GEORGIAN LESSONS

The conflict over Abkhazia and Georgia has reached a stage where it is possible to take stock and predict how the situation will develop. 

A not insignificant aspect to the Georgian-Russian conflict is the absolute clarity of the positions of the different camps that are involved. Two of them adhere to radical positions while the third can be provisionally described as "moderate", an adherent of so-called Realpolitik. 

Three camps 

Russia dominates the first camp in almost splendid isolation, as its supporters - Nicaragua, Hamas and Hezbollah - do not have much clout in the West. But Moscow is dictating its rules of the game. It has adopted the West's principle of taking action with future steps dependent on a position of strength and the current situation taken as an objective given. True, Moscow has already played its "knight" and will have to defend its position in future, as its room for manoeuvre has significantly narrowed. Nevertheless, Russia will gradually expand its camp, and the first signs of how it intends to do this can already be seen. It looks as though it is a matter of buying up the votes of opponents of the USA, in particular the left-leaning countries of Latin America. Events show that Nicaragua did not simply support Moscow and recognize Georgia's mutinous regions. In the second half of September it emerged that Russia had expressed its readiness to help Nicaragua build a transcontinental canal to compete with the Panama Canal. Experts think that construction of the canal will cost 18 billion dollars. The Nicaraguan authorities think that the canal will be used to capacity by the growing trade between China and Latin America. Moreover, Venezuelan leader Hugo Chavez wants to redirect oil exports away from the USA to China. China is ready to ship oil from Venezuela in gigantic tankers and may also invest in construction of the canal. 

After this, it emerged that Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega is holding talks with the leaders of other Latin American countries on the recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. 

It is hard to say how much time, effort and resources this will require, but the outline of the Russian camp is already becoming visible. 

In the second camp are the supporters of a tough response to Russia's actions. They are the USA, Great Britain, the Baltic states, Eastern Europe and Ukraine. With the exception of the first two, they all think that they are facing a real military threat from Russia. 

In the third camp are the fans of "a free lunch" - they are mainly countries whose economy (or, to be more accurate, fuel supplies) depend on Russia but who are politically part of the Western democracies. Germany, Italy and, to a certain extent, France dominate here.

It is not worth expecting any changes at the moment in the position of Russia, which has recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. This is what President Medvedev said recently, straight after his latest round of talks with his French counterpart Nicolas Sarkozy. It would be illogical to expect the Kremlin to take a step back in the current circumstances when it has made itself feared by its actions (which it has been trying to do all these years) and when the UN has no rapid and effective mechanisms. And no, no-one is planning to fight a war against Moscow.

The second camp - the radicals - is in no state to do anything concrete, as this would require unity in the whole Western democratic camp, which is lacking at present and cannot be expected any time soon. And the European Union, which hasn't taken shape properly yet, is too amorphous and inert, the UN Security Council is hostage to the veto, which Russia wields, etc. And the future of the camp's main leader - the United States - is not clear, as it is going through a complicated election marathon. Despite the tough rhetoric by the main candidates for the White House, we all know full well that in the USA election promises and declarations are one thing and keeping promises in practice is quite another. After the election of the new president, the anti-Russian position may be slightly softened or strengthened, but the foreign policy direction will remain the same. 

The power structure in the USA has long depended on two "monsters" - the grey cardinals - the military-industrial and energy complexes. Something akin to mutual understanding that existed between the two has recently been disrupted. Open confrontation can be seen, which does not escape the notice of Western political commentators and politicians. But both these lobbies are no supporters of cooperation as equals between Washington and Moscow.

As for Georgia itself… Unlike Azerbaijan, which thanks to its skilful leadership has managed to maintain its voice and is continuing to conduct an independent, moderate, foreign policy, Tbilisi has turned into a tool to be manipulated by the opposing sides. 

The third camp, well aware of the danger of the prevailing situation, admits that if appropriate action isn't taken, the echo of Kosovo, reverberating in Georgia, will ring out and not just once more. In the current circumstances of total, legalized disregard for all the previously existing international norms the consequences could be catastrophic. However, the addiction to imported fuel, on the one hand, and the desire to disassociate themselves from the overheated policy of the USA (in circumstances when the latter has complete domination and dictatorship), on the other, have done their work. These two factors have led to the Old World in true elderly style trying to take considered steps, even to the detriment of all international norms which are supposed to be Europe's main priority.

Cards up their sleeve

When many Western countries recognized Kosovo's independence, Russia said in reply that it had an appropriate response. And even then everyone knew what Moscow meant. These assumptions were confirmed by the Kremlin's action in supporting separatist regimes on Georgian territory. 

But could Russia go even further, as Ukraine, with its explosive Crimea, fears? Is Russia capable of seizing the peninsula, perhaps even by force? 

After all that we've seen, we have to think that there can be no absolute "no" on any issue involving Russian politicians. But probably this will not happen in the near future. 

First, Moscow is still waiting for a response from the West to its action in Georgia. And despite the euphoria of victory, its pride is wholly satisfied at present. 

