduces himself as the "Head of the US and Regional Policy Department of the Political Studies Institute," complained in the official newspaper, Voice of Armenia, that "there is no doubt now that Russia views its ties with Armenia only in the context of promoting its relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey. Russia's plans for the Karabakh problem are increasingly evident and envisage the complete withdrawal of Armenian troops from Karabakh, handing five, and later seven, districts to Azerbaijan, returning the so-called Azer refugees, the deployment of peacekeepers in the conflict zone - but effectively in Karabakh - and absolute neglect of the issue of status, which will be postponed for 10 or more years. This is nothing but a further division of Armenia by the same partners. Both in the 1920s and 1940s, Russia tried to win Turkey to its side, gambling on anti-imperialist sentiment in Anatolia, but it has invariably received a bloody nose instead of favourable access to the Black Sea straits."

Obviously, in the minds of Mr Muradyan and the Voice of Armenia newspaper, only ethnic Armenians can be refugees, victims, and so on; ethnic Azerbaijanis, or "Azers," cannot.

Let us also leave Mr Muradyan's deliberations on the plans to deploy Russian peacekeepers in Karabakh to his conscience.  First of all, there is no official confirmation that such plans exist. In addition, the Moscow declaration does not state anywhere the need to introduce measures to strengthen the cease-fire status of which, logically, deployment of peacekeeping forces should be part - not to mention the fact that the export of peacekeeping efforts is the last thing on Moscow's mind after the replacement in Georgia of the Russian "peacekeepers", who degenerated into marauders and occupiers, by EU forces.  What matters is this:  Yerevan was clearly unready for the fact that Russia does not want to become embroiled in a war with Azerbaijan and Turkey - and therefore, with the whole of NATO - by promoting its ties with Armenia. As a result, Mr Muradyan is already accusing Medvedev of every deadly sin: "As for Dmitriy Medvedev, according to my information, he all but heads the Azerbaijani lobby in Russia:  we know enough about his close ties and interests to make this statement. Many high-level officials in Russia are identified, first and foremost, as lobbyists for Azerbaijan, and only then as officials who occupy various posts. There are too many "gas men" and "oil men" in the Russian government these days." Then he comes up with a recipe for how exactly Armenia should behave to avert a "catastrophe." "Perhaps I will convey here not my own opinion, but that of leading Russian political analysts who have been propounding for many years the idea of 'freezing' the Karabakh problem. It would be unreasonable to react angrily or resort to the United States for help. In this situation, when the very fact that Karabakh belongs to the Armenian people comes into question, it would suffice for Armenia to say 'no,' a resounding 'no.' In that case, Russia would have no argument and no opportunity to continue pushing its plans. Russia will not insist any longer than it already has." When journalists asked what would happen if Armenia did not say its resounding "no," Mr Muradyan said literally the following: "In that case we need to stop sacrificing the ethnic Armenians of Karabakh like sheep at an altar and try to find the money to enable the residents of Karabakh to move to other districts of Armenia or, preferably, to other countries." However, there is plenty of evidence to support the theory that Yerevan banks on taking advantage of the omission of the "Karabakh authorities" from negotiations to thwart the peacekeeping process in the region.

It would seem that the "groundwork" for this type of "Karabakh demarche" has already begun, following the Moscow meeting. Strategic Culture Fund [as published] staffer Andrey Areshev said in his interview with a PanArmenian correspondent that in the third clause of the declaration, the parties "agree that the achievement of peaceful regulation must be accompanied by legally binding guarantees of all of its aspects and phases."  "For now, neither the level of these guarantees nor their specific parameters can be inferred, and one important reason behind this is that Nagorno-Karabakh does not take part in the talks between the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders. If they talk, say, about the deployment of some peacekeeping force in the 'security belt,' this might lead not to peace, but to a defrosting of the conflict, because the key problem of the status of Nagorno-Karabakh remains unresolved."

"Yerevan will never be able to surrender the 'security belt' territories and this issue, which is of so much interest to the Azerbaijani side, cannot be resolved without the involvement of 'Stepanakert' (quotation marks by the editor's office) as an independent actor in the negotiating process (in accordance with the decisions of the 1994 Budapest summit and other fundamental documents on the regulation of the Karabakh problem).  Trust-building measures set forth in the declaration are more than appropriate, but without the participation of the 'Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh,' they will remain just good wishes," Areshev said.

Let us note, however, that the Karabakh separatists have more than once made it clear that they will raise categorical objections to the withdrawal of Armenian troops - according to the official theory, because of fears for their security. Unofficially, however, it is a question of the business interests of local tycoons: poppy fields, terrorist camps and illegal checkpoints on the border with Iran, through which most drug trafficking and over-felling of forests occurs....

And in this situation, both Yerevan and Moscow will find it easy to put into operation a considerable military force "on behalf" of the Karabakh Armenians, unleash a new conflict in the region and so on. At any rate, the fact that after Medvedev's visit military exercises were held in Karabakh in which troops simulated an "offensive operation" and all this happening after determined recommendations to attack everywhere from Yevlax to Mingecevir, to cut off the railroad and all oil and gas pipelines cannot be considered an innocent prank any longer. Furthermore, it is possible that this scenario coincides with Moscow's plans; it is not involved in peacekeeping out of altruism, but out of a desire to control a region in which conflicts remain Russia's main lever of influence.