Second, it is very difficult to predict the outcome and consequences of the current political upheavals in Ukraine. It may all turn out to be highly satisfactory to Moscow, even without military intervention: Ukraine's pro-Western, democratic camp, that is, their current leadership, are constantly running a temperature.

Third, Russia has savoured the economic delights of invading Georgian territory and this has been instructive: the terrible fall in the market, the disastrous flight of capital, the fall in the oil price, which its whole economy depends on. Should there be a repetition of the Georgian events somewhere else, for example, in Ukraine, no-one can be sure that in just one month's time the Russian government will have the funds to pay pensions and benefits. And they know from bitter experience in Russia what a social crisis means. 

However, the world realizes that the most dangerous thing it could do is wake the sleeping bear. When daily bread is on one side of the scales and "great power prestige" on the other, the latter always weighs the heavier, even if this leads to disaster and shortages for the former. The West has been given a fine example that, in dealing with Moscow, talking from a position of strength does not produce the desired result. The question of Georgia is already a matter of prestige for the West, although Tbilisi may well become the chess piece that is sacrificed for the sake of a greater victory. 

The economy is the only more or less fair arbitrator in the latest political crisis over Georgia. The West has got a plan of action against Russia without having to make any special effort: the possibility of economic pressure. 

And this process is already under way. US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice hinted as much in her speech at the Marshall Fund: "To reach its full potential, Russia needs to be fully integrated into the international political and economic order.  But Russia is in the precarious position of being half in and half out.  If Russia ever wants to be more than just an energy supplier, its leaders have to recognize a hard truth:  Russia depends on the world for its success, and it cannot change that." 

Yes, but no-one has cancelled their dependence on Russia's fuel reserves yet.

The fuel reserves are the main provider of budget revenue. They allow the Kremlin to look optimistically at boosting the military-industrial complex - one of Russia's main arguments against the West, as the latter tries to surround it with a NATO ring. The recent downward trend in the oil price has given much food for thought. This might become a constant process and knock from under Russia's feet the final argument and hope for the restoration of its own political pole in the international system. The fall in oil prices did not look logical and many experts are inclined to see an "imperialist plot" behind it, as would have been the case in Soviet days.   

Moscow, having practically accepted the West's challenge to renew the cold war, should remember the lessons of the collapse of the USSR, which got bogged down in the arms race during a sharp fall in the oil price. It is enough to look at the Belovezhskaya agreement of 1991 to see how it all ended. After all, Russia's federal structure today and its multi-ethnic population are reminiscent of the former Union model…

The US secretary of state made another remark in her Marshall Fund speech, worthy of note: "Whatever its course, though, Russia today is not the Soviet Union - not in the size of its territory, the reach of its power, the scope of its aims, or the nature of its regime.  Russia's leaders today have no pretensions to ideological universality, no alternative vision to democratic capitalism, and no ability to construct a parallel system of client states and rival institutions.  The basis of Soviet power is gone." 

Yes, that's all true. But the remark that Russia does not have the power of the USSR is accompanied by a clear reference to the existence of the USSR and its future fate, even despite all the power and attributes listed by Condoleezza Rice.

"The process has started…"

Whether or not Georgia and Ukraine should be accepted into NATO is now being hotly debated. Almost everyone in the West is nodding in assent, but with the proviso that it is too soon to do it now. 

First, Georgia does not meet the main criteria for NATO states, especially with events in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Second, Ukraine's political future is still uncertain. Third, while the Russian Federation is enjoying the euphoria of victory and the West is hysterically helpless, unable to find any quick way to restore the status quo, the West understands full well that it is not worth annoying Moscow further, which has made plain its opposition to NATO's expansion. It has no way to respond to Moscow, as nobody wants nuclear war…

It's not difficult to see that at the last NATO summit Georgia and Ukraine were practically promised membership, but now are likely to be offered just a membership action plan. Moreover, the NATO powers themselves recognize that this is certainly no guarantee of NATO membership and Ukraine, and especially Georgia, do not look capable of clearing this hurdle.  

So first, the backlash from the West is obvious and, second, Ukraine and Georgia are likely to share the fate of Turkey, which has long been knocking at the door of the European Union. "But nobody is saying that Turkey won't eventually join the EU, are they?" Western politicians say as they put up the barriers against Turkey. 

So the West will act slowly, but doggedly, using the only effective means of pressure against Russia - economic pressure. Depending on the sustainability and length of this action, the result will be quite lamentable for Moscow.

But there is a "but": supporters of Realpolitik may get the upper hand in the West and in a year or two they may convince the others that it is not worth "stressing themselves out" over countries such as Georgia. This is made more likely by the vanguard of the anti-Russian camp, the USA's, weakening domination of world politics. 

However, Moscow will not thaw out completely. True, Moscow does not expect this, nor is it looking for it: the Russian electorate is happy with the current situation in the political arena with all the consequences of this for the Kremlin. And recent history has shown that no-one in Russia is concerned about what will happen in the long term. A short-term tactical victory is far more important there than a long-term strategy which no-one will think about…

But as the last president of the USSR said, "the process has started". And we just have to wait to see where it will lead…